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Preface 
 
 
 
This collection of papers is a response and contribution to the challenges of the third pillar of the 
Responsibility to Protect principle. This pillar focuses on the international responsibility to take timely 
and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in those instances where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population. As RtoP 
moves further away from discussions on norms towards operationalization, and following the concerns 
raised by the intervention in Libya, further thinking and clarity needs to be developed on the capacities 
needed for a timely and decisive response under pillar three. 
Indeed, NATO’s activities over Libya in pursuit of UN Resolution 1973 have again raised questions 
over the timeliness, legitimacy, proportionality and effectiveness of military action. Such issues have now 
been made more acute given the emphasis on the operationalisation of the RtoP principle, which has 
strong support from regional actors such as the European Union. There is a need to analyse the 
consistency, legitimacy and effectiveness of pillar three tools such as economic sanctions, diplomacy and 
civilian and military responses, especially in terms of how they impact on and complement preventive 
and re-building strategies. 
These questions become all the more important given the United Nations report on the “The Role 
of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” (27 June 
2011), plus the upcoming 2012 UN General Assembly interactive dialogue on ‘third pillar’ 
operationalisation of RtoP. This is an essential time to open up a policy and scholarly debate on the 
extant capacities of the UN and regional actors to effectively engage in pillar three of RtoP, as required. 
The collection of papers aims to provide substantive input for that interactive dialogue. 
This collection of papers also forms the basis of a public event held on the 26th April 2012 in 
Brussels at the Global Governance Institute – Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The workshop 
was organized by the Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the 
Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. The 
workshop provided an opportunity for policy experts and scholars to discuss their findings and 
recommendations and encouraged further debate on RtoP's third pillar with a diverse group of civil 
society partners. This collection of papers was presented first to the Office of the Special Advisor to the 
UN Secretary General on RtoP. 
The organizers wish to thank all of the authors in this collection for their respective contributions 
and dedication. Each paper offers a rich contribution to the debate on RtoP’s “third pillar”. The 
organizers would also like to thank the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
the European Union and Vesalius College - Vrije Universiteit Brussel for their assistance and input. 
Finally, special thanks must go to the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect for their 
generous contribution to this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Fiott, Robert Zuber and Joachim Koops 
Brussels 
25 April 2012. 
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Introduction 
 
DANIEL FIOTT 
 
 
Diplomatic, economic and military intervention remains one of the most contentious issues in international 
relations. Justifying intervention for the protection of civilians, even with the consent of the Security 
Council, makes the issue no less controversial or complex. This is hardly a new phenomenon. The humanists 
and Thomists once debated the justifications for and merits of intervention. The humanists were more 
inclined to justify intervention to halt "barbaric acts", whereas the Thomists questioned under whose 
authority the right to intervene could be given.1 The enduring tension was - and remains - between the 
sovereign right of a nation to be "free" from external interference and the "right" of other states to uphold 
human protection and dignity on a global basis. This tension has been greatly exacerbated by the processes of 
globalization. This is an era where globalized markets and finance, not to speak of challenges such as climate 
change, continue to test the resilience and authority of the state. The traditional unit in international politics 
is undergoing a long and drawn out crisis of identity and purpose. Added to this existential crisis are 
increased global media coverage of mass atrocities and the participation of civil society: "empathy without 
borders". These factors have made debates about intervention all the more acute and controversial. 
The RtoP principle has been both an intellectual and practical response to the crisis of sovereignty. RtoP 
seeks to stress the importance of "shared sovereignty" by entrusting states with the primary responsibility to 
protect populations with the support of concerted international action, and, should states be unable or 
unwilling to protect populations, to mobilise political and diplomatic tools – including, as a last resort, the 
use of force – to restore responsible sovereignty. This is an approach that was accepted by a majority of states 
at the 2005 World Summit. Yet critics of the principle point to the need to maintain traditional concepts of 
sovereignty: with the emphasis on non-interference. This claim partly derives from the perceived insecurity 
that might result from the undermining of the rules of the international system, at least as they have been 
enshrined since the signing of the UN Charter in 1945. Sovereignty is a precious element in the lives of 
governments and individual rulers, yet sovereign recognition occurs both at the domestic and the 
international levels.2 While it is true that notions such as "sovereignty as responsibility" cannot exist without a 
system of sovereign states, when sovereign power is contested or when it is concentrated in the hands of those 
who would abuse it the potential atrocities remains. 
The development of RtoP as a norm has seen it increase in complexity. This is particularly the case when 
one considers the moves to operationalize RtoP and its 'third pillar' approach; this pillar being geared to 
timely and decisive responses by the international community should a state be unable or unwilling to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities. While the third pillar approach is not just restricted to military 
intervention, the recent example of the NATO-led intervention of Libya (2011) has again raised the 
importance and contentiousness of using force to protect civilians. Indeed, the implementation of Resolution 
1973 in Libya has highlighted concerns related to the timeliness, legitimacy, proportionality and effectiveness 
of military action. Furthermore, military action in Libya has raised questions about how the use of force sits 
alongside other pillar three tools such as preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and restrictions and 
civilian protection missions. There is also the question of how pillar three tools in turn complement 
measures that are aimed at ensuring states meet their sovereign responsibilities in the first instance (pillar 
one) and to assist states in this task if needed (pillar two). 
This collection of papers provides a greater understanding of the range of peaceful and military 
measures and tools used under the third pillar of RtoP. The collection is a contribution to the development 
of further thinking and clarity on the capacities needed for timely and decisive responses to mass atrocity 
crimes. The contributions offer the reader methods and policy options for improving the legitimacy and 
consistency of the third pillar approach. 
                                                           
1 R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
2 S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
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Robert Zuber's chapter on building confidence and trust in third pillar response capacities provides a 
valuable perspective on the role of trust-building in developing a viable toolkit that would enhance the UN's 
capacity to prevent mass atrocities. Drawing on direct interaction with UN delegations, Zuber explores 
diverse options for trust-building to enhance the critical third pillar of RtoP. Following on with the issue of 
trust and legitimacy, Kate Seaman's chapter focuses on the shift in focus to regional organizations and the 
increased tendency to subcontract peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions from the UN to a variety of 
regional organizations including the EU, the NATO and the African Union. The chapter then examines the 
inherent dangers in removing international control of these operations including the challenges of legitimacy, 
accountability, resources, and capabilities. Peiran Wang’s chapter on China's role in implementing RtoP 
discusses the reasons for China's persistent cautiousness to non-consensual force, and its reticence about 
applying sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organizations. 
Discussion then moves on to capabilities. David Curran's chapter on the level of standby effectiveness of 
the EU for RtoP deployments is illuminating in this regard. After giving an overview of how the EU has been 
envisaged as a vehicle for the spread of Human Security, and an examination of how well prepared military 
and civilian peacekeepers are for intervention in RtoP-style operations, the chapter asks whether there exists 
an "expectations/capacities gap" between the values and capabilities of the EU. Looking at the prospects for 
and challenges to a robust civilian protection doctrine, Robert Schütte's chapter argues that neither the UN 
nor NATO have a comprehensive civilian protection doctrine, which could guide future Mass Atrocity 
Reaction Operations. Schütte's chapter makes an interesting exploration into the potential problems 
associated with the use of airborne capabilities as opposed to ground forces.  
Sheri Rosenberg's and Ekkehard Strauss’ chapter articulates a standard for the implementation of the 
RtoP that strikes at the mid-term prevention level. They show how this point is one where risk factors can be 
assessed with sufficient certainty to predict future developments and prevention tools are known to us. This 
standard, the authors argue, will narrow the boundaries within which decisions over the appropriate practical 
policy responses can occur. In his chapter on the lessons learned from the case of Libya, Ruben Reike argues 
that the Libya crisis provides the opportunity to clarify the role of pillar three in RtoP’s under-developed 
preventive dimension. The chapter also argues that the Libya crisis suggests that the tools that are usually 
listed under pillar three might be of key importance for preventing mass atrocities in an immediate phase. 
In the chapter by Conor Seyle and Eamon Aloyo the premise is that business is particularly relevant to 
RtoP. Drawing on historic cases as well as more recent business participation in democratic movements and 
the RtoP intervention in Libya, this chapter argues that business has the capacity to bolster the effectiveness 
of third pillar interventions and moral, legal, and economic reasons to do so. Looking at the gender 
dimension, Melina Lito's chapter argues that little attention has been given to how women can become full 
partners in prevention and implementation. Given RtoP's growing prominence as a key focus of the UN's 
security responsibilities, the chapter suggests that it is important to look at ways for women to become full 
participants in the formulation of RtoP policy and in the implementation of broad ranging RtoP mandates to 
halt mass atrocities and protect civilians. In the final chapter Caroline Fehl discusses the theoretical rationale 
for using two non-military – sanctions and criminal prosecution - strategies under RtoP and highlights the 
potential pitfalls inherent in both. Fehl argues that where criminal prosecution is concerned there may be a 
risk of counterproductive and destabilizing effects on conflicts and peace processes and that there is a danger 
that sanctions and trials are instrumentalized as symbolic responses to atrocities.  
The chapters to come then are ambitious in scope and cover a broad array of subjects related to the 
implementation of RtoP’s “third pillar”. Owing to issues of time and space, however, there are a number of 
areas which this publication has been unable to fully address including: the views of major players like India, 
Russia and Brazil; an analysis of region-based capacities and leadership on third pillar tool development and 
implementation; a contribution on the role and limits of the UN Security Council’s norm setting on atrocity 
crime prevention; a connection between RtoP’s “third pillar” and the “second” and “third” pillars; and an 
international law perspective looking at issues such as “just war”. Given the breadth of issues related to RtoP, 
there will undoubtedly be more subjects to consider. That said, each contributor in this publication has 
something interesting to say on the topics covered, which will undoubtedly give rise to further thinking on 
the operationalization of the norm. The editors of this publication feel certain that this is a constructive 
contribution of recommendations to continuing efforts aimed at further understanding and debating 
Responsibility to Protect’s third pillar. 
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A Living Trust: Strategies for Sustaining and Growing Support for Third Pillar 
Response to Threats of Mass Atrocities 
 
ROBERT ZUBER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The issue of trust has been an important one for both our organization and our partners for some time. As 
noted in a paper that we wrote recently for the Brisbane-based journal, Global Responsibility to Protect, ‘whether 
we wish to acknowledge it or not, trust issues permeate all security policy deliberations, including recent 
discussions at UN headquarters focused on building acceptance of the RtoP norm and laying out plans for 
the full implementation of all three of its programmatic pillars’.1 
While we celebrate the strategic efforts that have allowed the norm to find its place in the mainstream of 
UN security concerns, we also believe that serious obstacles to full implementation remain that can only be 
addressed through sustained attention to 'softer’ forms of diplomatic engagement. This must be focused less 
on dividing states by alleged levels of support and more on helping states overcome reasonable concerns 
related to the capacity of the UN to provide fair, transparent and robust response to atrocity crimes across a 
spectrum of threats. Specifically, we believe that more attention must be paid to providing reassurances that 
the UN system is prepared to do whatever is needed to ensure that our responses to the threat of mass 
atrocities are as principled as our aspirations to address such crimes in the first place. 
In light of the upcoming General Assembly debate on the “third pillar” of RtoP, this unique 
opportunity must be seized in all global regions for collective examination and assessment of “third pillar”, 
last-resort, coercive responses to threats of atrocity crimes. Moreover, the potential long-term implications of 
this examination, including building more durable and dependable bonds of trust between RtoP advocates, 
diplomats and policymakers, will only grow in importance. 
The priority of Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) on trust-building had its 
genesis in the context of our project to develop a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS). The UNEPS 
project calls for a standing, complementary, service integrated, rapid response capacity. UNEPS is being 
designed to more effectively energize what are often insufficient diplomatic engagements and more coercive 
responses that are often controversial in their mandates, late arriving in the field, and with insufficient 
capacity to address violence which often evolves and escalates in the gap between mandate and deployment. 
UNEPS is the latest iteration of a long line of proposals to create standing peacekeeping capacity at the 
UN. Juan Mendez, former Special Advisor to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, has 
noted that ‘UNEPS [could be] to protection what the International Criminal Court is to accountability’.2 
While a UNEPS-style service might well turn out to be a “game changer” in terms of UN capacity, it evokes 
considerable caution and even consternation from governments. For the most powerful states, the thought of 
the UN having direct access to deployment capacity not under their full control raises suspicion. And for the 
less powerful, providing the Security Council with another coercive option when the Council has not 
demonstrated its ability to handle existing options with sufficient fairness and care evokes great unease. Thus, 
while many policymakers and diplomats we have interviewed actually welcome the idea of UNEPS, they 
cannot easily overcome the multiple trust barriers that impede progress towards its eventual adoption. 
Our work in the area of “trust-building and the third pillar” has led us to organize many regional 
meetings and produce some publications, largely inspired by a former GAPW staff person, Kavitha 
Suthanthiraraj, and by an affiliated researcher in Australia, Annie Herro. Using our regional meetings as 
opportunities to conduct interviews and arrange for others, Suthanthiraraj and Herro examined the multiple 
levels of trust that must be addressed if states are to feel comfortable endorsing (and paying for) a “third 
                                                           
1 R. Zuber & A. Carolina Barry Laso, “Trust but Verify: Building Cultures of Support for the Responsibility to Protect Norm”, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 3 (2011) pp. 286-300.  
2 J. Méndez “Standing for Change in Peacekeeping Operations”, UNEPS Secretariat (2009), p. 46. See: 
www.globalactionpw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/standing-for-change-final-09.pdf. (Accessed 12 April 2012).   
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pillar” tool such as UNEPS. Their research conclusions found their way into a paper, Trust and the 
Development of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service3 that elevates a dimension of social change often 
overlooked (and at times even scorned) by academics, policymakers and even some civil society advocates – 
the need to cultivate trusting relationships to enhance the feasibility of new security ideas, tools and policies 
within multilateral frameworks. 
Their findings and recommendations for GAPW and our network have been tweaked several times over, 
but the course on which they have set us is one we are pledged to keep. At the end of the day, as members of 
civil society with a clear vested interest in RtoP effectiveness, our wish list for the “third pillar” is predicated 
on our determination and willingness to partner with state actors, academics and other policy stakeholders in 
the creation of political conditions conducive to response options on atrocity crimes worthy of broad and 
sustainable government support. In the end, a more robust culture of trust is at least as important to 
successful “third pillar” capacity development as technical competence.  
 
 
Pillars of Trust 
 
 
From the outset we acknowledge, as we have done in other speeches and publications, that trust is difficult to 
quantify. It relies on the willingness of some to offer assurances and demonstrate due diligence in policy 
formulation and implementation, in part by eschewing policy short cuts and in part by striving for policy 
inclusiveness. But it also requires others to accept the assurance offered and to respond in kind where 
appropriate; in the case of RtoP, giving up what Mendez referred to as ‘excuses for refusing to rescue lives at 
risk.’4 In the multilateral setting of the UN, trust is more about effectiveness than friendship, but both are 
challenging to define and promote. Given the lack of clear benchmarks when it comes to trust-building, 
many decide to stick with narrow policy priorities and eschew more complex, more complementary and 
perhaps more “personal” engagements. But relevant categories and principles do exist that can guide the 
trust-building pursuit, help remove incentives to hide behind excuses, and enhance opportunities for open 
assessments of challenging or controversial response options, such as many proposed for the “third pillar” of 
RtoP. 
We have identified three inter-related “pillars” of trust to complement the three pillars of RtoP 
response: trust in the effectiveness of the norm and its diverse tool kits; trust in the sincerity and diversity of 
those promoting the norm and its tools; and trust in the independence and transparency of the organization 
or organizations that are tasked with “hosting” and nourishing the norm and strategies for implementation. 
We will offer a brief analysis of each. 
 
i. The first pillar of trust relates to levels of confidence in the norm and its existing and proposed 
implementation tools. While there is still skepticism regarding strategies and commitments for its 
implementation, the norm itself has won broad (if not always active) support from a wide range of states. 
While perhaps too much was made of the consensus adoption of the norm at the 2005 World Summit, 
there is little doubt that UN officials and RtoP advocates have successfully nullified much of the original, 
overt concern about the norm, in part by pointing to the growing consensus that in certain instances 
sovereignty must 'soften' enough to embrace collective security frameworks that include protection of 
civilians. This success is also tied, we believe, to the deep resonance of a “responsibility to protect” with so 
much in our lives beyond policy. Our language, especially within the contexts of family and school, is 
replete with protection references. Symbolically, we place versions of “protect and serve” on our police 
and emergency vehicles. Safety has become such a preoccupation that, at least in the US, we could easily 
be accused of fostering a culture that minimizes challenge and suppresses risk-taking. 
                                                           
3 A. Herro and K. Suthanthiraraj, Trust and the Development of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, paper first delivered at 
the International Studies Association Annual Conference in New Orleans, (18 February 2010). See:  
http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/reports/UNEPS_report.pdf. (Accessed 12 April 2012).  
4 Op.Cit., “Standing for Change in Peacekeeping Operation”, p. 44. 
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The point for us is that, thankfully, the norm is now firmly established. The lingering trust questions 
for states and others mostly relate to the gaps between these protection values we affirm and the tools and 
policy actions that flow from those values. Most of us have had bad experiences with people and 
institutions claiming a value “high road” but acting in ways more akin to a roadside ditch. And diplomats 
sometimes use value-laden language as much to brand a government interest as to commit to actually 
improve circumstances on the ground. Given these mixed priorities, the RtoP community must insist that 
proposed “third pillar” capacities to address the threat of mass atrocities are governed by the values 
underlying the norm itself. We equally question any attempts to use the norm as “cover” for hastily 
conceived responses to the threat of mass atrocities, or as justification for inaction. 
 
ii. The second pillar of trust relates to those primarily responsible for defining, refining, promoting and 
operationalizing the norm. Up until recently, this group has been modest in size and largely western in 
orientation, training and physical appearance. There is a small group of advocacy and policy organizations 
which has become almost synonymous with the defense and application of the norm, at least within the 
RtoP community itself if not beyond. Part of this is related to the natural evolution of norms, which are 
proposed first by a small group and then struggle to find broad based endorsements. But there has also 
been concern expressed to us often that we in the RtoP community (including GAPW as well) are more 
intent on maintaining our place at the table than doing what is needed to make the norm as universally 
accepted and effectively implemented as possible. We have spent too much time selling a norm we don't 
own and too little building bridges with persons and institutions with complementary mandates and 
policy concerns. We have acted as gatekeepers for involvement instead of investing energy in creating 
larger and more representative spheres of interest and engagement. 
In building this broader community, there are two issues about which we need to be cognizant. First, 
we must acknowledge the degree to which current capacity levels are ill equipped to deal with the wide 
ranging challenges associated with synchronizing all aspects of our preventive and reactive toolkit and 
then subsequently demonstrating the legitimacy, fairness and effectiveness of those tools to often wary 
global audiences. Even with a recent and most welcome burst of attention by younger scholars and 
policymakers to the norm and its potential, we are woefully short of resources to handle all of the 
challenging political and technical responsibilities needed to instill state and civil society trust in a still-
evolving framework. 
Second, there is an expressed need to ensure that the “toolmakers” represent, as much as possible, 
the full spectrum of state and civil society interests. It really does matter which persons are on stage and 
whose faces are in front of the camera. The more controversial and profound the matter at hand – and 
“third pillar” implementation capacities and strategies would certainly qualify – the more important it is 
to insist on diverse leadership in all phases of policy and practice. In the context of RtoP, we can do more 
to ensure that states and their citizens most likely to become the object of “third pillar” response have 
every relevant opportunity to contribute to and help assess existing and proposed “third pillar” capacities. 
For us, this upcoming GA debate is merely the latest opportunity to help broaden and diversify 
participation. 
 
iii. The final pillar of trust is related to the capacity of the host institution – in this instance the UN – as a 
reliable 'home base' to handle the grave responsibilities of timely and decisive response. On this point, the 
jury is still out. The multilateral system in which we do most of our work is one in which trust-building 
and integrated security concerns seem forever subsidiary to state priorities and discrete policy interests. It 
is also a system with some fundamental security-related inequities, including the dominance of the five 
permanent members (P5) of the Security Council and the wildly divergent staff capacities of diplomatic 
missions that make it almost impossible for smaller countries to keep track of issues – from illicit arms to 
civilian protection – on which they should have the opportunity (and the incentive) to weigh in. All of 
this reinforces systemic imbalances at the UN which, as noted by Henry Farrell, highlight difficulties in 
maintaining conditions of trust in situations of extreme power disparities.5 Furthermore, the UN 
represents a system – from largely unaccountable major powers to NGOs content to “swim in their own 
                                                           
5 H. Farrell, “Trust, Distrust and Power” in Russell Hardin (ed.), Distrust, (Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), esp. pp. 8-15.   
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policy lane”, that often appears closed to the full range of voices that have a direct stake in ensuring that 
the international community acts as an honest, trustworthy broker for global security interests, including 
applications of the “third pillar” norm tasked with preventing and, if necessary, halting atrocity crimes 
against vulnerable civilian populations. 
The role that the UN is choosing to play in atrocity crime prevention has life saving implications – 
with able direction from the joint office (Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect) and other 
sectors of the secretariat as well as significant input from the state “friends” of RtoP, other governments 
and various NGOs. Despite several political miscalculations and needlessly stubborn capacity gaps, the 
UN still maintains legitimacy on security matters that regional organizations struggle even to approximate. 
But the responsibility embedded in our responses to mass atrocities is as grave as the crimes to which 
response is so often desperately needed. Many sectors of the global community still have serious 
reservations about the ability of the UN system to “raise its game” on atrocity crime response. Those 
sectors are likely to be satisfied only with “full spectrum” responsibility while protecting that considers the 
longer term implications of coercive measures and makes provision for robust prevention before Council 
authorization of coercive force is even at issue. Clearly more trust-building, grounded in transparent 
activities designed to “get prevention right”, must be integrated into our collective strategic plan if the UN 
is to ensure sustainable progress on norm implementation. 
 
 
Lessons for Trust Builders 
 
 
There is no “playbook” for increasing reservoirs of trust with regard to “third pillar” response capacities. But 
there are useful guidelines. Some of these flow from the previous section, specifically the need to ensure 
diverse leadership and spokespersons so that people can interrogate their responsibilities under the norm 
from people whose word they are more inclined to trust. But there are more.   
 
i. First, we must listen more attentively to the concerns of states and civil society rather than dismissing, 
categorizing or demonizing those concerns. There are many lessons to be learned about handling 
objections in UN contexts, but two stand out: first, articulated objections are rarely as toxic as silent ones, 
and thus objections shared should always be properly and even gratefully heeded. Some states, for 
instance, are uneasy about RtoP implementation tools that give yet more power to a Security Council that 
has not always been the fairest or most transparent steward of the norm and its values. And such concerns 
once expressed and then ignored do not easily disappear. Indeed, they tend to deepen in their reactive 
patterns. 
At the UN, state objections to RtoP can certainly be both repetitive and tiresome. And, of course, 
motivated as much by political positioning as by a desire for clarity on policy or responsibility. But 
repetitive political rhetoric can characterize policy expressions by RtoP supporters as well. States that 
support the norm will also use the upcoming GA debate to rehash statements from previous years that 
contain no new recommendations for implementation capacities, no deep recognition of the bottlenecks 
in the UN system that prevent us from being seized of matters at the earliest possible stages, and no 
recognition of what they have learned since the last debate on the regionalization of RtoP and all of the 
hand-wringing over Libya and Syria. 
This shortage of attentiveness and humility is not a new problem. The US theologian, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, like many so-called Christian realists in the mid-20th century, did his best work in an era of wars 
and rumours of wars. Niebuhr would likely have warmed quickly to the RtoP norm. This point was 
reinforced for me in the context of an email conversation (about UNEPS) I had a while back with Sir 
Brian Urquhart, one of the great statesman of the UN in its history and someone also intrigued by 
Niebuhr's thought. But there is a caveat amidst Niebuhr’s receptivity – while endorsing the norm he 
would be cautious about the ability of policymakers, let alone governments, to fully grasp the staggering 
implications and responsibilities that the norm's implementation suggests. From our standpoint, if there 
is any place in the UN system where “business as usual” should yield to a sober and almost sacred sense of 
responsibility, it is in the area of atrocity crime prevention. There is simply too much that can go wrong, 
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even at times when we are trying our very best to address wrongdoing without contributing to its toxic 
after effects. 
But for Niebuhr, acknowledging an awesome and uncertain duty does not in any way imply shirking 
from its responsibilities. There are too many instances where even supportive governments make excuses – 
of time, of resource, of will – to keep from taking a long hard look at our existing response tools and 
capacities and to make honest, humble and transparent assessments of what are still largely precedent 
setting actions. 
Policy is an inexact science that seeks to blend national interest and the common interest – as well as 
decisive response and deep humility – that can point the way for more timely and effective relief for 
citizens suffering under incompetent, indifferent or even malevolent governments. As such, we must 
ensure careful attention to precedent as well as the need for prompt response. When Niebuhr noted 
during the tumultuous debates in the US about entering the second war against Germany (an entry he 
supported), that ‘the evils against which we contend are often the fruits of illusions similar to our own’,6 
he was underscoring the imprecision of so many major policy decisions, the precedents we establish 
without our full awareness. He was also highlighting the need to listen harder and evaluate more 
judiciously.  
 
ii. We must also ensure that our resources (time, talents and finances) confirm, as best as we are able, our 
most important institutional values. In the case of atrocity crimes prevention, there are obvious deficits in 
the architecture of response – especially on the “upstream” preventive capacities – that can be filled with 
sufficient will and resources. 
As Human Rights Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley noted recently at a two-day panel at UN 
Headquarters on how to make human rights treaty bodies more effective (an event that was not attended 
by any recognized RtoP advocate), that Sixth Committee discussions on funding treaty bodies reminded 
him of politicians in the US who try to convince voters that they can lower taxes and provide heightened 
levels of service at the same time. 
With all due respect to the need for resourcefulness in application, our willingness to commit funds 
to get implementation tools properly designed, vetted and deployed in the service of atrocity crime 
prevention is a major dimension of trust-building. We must be cost-effective but not stingy if we expect 
others to accept with confidence our jurisdiction over these critical responsibilities. It is much more 
expensive in currency, lives and political capital to drop bombs than to create credible information on 
mass atrocities and eliminate bottlenecks in the system that prevent such information from becoming 
actionable at earlier stages.  
 
iii. A third issue of trust involves clarifying the opportunities and limitations of our own authority. UN 
headquarters is an odd place insofar as it seemingly commands great authority but without many decision-
makers actually in residence. Governments are represented in New York, but decisions on policy are 
largely made in capitals. UN secretariat staff members pose variable levels of challenge to governments, 
but most recognize that the large powers play a more formidable role in policy than all but the most 
charismatic, senior secretariat officials. 
For their part, academics have the capacity to explore policy inconsistencies, contexts and 
implications in ways that generally elude policymakers, but they also tend to be more concerned with the 
opinions of the 'trend setters' in their academic fields and are thus often rendered more marginal to policy 
discussions than they could be. 
And what of the NGOs? Well, we clearly are not decision-makers, nor do we as a group pay much 
attention to what diplomats are thinking about and committed to in order to help them make better 
decisions on critical security matters such as RtoP. Our institutional propensity for branding rather than 
collaborating, for settling for the easy political consensus at the expense of the hard political questions, for 
practicing relationships with diplomats predicated on solicitation rather than partnership, continues to 
                                                           
6 Quoted in A. J. Bacevich, “Illusions of Managing History: The Enduring Relevance of Reinhold Niebuhr”, (9 October 2007). 
(Lecture available at:  http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/08152008/profile3.html).  The reader may also wish to consult, 
Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
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rob us of what authority we have. We simply have not done enough to ensure that, on RtoP, all political 
and geographical contexts have been explored and duly integrated, all relevant voices have a place at the 
policy table, and all critical ideas that have not been put to rest have been put to work. Trust-building in 
the UN system is partially our responsibility as well, and we need to be more resolute in this challenge.  
 
iv. More than anything, our primary trust-building task is to demonstrate, in word as well as deed, our 
commitment as a policy community to get atrocity crime prevention “right”. The norm itself does not 
suggest obvious pathways to implementation any more than a theological principle immediately suggests a 
pathway for faithful living. It is an arduous task to ensure that all the tools and capacities we need – both 
before and after the Security Council is seized of a challenging circumstance – are in place, fully 
functional and sufficiently complementary. But more than arduous, it is essential to trust-building. States, 
like individuals, will tolerate mistakes in judgment or policy as long as they can see that robust, good-faith 
efforts are being undertaken. But in a system that is generally unwilling to be seized of deadly challenges at 
early stages, that does little assessment of its actions, and that literally bristles at the suggestion that 
someone might want to apologize to the global public for serious policy mis-steps, trust will be more 
difficult to attain than it probably should be. 
Whether we like it or not, the higher the stakes regarding a particular policy challenge, the higher the 
bar on trust-building is likely to be. If we believe that RtoP is a permanent game changer, if we believe that 
we have all helped set in motion a process that can eventually bring response tools and political will and 
diplomatic wisdom into a decisive and harmonious engagement with the threat of atrocity crimes, then we 
must set high standards for trust-building. Towards that end, we must do more to help states at early 
stages of the challenge, in the form of capacity assistance to governments under stress, but also by our 
willingness to ask the difficult questions; for instance regarding standards for legitimate state responses to 
domestic threats to its authority. We must also do more to anticipate problems in RtoP implementation, 
specifically how best to effectively narrow those vast, empty spaces that so often separate early warnings 
and late deployments. “Getting it right” implies a process and a commitment for which the global public 
needs to see stakeholder determination and concrete, preventive and protective results. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Let me draw this to a close by repeating the obvious. We do not control this norm. It will not succeed or 
collapse on the basis of recommendations from formal academic colloquia or from qualitatively based 
research and diplomatic engagement such as we attempt through my office.  Indeed, we have only begun to 
identify the relevant actors and their complementary issues from all parts of the globe who can and must have 
a place in this discussion. Terrible things usually do not happen to us here in Brussels or in New York, but 
horrible things are happening in many parts of the world, right now, on our watch, over our coffee breaks. 
These people need a policy voice, but also a response architecture that is hopeful, competent and 
representative. 
We must do all that we can to get this right and we must do it urgently. Clearly lives are riding on policy 
discussions such as the one planned for the General Assembly this summer, many lives in fact. But also on 
notice is the credibility of the UN as an impartial defender of human dignity in those instances where 
governments cannot or will not offer protection to their own. If UN member states large and small continue 
to undermine public trust in the UN's capacity for decisive, fair and transparent action in the security field - 
with deadlocked disarmament architecture, and civilian protection norms that fail to find the hopeful 
ground between rhetoric and reckless reaction - we will lose more than respect. We will lose our way. 
 
Kofi Annan, as is commonly known, used to employ “fire department” analogies to describe the problems 
with peacekeeping operations – having to hold a bake sale to purchase a fire truck before there could be any 
response to the outbreak of fire. Timing is a key element of trust. To arrive late can be tantamount to not 
arriving at all. At a certain point, the homes that the fire department has pledged to protect are reduced to 
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rubble. But commitments to prevention are also essential to trust on RtoP. We are fond of saying in our 
UNEPS network that the best deployment for rapid-response capacities is the one that we do not need to 
make. In the same way, the best coercive response under the “third pillar” is the one that is not necessary, 
because we have created a durable, sustainable framework that can identify and respond to smoke before the 
fire erupts. 
We must use the opportunity afforded by this summer’s GA debate to discuss ways to ensure that any 
future coercive deployment in response to the threat of mass atrocities is transparent, principled and 
effective. As noted in one of the other chapters of this book, we should not settle for symbolic responses that 
raise public expectations with little prospect of behaviour change. But we also do not principally need to 
coerce change at the tip of a missile. With Finnemore and Sikkink, we affirm other, less-muscular moments 
of persuasion that we must also be prepared to seize at the earliest possible stages and that are central to both 
normative influence and lasting behavioural change.7 This much is clear: once human beings have been 
relegated to the status of “cockroaches”, the time for trust-building and tool development is compromised, 
and the immediate mass violence, not to mention the longer-term cycles of retribution that often follow, are 
that much harder to stop.    
 
 
Trust-Building Recommendations 
 
 
 We must ensure that our resources (time, talents and finances) amply support our RtoP 
commitments. There are obvious gaps in the architecture of UN response – especially regarding 
‘upstream’ preventive capacities – that can be filled in ways that are fully functional and sufficiently 
complementary. 
 
 We must develop capacities that allow stakeholders to be seized of potentially grave dangers to civilians at 
the earliest possible stages. This must include commitments to eliminate bottlenecks that prevent 
legitimate findings emanating from states or other sources from receiving full assessment and preventive 
response before contemplating more coercive measures. 
 
 We must listen more to objections raised by governments and civil society to the current architecture of 
atrocity crime response. While not all are equally valid or helpful, such objections provide pathways to a 
response system that is fair, transparent and representative of diverse global interests. The less our 
willingness to listen, the more deeply embedded objections will likely become. 
 
 We must do more to ensure that the Security Council conducts full and transparent assessments of all 
authorizations of coercive force, but especially those which might create controversial precedents. Full and 
transparent assessments of coercive mandates (including lessons learned) are key indicators of 
trustworthiness for many states and stakeholders. 
 
 We must help promote a secure seat at the policy table for region-based groups working on RtoP – 
especially from regions likely to be the recipients of RtoP-mandated coercive responses. Failure to facilitate 
diverse participation is likely to generate wary or even hostile reactions, raise questions about the 
legitimacy of the norm and its tools, and stifle movement towards building viable regional “audiences” for 
RtoP discussions.  
 
 We must do more to ensure that smaller missions, which constitute the majority of the 193 member 
states, get the assistance they need to keep track of RtoP and related matters so that they can be full and 
active participants in all relevant policy discussions. “Related matters” include illicit small arms, 
international justice, and gender-based violence. This assistance to missions can come from sources 
including regional experts and civil society organizations. 
                                                           
7 M. Finnemore & K. Sikkink “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, (2001), p. 914.  
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The Regionalization of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
KATE SEAMAN 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In recent years regional organizations including the AU, the EU, the Economic Organisation of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and NATO, have been increasingly involved in peacekeeping missions, either 
independently of the UN or in coordinated operations. There has been a shift in opinion and the 
emphasis is now placed on viewing these organizations as an asset rather than a liability. This shift 
can be attributed to the fact that the UN, following several failures, came to be viewed as overburdened 
and unable to undertake the increasingly complex operations required of it. It can also be connected to 
the push for ‘local solutions to local problems’1 which was directly in response to and designed to 
reduce the perceived burden of peacekeeping; particularly in relation to the funding and troop provision 
for operations which had been placed on more developed countries following the end of the Cold War. 
Although the existence of and cooperation with regional organizations is foreseen in the UN Charter, 
under Chapter VIII, an increased role in peace operations for these organisations raises some difficult 
questions in relation to legitimacy, accountability, capacity, and resources. 
The examination of these questions is made even more important when the growing role of regional 
organizations is coupled with the increased emphasis on the development of the RtoP. The concept of 
RtoP is still, in terms of development, fairly new. It has been hailed as a watershed development in 
international relations, a representation of a new political commitment to take timely and decisive action 
in the face of gross human rights violations. As emphasis has shifted away from the protection of 
traditional notions of sovereignty toward “sovereignty as responsibility” the international community has 
had to come up with new ways of resolving crises. RtoP and the application of the specific tools outlined 
in the third pillar have the potential to become a resolution to many of these problems, however ‘a 
responsibility to protect must also entail a responsibility to do it right’2 and before it can be done right a 
lot more work needs to be done on operationalizing the concept. If this work is not undertaken it risks 
placing increasing pressure on the UN and its peacekeepers to undertake ever more complex tasks with 
the same limited resources and support which have always been provided. 
Whilst substantial progress has been made in relation to the first two pillars of RtoP, the third pillar 
focusing on civilian and military capacities for “timely and decisive action” requires much more attention 
in order to ensure the operationalization of the norm is successful. RtoP has the potential to be the basis 
for a new activism within the international community. However, the concept raises as many questions as 
it answers, particularly in relation to the potential use of force in interventions. There are also questions 
as to which situations RtoP could be applied to. Is the concept only applicable to situations occurring 
after the 2005 summit? Or can it be applied to ongoing crises such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Somalia? Alongside the lack of definition in the type of situation to which it is applicable is 
the lack of clarity as to how exactly it should be operationalized. How should the international community 
help to prevent genocide? Where are the resources going to come from? Who will be the legitimating body 
for action? 
In this respect RtoP faces the same problems as humanitarian intervention - a lack of political will and 
resources. It is that same fundamental problem that confronts the UN system and is preventing the 
operationalization of RtoP and that is ‘the gap between: i) the wisdom occasionally manifested by 
representatives of states assembled in UN bodies; and, ii) the conventional policies for UN participation 
                                                           
1 UN, “Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict”, A/63/881–
S/2009/304, New York, (11th June 2009). 
2 G. Day & C. Freeman, “Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: The Policekeeping Approach”, Global Governance, 
Vol. 11, (2005) pp. 139-146.  
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made in the capitals of these states.’3 Given the challenges the UN has faced in the past in relation to the 
gap between mandates and resource provision, there has been increased focus on the abilities of regional 
organizations to plug the gap. The question is whether or not these organizations do represent a plausible 
and possible solution to the problems of operationalizing RtoP. 
 
 
Regional Organizations and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
 
The incorporation of regional organizations under the UN system is covered under Chapter VIII of the 
Charter but it was not until the 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom’ that the potential these organizations 
represent was formally recognised. In the report, then Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that ‘the time 
is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping 
capacities that will enable the UN to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable 
partnerships.’4 The increasing emphasis being placed on the utilisation of regional organizations stems 
partly from the realization that ‘exclusive reliance on the UNSC to authorize intervention often erodes 
the credibility of threats to intervene’5 due to the failure of the Council to intervene in a timely and 
appropriate manner in some crisis situations. Regional organizations are however much better placed to 
intervene in a timely manner, with recent examples such as the EU’s Operation Artemis in the DRC and 
the NATO backed air operations in Libya demonstrating this to great effect. For others sub-contracting is 
connected to the need to back-up or replace peacekeeping operations with more forceful interventions.6 
However the somewhat sporadic use of these organizations is again an illustration of the selectivity of 
Council members, and the differing importance they assign to some interventions to the detriment of 
others. It is a clear demonstration that ‘the complexities of the international political system militate 
against developing a predictable and reliable inter-locking system.’7 This selectivity has been a particular 
problem in relation to the implementation of the principles of RtoP, and the different application of the 
tools available under the third pillar. One of the key factors in the successful operationalization of the 
concept will be consistency in application. This will require the development of a clear division of labour 
between the different actors involved. 
Although the use of regional organizations does represent one way of remedying the gap between 
demand and supply, it also poses a lot of other challenging questions. The first question relates to the 
legal authority by which the Security Council mandates operations and whether or not the same kind of 
authority is attributable to regional organizations. Many of the questions relating to the Council’s 
legitimacy stem from concerns about ‘whether the UN decision-making process adequately represents the 
interest of actors in the region of the conflict.’8 These questions have led to an increasing emphasis on the 
use of regional organizations, such as the AU, because ‘they can provide legitimacy, local knowledge, and 
experience.’9 For many, the sole legitimacy of the Council is questionable and in some cases regional 
organizations, from the basis of their makeup and on the legal authority of their agreements, may have a 
stronger form of legitimacy than the Security Council. In relation to the wider development of third pillar 
RtoP activities this can be viewed as one way of increasing the democratization and representation within 
                                                           
3 P.F. Diehl, The Politics of Global Governance, (Lynne Rienner: USA: 2001), p. 493. 
4 UN, “Report of the Secretary General In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all”, 
A/59/2005, (21st March 2005). 
5 M.C. Waxman, “Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities” in M.C. Waxman (ed.) Intervention to Stop Genocide 
and Mass Atrocities, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), p. 16.  
6 N.D. White, “The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues” in M. Pugh (ed.), The UN, Peace and 
Force, (Frank Cass, 1997), p. 58. 
7A. Sarjoh Bah & B.D. Jones, Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements 
(Center for International Cooperation, 2008), p. 7.  
8 C. Samii & W.P.S Sidhu, “Strengthening Regional Approaches to Peace Operations” in M. Pugh & W.P.S Sidhu, The 
UN and Regional Security, (Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 259. 
9 M. Alagappa, “Regional Institutions, the UN and International Security”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, (1997), 
pp. 421-441. 
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these operations. Local actors will provide a more nuanced and perhaps more locally acceptable 
solution to problems which outside organizations may not understand. 
Another argument for the utilization of regional organizations is that decentralization, delegation and 
cooperation will lighten the burden on the UN, especially in relation to resources. But there are questions 
regarding the potential for regional organizations to fulfil this devolved responsibility, particularly in 
relation to the inherent weaknesses of many regional organizations in terms of capabilities and resources, 
plus the potential difficulty regional actors may face in remaining impartial in a conflict situation.10 There 
is also the potential risk that allowing more regional enforcement action, outside the control of the 
Security Council increases the risk of abuse by regional superpowers.11 Rather than making peacekeeping 
more representative and responsive this would then only exacerbate power politics on a regional level 
rather than an international level. There is also a danger that ‘reliance on regional operations may mean 
that a greater burden is carried by those who are comparatively ill equipped to do so.’12 
One of the key testing grounds for the utilization of regional organizations has been Africa. It is the 
limitations of the UN and the challenges it has faced in several complex conflicts, which have led to 
arguments that the AU would be better ‘able to do things that particularly the UN cannot do because of 
the greater legitimacy that comes from being Africans, and African troops and African governments.’13 
This greater potential legitimacy is combined with a greater willingness to intervene. A willingness most 
clearly demonstrated in the constitutive act of the AU which outlines ‘the right of the Union to intervene 
in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’14 Unfortunately the increased willingness to intervene is 
not necessarily matched by the capabilities required to do so. This then raises the issue of credibility as the 
‘operational difficulties raise the question of what capacity African states currently possess to conduct 
complex and multidimensional peace operations.’15 Again the problem is the resourcing and funding of 
increasingly complex peacekeeping missions. 
The problem is that in some cases the use of regional organizations, with their resource deficit, can 
also undermine the UN operation. As one field operative argues ‘it undermines the UN in cases like 
UNAMID where you end up with some kind of hybrid. What we have ended up with is an organization 
which the UN funds and the AU is or members of the AU are providing most of the assets and that has 
not been helpful.’16 This then leads to a blurring of lines between what the UN wants to achieve and what 
the AU is working towards on the ground. It only serves to make the operation more complex and 
convoluted. 
Interoperability between the UN and regional organizations, and between different regional 
organizations is another issue that needs to be examined further. The use of regional organizations not 
only poses credibility issues to the UN but also practical coordination issues.17 This was particularly true 
in Bosnia with the coordination between UN peacekeeping troops under UNPROFOR command and 
the NATO air strikes. The role of NATO in Bosnia was to provide the coercive military capacity required 
to create a solution to the conflict. The coordination was based upon the “dual key” approach in which 
any NATO action had to be approved by both the UN and NATO before it could take place. This caused 
large delays in the ability of NATO to deploy air strikes in a timely manner. The “dual key” approach was 
not however the only hamper to both coordination and action between the UN and NATO:  
 
                                                           
10 M. Berdal, “Whither UN Peacekeeping?”, Adelphi Paper 218, (IISS, 1993). 
11 Op.Cit., “The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues”, p. 58  
12 S. Forman & A. Grene, 'Collaborating with Regional Organisations', in D. M. Malone (ed.) The UN Security Council: 
From the Cold War to the 21st Century, (Lynne Reiner: London, 2004), p. 306. 
13 Interview with Professor Craig N. Murphy, Wellesley College, (3rd September 2008). 
14 Constitutive Act of the African Union. See: www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. (Accessed 4th May 2011).  
15 P.D. Williams, “The African Union: Prospects for Regional Peacekeeping after Burundi and Sudan”, Review of African 
Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 108, (2006), pp. 352-357. 
16 Interview with UK Mission Official One, (27th August 2008). 
17 This problem was recognized by the Secretary General in his 2006 Report. See: UN, Report of the Secretary General on 
A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities, A/61/204–S/2006/590 (28th July 2006).  
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‘NATO’s inertia was, in part, a reflection of UNPROFOR’s composition. Many Allies including 
Canada, France and the United Kingdom, had deployed their own peacekeepers in UNPROFOR 
and feared that a more robust approach towards the Bosnian Serbs would produce a backlash against 
their troops. Meanwhile, the United States, which did not have troops on the ground, was pushing a 
“lift and strike” policy – lifting the arms embargo against the entire region that penalised in 
particular the Bosnian Muslims and striking the Bosnian Serb targets from the air.’18 
 
There were clear disagreements over how best to proceed which were only resolved with the authorization 
of ‘operation deliberate force’19 by both the UNPROFOR commander and the NATO commander, who 
both held the necessary keys to instigate the air strikes. The air strikes however signalled the end of the 
UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as it essentially became a peace enforcement operation instead. This 
again highlights the complications of coordination with other organizations, especially organizations with 
a higher level of military capacity than the UN. It can lead to the UN becoming involved in operations it 
is not capable of undertaking, and perhaps more detrimental is the potential for the UN to become a 
party to the conflict in the eyes of the belligerents which leaves its troops open to attack and kidnapping, 
as then occurred in Bosnia.20 
These challenges need to be addressed and there are a number of ways in which the problems could be 
mitigated. As outlined in the 2011 UNSG’s report, regional organizations have the potential to act as 
‘political and operational bridges between global standards and local and national action.’21 Regional 
organizations have the potential to enhance the legitimacy of an operation by providing local context, 
regional ownership and appropriate operationalization. This may come in a variety of different forms, all 
utilising tools under the third pillar of RtoP, but perhaps focused more on the non-military tools such as 
good offices, mediation, investigation, and most importantly the use of personal persuasion. This has the 
potential to dramatically lower the footprint of RtoP operations, and make them more acceptable in the 
eyes of local populations. 
There is a need to formalize these roles and the relationships between the different organizations in 
order to ensure the most is made of each organization’s assets. A formalization of the roles would also 
avoid improve the issues of coordination, and reduce the potential for complications as outlined in the 
example above. The focus should be shifted to the development of more robust regional mechanisms for 
dealing with RtoP situations, in order to do so there should be a renewed focus on capacity building 
through international development assistance. This ties the responsibilities of the international 
community under pillar two of RtoP directly to the capabilities of regional organizations to undertake 
these missions, a development which is key if the potential synergies outlined by the Secretary General are 
to be realised.22 
Alongside the focus on capacity building should be an emphasis on increased coordination between 
the UN, regional organizations, and regional civil society actors. For staff at the UN, NGOs and other 
civil society actors play a valuable advocacy role in ensuring that issues are kept on the agendas of both 
international organizations and states23 and whilst ‘they have had a steadily growing impact on the security 
council’24 this impact seems to come more from their interactions with national governments ‘for example 
Oxfam in the UK or faith based organizations in the USA’ as ‘they have the potential to embarrass 
governments into action.’25 This influence then translates into actions taken by states within international 
organizations. These actors have access to a greater wealth of information, can provide early warning signs, 
and can again only serve to enhance the legitimacy and contextualisation of RtoP operations. 
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All of these new roles and relationships will however have to be carefully managed with a focus on 
communication, inclusion and support.26 The reality is that the use of regional organizations instead of 
the UN ‘may be politically expedient, but it does not represent a conceptual solution.’27 It could also 
potentially lead to ‘a brewing competition between the United Nations and regional organizations’28 in 
which the primacy of the Security Council would not be guaranteed. The problem is that although the 
UN is strong in some aspects such as troop access, in the eyes of many member states it lacks other 
important tools. As one UK official outlined, ‘the UN lacks organization and administrative skill and also 
military planning skills in comparison to the EU and NATO. There is also the problem of the small 
numbers in the UN in comparison to the EU and NATO particularly in relation to qualified military and 
administrative staff.’29 In order to overcome these disparities, there needs to be a focused programme of 
capacity-building between the UN and regional organizations, along the lines of the UN-AU ten year 
capacity-building programme. This would go some way towards mitigating the problems of disparity 
between regions in their capabilities to undertake RtoP operations. 
The use of regional organizations in the application of RtoP also serves to enhance the legitimacy of 
these operations. This is not to say however that the Security Council will become irrelevant. Instead its 
importance may even increase. Among the many considerations that could point in such a direction is 
that it can authorize the use of force and of peacekeeping operations in a wide range of circumstances, 
including the use of force by regional organizations. This need for Council oversight is clear, as ‘the key 
danger is that those with the military capacity will take on such interventions outside the ambit of the 
United Nations, and will thereby forfeit the international legitimacy upon which such operations in the 
end depend.’30 At the moment ‘a UN Security Council resolution is the gold standard of legitimacy.’31 
However, should the influence of regional organizations continue to increase it is clear to see that the 
Security Council needs to be even more careful to ensure its own primacy continues. The UNSC also has 
an important role in guaranteeing a more consistent approach to the application of the norm. The 
credibility, authority and effectiveness of the operationalization of the third pillar of RtoP are entirely 
dependent on the consistency with which it is applied.  
 
 
The Dangers of Regionalization 
 
 
For many, regional organizations represent the future of peacekeeping operations, and the chance to 
create a more stable form of multilateralism to ensure international peace and security. NATO in 
particular has embraced this new role, and in many ways it has provided a new relevance in the post-Cold 
War world. These newer actors in peacekeeping are however not without their challenges. One of the key 
problems is, as Bellamy and Williams argue, the uneven occurrence of regionalization. Indeed, not all 
regions have developed capabilities to the same extent and more importantly not all regional organizations 
are confined to their own regions.32 As one United Kingdom mission official explains, different 
organizations have different capacities, for example: 
 
‘the EU can do things that the UN cannot. If the EU is looking at a peacekeeping mission or a 
peacekeeping scenario the EU looks at it from a much more pragmatic point of view than the UN 
does. The UN tends to look at it through a completely political prism and therefore you get 
missions set up which have no real clear military peacekeeping goal, or achievable clear 
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peacekeeping goal. Whereas the EU on the other hand will look at it and say do we have the means 
to achieve this? If yes then we might go and do it, if no well we will not even consider it any 
further. It also has forces of course which are much more capable than the average forces that come 
forward as troop contributing countries in the UN.’33  
 
The lack of capacity of some organizations is directly connected to the involvement of other actors, 
however, there is still the issue of control and mandating of operations. The problem then becomes the 
fact that the UN cannot dictate to regional organizations and in many cases ‘the leverage available to the 
UN to ensure accountability is limited to its moral authority and, at times, the resources that it can make 
available.’34 
Some practitioners such as one former UN Ambassador argue that all interventions ‘should be 
retained under UN control,’ and that ‘the UN charter allows for regional organizations to follow their 
own initiatives so long as they follow the principles of the UN charter.’35 However, the problem is that 
many regional organizations do not classify themselves as or associate themselves with the UN under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, which subordinates regional organizations to the will of the UNSC. This is a 
clear demonstration that the hierarchy outlined in the Charter is not being put into practice. Whilst there 
is a need for an international division of labour based on who does what best or better, the ability of the 
international system to produce such a division is hampered by the lack of a straightforward hierarchy and 
the lack of accountability in regional security to the UN. It is clear that in many ways the UN is not 
viewed as the prime organization for keeping the peace, and in some places regional organizations are 
viewed as more powerful, particularly because of the practical operational capabilities of regional 
organizations.36 
The reality is that greater coordination with other international organizations is unavoidable as the 
UN itself does not have the resources or capacity to deal with the increasing number of tasks it is being 
asked to undertake. The increased involvement of regional organizations could be beneficial to the UN 
and might also remove the question of selectivity in operations. As Daws argues, this has not necessarily 
been detrimental to all operations as:  
 
‘The various external reports have shown that UN nation building has been very cost effective, has 
greater legitimacy, and is more efficacious than similar US nation building exercises. It is just a 
political reality that we do not live in a perfect world. I think selectivity results from a combination 
of member states accepting that priority should be given to where the need is greater, but that there 
are limits on resources and that they need to be prioritized in part to reflect national interests.’37 
 
The increasing emphasis on the use of regional organizations can in part be attributed to this need for 
value for money and can also be connected with the argument that regional organizations might in some 
ways be a more effective force for peacekeeping than the UN. This is particularly relevant given the more 
complex situations into which troops are being deployed. This is one of the key arguments in support of 
increased reliance on regional organizations, that they will provide a more robust form of peacekeeping, 
something which the UN is not capable of producing. 
The real problem is that ‘the hierarchy envisioned in the Charter does not hold’38 and the Security 
Council has little influence over the actions of regional organizations other than its moral authority, 
which in some cases is limited. This has meant an increasing perception that major powers are utilizing 
the UNSC as a forum to authorize military action and garner international legitimacy for actions, which 
may not necessarily be aimed at preserving the international order, but rather at furthering their own 
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national interests. As Ambassador Colin Keating argues this situation occurs because: ‘when you 
essentially have one group of civilians killing another group of civilians and there is a serious training and 
preparedness set of exercises that need to be undertaken and is there political will for that, who actually 
has the capacity to begin such a process, only four or five countries in the whole world and they all seem 
somewhat distracted at the moment.’39 
The reliance on a few countries to provide the key resources is also a huge challenge, one which the 
UN has failed to resolve. As one former peacekeeper argues ‘you have difficulties straight away because 
you have some nations who will sign up to what you might call the cheap and cheerful missions, what the 
cynics talk about as “barefoot infantry”.’40 But states are much less willing to provide the more important 
resources, an issue that is unlikely to be resolved with increasing regionalization as the key resources are 
focused in a few countries. 
The unequal division of resources between regional organizations is a huge obstacle to the 
regionalization of RtoP, an obstacle that is further exacerbated by the differing interpretations of the 
norm itself. In order for the norm to be successfully applied, both regionally and globally, more work 
needs to be done on establishing dialogue between the various actors to ensure consistency in approach 
and application. At the moment there is an inherent contradiction between ensuring regional 
organizations are allowed to develop the norm at their own pace and to suit their needs whilst also 
ensuring equality and consistency of application. This will become increasingly important if organizations 
such as NATO and the EU continue to undertake RtoP operations outside of their usual spheres of 
influence; particularly if there is a conflict of opinion between these organizations and those local to the 
region, as occurred with the situation in Libya and the AU. The Security Council will have an important 
role to play in ensuring consistency of application, and will have to work on limiting and controlling 
regional organization actions to reduce the potential backlash. This has already been seen following the 
suggested overreach of NATO in Libya, leading to the veto threat by China and Russia in relation to 
Syria, despite the clear support for intervention by the Arab League. The Security Council will have to 
focus on the provision of clear and unambiguous mandates in relation to RtoP operations, will have to 
learn from operations undertaken by different organizations, and focus on trust- and capacity-building 
between the Council and regional organizations, and between regional organizations themselves. In order 
for RtoP to be operationalized successfully, it will have to be implemented consistently.  
 
 
Implementation and Operationalization of RtoP 
 
 
The first challenge in operationalizing RtoP is the challenge it poses to the traditional normative basis of 
the international system. Sovereignty has been the cornerstone of the international system and it seems to 
provide ‘order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are regarded as 
equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth.’41 The development of RtoP challenges the inviolability of 
this sovereignty on the basis of the protection of human rights. Sovereignty is now evolving into a concept 
based on a state’s responsibilities to its citizens and the international community. However, as the concept 
gains in popularity one of the key arguments against the development of RtoP is that it is ‘eroding the 
existing normative basis of international society in order to provide major powers the facility to intervene 
selectively in the domestic affairs of weaker states ought not to form part of the humanitarian intervention 
argument. Otherwise the moral basis of the argument itself is diluted, detracting tremendously from the 
legitimacy of the humanitarian enterprise.’42 
This leads to another argument utilised by opponents of the concept, the question of who decides 
when and where to intervene? For many the gold standard of legitimacy remains a Security Council 
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Resolution, and the Council gains its legitimacy through its ability to reach out into virtually every society 
and to establish universally applicable norms.43 However the increasing disconnect between those states 
that mandate UN operations, advocate RtoP and support civilian protection and those that are 
contributing the troops for the operations is a demonstration for some that ‘western support for RtoP 
derives more from its potential to be abused to legitimize unilateral intervention than from genuine 
concern about protecting people from grave harm.’44 The danger is that those states deciding on when 
and where to intervene are not those in danger of being intervened in. The reality is that powerful states 
determine whose human rights justify departure from the principle of non-intervention and this leads to 
charges of neo-colonialism.45 
Without a world body viewed as legitimate by all members of the international system there is little 
hope of a successful implementation of the concept. There is also a danger that if the UN Security 
Council is seen as a partial body that this will increase the utilization of the concept by regional 
organizations or individual states justifying their actions on the basis of RtoP not justifying interventions 
from ‘a renewed commitment to human rights, but from a need for a new pretext for imperialist 
interventions.’46 There is also another danger inherent in the potential failure of the Security Council, 
that if another organization was to take action, which did meet the criteria for an RtoP intervention ‘this 
may have enduringly serious consequences for the stature and credibility of the UN itself.’47 The 
supporters of RtoP need to ‘ensure that RtoP is seen not as a Trojan horse for bad, old imperial, colonial 
and militarist habits but rather the best starting point the international community has and is maybe ever 
likely to have, in preventing and responding to genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.’48 This will 
however prove easier said than done. 
Along with the issue of legitimacy RtoP also faces more practical challenges in its development, the 
lack of political will and resources, and the problems of coordination and interoperability between the 
different organizations undertaking RtoP missions. Unfortunately ‘the new term does not solve the 
fundamental problems of insufficient political will or provide a politically realistic blueprint for the 
changes in state practice that would be required to make the responsibility to protect meaningful in policy 
and operation terms.’49 The UN is still operating with a ‘lack of coherent doctrine underpinning the 
growing number of mandates that fall between traditional peacekeeping missions and armed engagement 
with a specific adversary or adversaries.’50 If RtoP is to become operational through the UN then the 
organization needs to ensure there are adequate resources available to do so.  
More time will also need to be spent on the practicalities of planning and resourcing missions. In most 
interventions and ‘in most of the countries where intervention takes place, a peace process coincides with 
a double political process of democratization and state-building.’51 This increases the number of tasks that 
any UN mission needs to be capable of undertaking, and therefore increases the demand on resources. It 
is true that ‘all conflicts have underlying causes and almost all have possible solutions. More often than 
not the greatest determinant of a successful outcome to any involvement will be whether key decision 
makers can take the time to understand the causes, and have the political will to vigorously pursue a 
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solution.’52 Getting the key states to sustain that political will is however another key challenge faced by 
those proponents of RtoP. The problem is that by the time a crisis is brought to the attention of the 
Security Council it is generally beyond the limited scope of any preventive measures. This then requires 
some form of intervention, be it military or diplomatic, which requires exponentially more resources than 
prevention as it requires a commitment to the intervention and rebuilding process. These situations tend 
to be more complex and dangerous and the Security Council is often unable, if not unwilling, to commit 
the resources. 
The main argument in support of regionalization is that these organizations represent an alternative 
to the UN structure, that these organizations will offer increased accountability and representation 
through greater local input, and will also reduce the increasing strain on the UN.53 The problem is that in 
many cases they have also complicated the UN’s peacekeeping role. There are also unanswered questions 
as to the legal authority of regional organizations to mandate interventions and the potential for what 
Marrack Goulding termed a peacekeeping apartheid to develop.54 An increased reliance on regional 
organizations also represents a challenge to the authority of the UN and has increased the complexity of 
the operating situation in the field where the lack of coordination and the risk of organizations being 
played off each other is a real danger. As Ambassador Keating highlighted:  
 
‘the interaction between the Security Council and regional organizations has got both significant 
potential opportunities, but also, if its not handled well by one or both sides of the equation, then 
it could actually be misused to the detriment of international peace and security. The international 
organizations that operate at the regional level are somewhat ephemeral by comparison to the UN 
at the present point in time and as a result the relationships often tend to be somewhat one 
sided.’55 
 
Although these risks are somewhat ameliorated by the benefits the organizations can provide, including a 
faster response time and improved troop provision, ‘they’, as Simon Bagshaw states, ‘fill a gap in the sense 
that we do not have the capacity to deploy as quickly as we would like, so they can get there much quicker 
and they are often seen as much more acceptable to other African states.’56 These benefits do not however 
prevent the organizations facing similar charges to the Security Council in relation to accountability and 
legitimacy especially when there is a dominant regional hegemon.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
As explored above, in order for RtoP to be successfully implemented at regional and global levels there are 
several issues that need to be addressed. These issues can be divided into four key areas: legitimacy, 
accountability, resources and finally capabilities. In order to establish legitimacy in the application of RtoP 
there needs to be a concerted effort by the Security Council to ensure consistency. This will involve 
building on the already strong normative consensus surrounding RtoP to establish a clear doctrine in the 
application to specific cases. 
The Security Council needs to focus on creating clear and unambiguous mandates through their 
Resolutions, establishing dialogue with regional partners, and clearly defining the roles of these partners 
in relation to the implementation of mandates. In many cases regional organizations should be enabled to 
undertake RtoP actions using the diplomatic tools of the Third Pillar without requiring Security Council 
authorization. A Council mandate should be reserved for the most serious cases, where force is required, 
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and when it is required the Council should act to ensure there is a credible, consistent, and authoritative 
response. 
In order to ensure accountability for these actions there needs to be a formalization of the 
relationships between the different actors. This formalization should include a clear division of labour 
between the UN and other regional actors based on the capacities of each actor to respond to different 
RtoP situations. The accountability of each organization to the wider international community will also be 
key to ensuring the continued legitimacy of the norm, particularly in preventing the misuse or 
misinterpretation of the situations to which it is applicable. 
Alongside the division of labour, the UN also needs to focus on capacity-building within regional 
organizations, along the lines of the ten-year UN-AU capacity-building programme. The amount of 
resources available is limited and there is a need to focus on capacity sharing alongside capacity-building. 
The need for global and regional collaboration is clear, and in order for this to be successful it will need to 
be carefully managed. Part of the responsibility for the management of this collaboration also falls on the 
regional organizations. Alongside the UN actors including the AU, EU, NATO, ECOWAS, and the Arab 
League have a key role to play in developing the implementation and operationalization of RtoP. Perhaps 
the most important of these roles will be in establishing the legitimacy of the norm in a regional setting. 
This role will be particularly important for organizations operating outside their usual sphere of influence. 
The importance of regional organizations in establishing the legitimacy of RtoP operations is clearly 
demonstrated by the ongoing situation in Syria. The perceived overreach of NATO in Libya led directly to 
the backlash against authorising any intervention into Syria. This underlines the impact regional 
organizations can have on the successful operationalization of the norm, and the need for the Security 
Council to maintain control over operations, to ensure the mandate they provide is not exceeded. 
Alongside this, regional organizations also have a responsibility to live up to expectations in their response 
to RtoP situations. The AU in particular has established itself as an organization determined to intervene 
when member states fail to live up to their responsibilities. What regional organizations need to do now is 
clarify the situations in which RtoP does override the norm of non-interference, and the ways in which 
they are willing to intervene, and assist their member states.  
There is a clear need for doctrine creation in relation to the use of third pillar tools, not only at the 
global level, but also at the regional level. The various actors involved should work to formalize and define 
their different roles through further research. Communication between the different organizations will be 
key to the successful implementation of RtoP, as will the process of learning from each other, particularly 
in relation to the contextualisation of operations. Hopefully lessons can be learned for future operations 
in order to ensure the continued legitimacy of RtoP. Unfortunately, the reality of international 
intervention is that it occurs only when the situation has developed to such a stage as to shock the world 
into action. The goal of operationalizing RtoP should be to minimize the need for this shock by 
preventing the escalation of crises. In order for RtoP to be successfully implemented there is a clear need 
for much more frank and inclusive discussion between all the actors involved to ensure the consistency in 
application required to gain legitimacy for the norm. 
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A Reluctant Actor: China’s Dilemmas in the Responsibility to Protect 
 
PEIRAN WANG 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
As a rising power, China has undertaken the international responsibilities towards the regional stability 
and peace through a step-by-step approach, such as dispatching blue helmet personnel and engineer 
troops to assume mine-clearing and infrastructure construction in the post-conflict regions under the 
framework of the UN. Moreover, China accepted the principle of the RtoP, which endorsed RtoP at the 
UN, first at the World Summit in 2005 and later in SCR 1674. However, China remains persistently caution 
to non-consensual force and is reticent to apply sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed 
by relevant regional organizations. The ambivalent attitude and behaviour can be tracked from the 
domestic realpolitik in China and the country’s strategic culture. Firstly, the lack of strategic projection 
capabilities limit China’s policy options; secondly, the non-intervention principle derived from the 
traditional understanding of sovereignty still holds an important position in China’s diplomacy discourse, 
which profoundly influences the thinking of policy-makers; thirdly, China is concerned that domestic 
separatist movements will be spurred on by RtoP; fourthly, China’s ambivalence of keeping the balance of 
economic interests and international norm values; and, finally, the use of force is usually regarded as the 
last resort to recovering social order in China’s traditional strategic culture. This chapter will look at such 
themes and make some recommendations based on the analysis. 
 
 
 
China’s Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations: the 1990s to Present 
 
 
In the year 1990 China sent its first military personnel to participate in a UN military observer mission. 
From the perspective of the western world, China’s engagements are derived from the need to break out 
of its diplomatic isolation and improve its international image by adopting a relatively constructive 
approach.1 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has dispatched military blue helmet personnel and sapper 
troops to assume mine clearing and infrastructure construction in the post-conflict areas under the 
framework of UN. Since the beginning of 21st century, China has become much more involved in 
international peacekeeping operations under the framework of the UN. After 2003, whether it is by rank 
or personnel contribution, the role of China has obviously increased. Moreover, the stable rank shows 
China’s consistent support for the UN’s peacekeeping operations (PKO). In 2004, Hu Jintao, China’s 
president, said, that the PLA should be able to undertake ‘new historical missions’, some of which involve 
UN peacekeeping. Among the P5 of the UN Security Council, China has been the biggest contributor of 
peacekeeping troops.2 
By participating in UN peacekeeping missions, China has gained practical and potential benefits for its 
diplomacy and the PLA. Since the late 1990s, Chinese peacekeeping contributions have raised its profile 
in the international community as a constructive and responsible power. Beijing policymakers see 
engagement in peacekeeping, and in conflict resolution, as a way for China to project a more benign and 
“harmonious” image beyond its borders, to reassure neighbours about its peaceful intentions, and to softly 
balance US and other Western influence while gradually but more firmly establishing China’s status as a 
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great power.3China’s peacekeeping deployments, and the associated opportunities to train and operate 
alongside other countries’ forces, have provided practical experiences for the PLA. 
Finally, China’s arms exportation has evolved into the field of peacekeeping equipment. Ghana signed 
a RMB 160 million agreement with China in September 2008, which included help with re-equipping the 
Ghanaian Armed Forces and enhancing Ghanaian preparations for multilateral peacekeeping operations. 
Zambian troops have been using Chinese-manufactured WZ-551 armoured personnel carriers in their 
peace support operations in Sudan. In 2008, Argentina ordered WZ-551s from China for its troops in the 
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).4 More recently, landmine detection equipment was 
provided to Egypt as was mine-clearance training courses for engineers from African and Asian countries, 
such as Angola, Chad, and Thailand. Moreover, the mine detectors manufactured by the Chinese have 
been used extensively by UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon) along the southern border of 
Lebanon.5 
 
 
China’s Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operation: 2003-20116 
 
Year Personnel Contribution Rank 
2003 307 28 
2004 942 17 
2005 871 18 
2006 1,648 13 
2007 1,811 13 
2008 2,164 13 
2009 2,155 14 
2010 1,995 15 
2011 1,943 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese Perceptions of RtoP and its Concerns 
 
In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) made an effort to solve the 
conflict between the principle of national sovereignty and the right of the international community to 
intervene in cases of mass atrocity crimes. The Commission developed the RtoP concept. Specifically 
speaking: 
 
‘the responsibility to prevent [is] to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal 
conflict and other man-made crises. The responsibility to react [is] to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like 
sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. The 
responsibility to rebuild [is] to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm…’7.  
 
                                                           
3 B. Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 200-202.  
4 B. Gill & Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications”, SIPRI Policy 
Report, No. 25, Nov. 2009, p. 29. See: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP25.pdf.  
5 China-Made Mine Sweeping Tools used in UN Peacekeeping Mission. See:http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-
channels/2009-03/05/content_1676051.htm.     
6UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Peacekeeping Fact Sheeting. See: 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.    
7 ICISS Report 2001: XI. 
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In all the above-mentioned responsibilities, the most sensitive point is when and how the international 
community is eligible to launch military intervention against a sovereign state. While the UNSC has the 
primary role in international peace and security fields, especially the right to  the launch military 
interventions and sanctions under the UN Charter, it also “bravely" permits the possible use of force 
outside of the authority of the UNSC, more specifically, by the UNGA and regional organizations. 
China has twice endorsed RtoP at the UN, first at the World Summit in 2005 and later in SCR 1674. 
Since then, China has clearly and consistently affirmed the RtoP principle and issued corresponding 
statements in favour of bolstering the UN’s capacity to avert mass atrocities. It is important to note, 
however, that China remains persistently averse to non-consensual use of force and is reticent to apply 
sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organizations.8 
However, China still holds some differences over RtoP. It is well known that the traditional view of state 
sovereignty and non-interference will continue to be the most important concern for Chinese 
policymakers.9 As a general rule, the effectiveness of action depends on two variables: one is capability, the 
other is intention. If any variable is zero, the effectiveness will be destined to fail. In the following 
sections, the chapter explores the issues which limit China’s policy adoption of RtoP concerning the 
dimension of capabilities and intention. 
According to the UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, the third pillar of RtoP was defined as ‘the responsibility of 
UN Member States to respond in a timely and decisive manner, using Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threat and Peace), and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN 
Charter as appropriate, when a state manifestly fails to provide such protection’.10 The international 
community has a range of options under the third pillar, including preventive diplomacy, fact-finding 
missions, economic sanctions and embargoes, and military operations such as no-fly zones, monitoring 
and civilian defense missions.11 Facing such a wide range of options, China has showed its aversion to 
coercive measures, although it is increasingly open to participating in political dialogue and mediation 
efforts to coax state leaders to consent to international involvement. 
  
 
 
China’s Limited Power Projection Capabilities as an Obstacle to Supporting RtoP 
 
 
The current ability to project strategic power fundamentally limits China’s aspirations for the adoption of 
preventive military measures. China’s ability to project air and sea power is gradually increasing but 
limited. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has about 10 IL-76 transporters that can provide strategic airlift.12 As 
far as the performance of the PLAAF’s extraction of citizens from Libya is concerned, according to an 
interview with Xiang Xiaoling, Deputy Director at the Institute for Military Strategy, National Defense 
University, PLA, the largest transport aircraft equipped in the PLAAF usually loads a maximum of 50 
tonnes.13 With the disputes over military transfers among China and Russia, Chinese endeavours to 
import IL-76 transport aircraft and IL-78 refuelling aircraft have yet to gain substantive fruits. Although 
there are military modernization programmes underway in the region, the power projection capabilities of 
                                                           
8 S. Teitt, China and the Responsibility to Protect, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, December 2008. See:  
www.r2pasiapacific.org/images/stories/food/china_and_r2p.pdf.  
9 R. Kamphausen, D. Lai & A. Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, (Strategic Studies Institute, April 
2009), p. 115. 
10 Ban Ki-moon, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005.  
11 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Clarifying the Third Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect: 
Timely and Decisive Response”, 20 September 2011. See: 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Clarifying%20the%20Third%20Pillar%20of%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Prote
ct_Timely%20and%20Decisive%20Response(1).pdf. 
12 P.C. Saunders, Chinese Views of Its Military Modernization, Monterey Institute of International Studies. See: 
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/cns/programs/dc/track2/1st/saunders.pdf.   
13 China Net. See: www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2009-11/04/content_18826387.htm.  
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China, Japan, and India will remain limited and their policies restrained.14 In a word, China’s capability 
to project power will still be limited to the regional level in the foreseeable future. 
If China agrees to preventive military measures at the UN Security Council, it is obvious that China 
lacks the “global reach” capabilities to carry out such operations along with other actors, such as NATO or 
the US. China’s power projection capabilities are currently limited to voting on the relevant resolution at 
the UNSC. For its high profile as a rising power, China’s role as an onlooker cannot be accepted. In the 
domestic media, China’s diplomacy has been described as “positive”, “rising” and “influential”. As an 
onlooker the government has to explain why a more practical role for China is incompatible with its 
discourse to citizens. At the same time, without aircraft carriers and long-range transport aircrafts, China’s 
military power projection has to depend on third-parties rather than their own platform, when, for 
example, imaging how to address the potential scenarios of an RtoP mission in Sub-Saharan Africa. Who 
will offer the equipment to China? Besides the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is not a 
member state of any security organization. Under the framework of NATO or the EU’s CSDP, Europeans 
and Americans share their defence and operation capabilities and assets. Hence, RtoP missions will be 
completed in a cooperative and coordinated way. However, there are not any official mechanisms among 
China, the EU and NATO on security affairs. China has two options: one is carrying out the related 
operations through long-term independent capability construction; and the other is acting as onlookers 
with only a vote in the UNSC. The former will cast more doubt on the future of China’s military build-
up. Chinese nationalists and conservatives will understand the latter to mean that China will be 
secondary player, which will result in pressure on China’s foreign policy. Perhaps NATO should seek to 
construct relations of cooperation and mutual trust with China rather than rest on concerns and mistrust. 
The related technology and equipment exchange and exercise can be regarded as a starting point. 
Complicated decision-making procedures hinder the lifting of the Arms Embargo against China, which 
has been regarded as an obstacle in EU – China relations.15 The related equipment and technology 
transfer under the framework of NATO, which is not designed to get around the EU’s embargo of China, 
but also NATO will benefit from China’s engagement in RtoP and the other security affairs. 
 
 
 
China’s Traditional Perceptions on the Obstacle of Sovereignty to RtoP 
 
 
Compared with humanitarian intervention, military measures are authorized solely by the Security 
Council and are to be employed when peaceful measures have proved inadequate. Humanitarian 
intervention – characterized as unauthorized coercive action (unilateral or multilateral) – has not been 
endorsed as a norm by Member States, and is not permitted under the third pillar of RtoP.16 Be that as it 
may, sovereignty is still a sensitive subject to Beijing. Ethnic separatism in the Xinjiang and Xizang regions 
is the most practical and ultimate concern. Human rights protection and freedom have been central to 
political discourse over ethnic separatism. Moreover, different understandings about sovereignty influence 
China’s perceptions and practice towards RtoP. 
Sovereignty is the inter-subjective term from the perspective of the social contract. Significantly, a 
central component in the transformation from the medieval to the modern system was the formation of 
the sovereign territorial state, where the interlocking levels of local, regional and imperial authorities gave 
way to one sovereign centre and the territorial boundary became the significant dividing line. This 
transformation was one where political authorities gained ground compared to religious ones. It meant 
that the state became more secular and that this secularity was played out in interstate relations as well as 
domestically. Through Hobbes’ famous understanding of the sovereign state as the Leviathan, which 
provided the solution to the problem of individual security, the ‘contract’ between the individual and the 
                                                           
14 D.C. Blair, Military Power Projection in Asia, The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2008. See: 
www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa08xs_MilPower.pdf.  
15 Wang Peiran, ‘A Tough Sell: Overcoming the EU Arms Embargo’, China Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2010), pp. 51-58.  
16 Op.Cit., “Clarifying The Third Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect”.  
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state is one where the individual grants the state the right to protect – and define – individual security in 
exchange for an acknowledgement of its sovereign authority.17 
In the mid-19th century, sovereignty was introduced into China’s intellectual community through 
William A. P. Martin who translated Elements of International Law by Henry Wheaton into Chinese. 
Through Elements of International Law, the Chinese got to know that the concept of sovereignty has two 
dimensions, external and internal. Externally, this centres around the recognition of a state by other 
actors in the international system.18 Sovereignty can be defined as ‘the recognition by both internal and 
external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its 
territory’.19 States are recognized as sovereign when they present a fact of sovereignty; that is, states 
recognize another's sovereignty when the latter has achieved the capability to defend its authority against 
domestic and international challengers.20 Internally, as Pan points-out, ‘sovereignty means supreme 
authority over jurisdiction: in any single territorial entity there is only one final and unlimited decision-
making centre that is unquestioned within state borders. Internal sovereignty signifies the right of a 
nation state to determine its own political system and authority structure’. Under the historical 
background of the weakened Qing Empire, as the loser of international competition, China easily 
accepted the non-interference principle derived from the concept of sovereignty. At the same time, the 
Chinese saw sovereignty as the right to autonomously handle domestic issues free from external 
interference.21 On the internal dimension of sovereignty, as far as the juridical independent territorial 
entity is concerned, China has experienced an absolutist history of more than 2,000 years, and not the 
heritage of social contract between government and citizens, which means the imbalance in relations 
between state/government and individuals. Hence, the protection of the individual from the state has 
been secondary to the survival and power of the state. At the same time, in China’s academic community 
there are seldom critical-studies on sovereignty from the perspective of post-modernism since the post-
Cold War. In light of the constructivist school of International Relations, agents act within their social 
reality based on rules and their knowledge of it. Thus, when official dialogues on sovereignty occur 
between Chinese and Western counterparts, which are certain to be influenced by the thinking and 
research gap, Chinese diplomatic practitioners cannot get intellectual support from the Chinese academic 
community. 
Since the foundation of People’s Republic of China (PRC), the principle of respecting sovereignty and 
non-interference has been centralized in the PRC’s diplomacy discourse. The discourse and behaviour of 
an actor constitutes a constructive relationship. When an actor puts forward discourse, its behaviour will 
be restricted by this discourse. In the post-Cold War period, although the principle of non-interference 
restricts China’s diplomacy, Chinese diplomacy has been in a dilemma that insists on its discourse while 
also trying to act as a responsible, rising great power. 
 
 
Some Elements in Chinese Strategic Culture are Compatible with RtoP 
 
 
As for the use of force, this chapter explores the preferences in China’s behaviour from the perspective of 
its strategic culture. The chapter adopts Alastair Iain Johnston’s definition of strategic culture as an 
                                                           
17 B. Buzan & L. Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 
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20 Ibid. 
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integrated ‘system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military 
force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.’22 In the other words, strategic culture 
refers to the means deemed appropriate to ensure security.23 
Some elements of China’s strategic culture are clearly rooted in the historic record. Retired Lieutenant 
General Li Jijun, former Deputy Director of the Academy of Military Sciences, has said that ‘China’s 
ancient strategic culture is rooted in the philosophical idea of unity between man and nature (tian ren he 
yi, 天人合一), which pursues overall harmony between man and nature and harmony among men’.24 In 
this regard, ‘the political-military pattern of PLA deployment from 1950 to 1996 showed certain 
consistent characteristics, such as early warning for deterrence, seizure of the initiative, risk acceptance, 
and risk management’.25 Such patterns can be traced from The Art of War by Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu stated 
that ‘The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's 
deliberations when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are: i) Moral Law; ii) 
Heaven; iii) Earth; iv) the Commander; and, v) Method and discipline’. “Heaven” refers to the night and 
day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 
Most Chinese researchers believe that ancient principles, such as ‘trying peaceful means before 
resorting to force’ (xian li hou bing, 先礼后兵), has been a major influence on post-1949 China. 
Professor Alastair Iain Johnston has pointed out that there are three preferences - ‘territory-oriented’, 
‘policy-oriented’ and ‘regime-oriented’ - when analyzing China’s basic political approach to the use of 
force. These preferences aim at alternating or defending the territory status quo, alternating the policies of 
the given related states, and alternating the regime of other states or maintaining the legitimacy or stability 
of its own state. Professor Johnston’s conclusion is that from 1949–1992, in Chinese foreign policy the 
first category accounts for 49%, the second 42.3% and the third is only about 7%.26 That is to say, regime 
change has been less of a preference in China’s foreign policy agenda. 
As Sun Tzu famously wrote, ‘the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and 
intact’（不战而屈人之兵), however, this arises not out of any humanitarian impulse but a general 
correct assessment of the full range of variables, and such victory will be determined before engaging in 
battle and may even make battle superfluous. Most Chinese strategic thinkers believe that Chinese 
strategic culture is pacifistic, defensive-minded, and non-expansionist.27 However, as the coin has two 
sides, there are some contradicting viewpoints and arguments on the surface. Indeed, Sima Rangju, a 
professional militarist in the latter part of the “Spring and Autumn period” (BC. 770 - BC. 476), states 
that ‘warfare is necessary to the existence of the state, that it provides the principle means for punishing 
evil and rescuing the oppressed, and that its conscientious exploitation is the foundation for political 
power’（攻其国，爱其民，攻之可也；以战止战，虽战可也).To pursue justice and legitimate goals, 
he opined, necessary military means can be considered and accepted, even aggressive approaches. 
However, it is a difficult to demonstrate how war can be just or not. It is well known that the judgments 
on “just war” depend on different values and philosophy. Hence, how to make Beijing accept that RtoP is 
both just and legitimate is the challenging task for the related stakeholder.   
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Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
 
As an ever more important player in UN peacekeeping, China’s attitudes and behaviour are certainly 
essential to RtoP decision-making and implementation through the UN. Criticism is not the appropriate 
way to promote China’s engagement in RtoP. The PLA’s researcher at the Academy of Military Science, 
Yao Yunzhu says, ‘we are criticized if we do more and criticized if we do less. The West should decide 
what it wants. The international military order is either US-led through NATO or through bilateral deals 
– there is nothing like the World Trade Organization (WTO) for China to get into’.28 Once China is 
accepted by international regimes, it will accept the related rules and norms. China’s access to the WTO is 
an excellent example. Without the WTO as a platform, the EU’s and US’ debates over intellectual 
property and other issues with China would be more difficult than present. If only criticism against China 
pervades, China will be more reluctant to play a role. More reluctance results in more criticism and so the 
spiral continues. Then, mistrust similar to the security dilemma witnessed during the Cold War will 
promote rising conservative nationalism in China, which will be a further obstacle to cooperation. The 
importance of consensus between Chinese and Western values should be attached. Consensus is the 
social and intellectual basis of international cooperation between China and the Western stakeholders. 
To promote China’s engagement in RtoP, a multi-track dialogue mechanism should be established, 
including official, academic and civilian. Through academic exchange, Chinese intelligentsia acquaints 
and accepts Western perceptions and values, which will exert its influence on political policy-makers. In 
China, international studies, especially applied policy analysis, will get funding support from the Ministry 
of Education and related institutions, which means there are dialogue mechanisms and tracks between 
government and academic researchers. Last but not least, as was mentioned above, the dilemmas faced by 
China, such as regime-change oriented preferences, diplomacy taboos and its limited power projection 
capabilities, should be considered by the international community.   
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An Examination of the Level of Standby Effectiveness in the EU for RtoP Style 
Deployments 
 
DAVID CURRAN 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The EU (and its Member States) has been a key advocate of developing RtoP capabilities on a regional 
and international level. In 2008, Oxfam International reported that EU Member States were ‘at the 
forefront of the successful diplomacy’ that resulted in the historic 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document1. In the 2011 General Assembly dialogue on the role of regional and sub-regional 
arrangements in implementing RtoP, the EU ‘voiced support’2 for the suggestion of the UN Secretary 
General to hold next year’s dialogue on the third pillar of RtoP3. However, questions remain over the 
extent to which EU standby arrangements are prepared to develop capacities to meet demands that a 
human security orientated foreign policy would demand. 
It is thus worth analyzing current EU preparedness for operations that would be akin to suggested 
RtoP deployments: namely deployments centred around the ‘Protection of Civilians’ (PoC) as defined by 
the UN’s ‘cross-cutting mandates’4. This chapter demonstrates that although the EU has declared 
approaches to human security and PoC operations, the preparedness of military Battlegroups and civilian-
led peacekeeping operations is less clear. Therefore in examining ‘timely and decisive’ approaches to third 
pillar activity from a regional organization, this chapter makes an important contribution to ongoing 
debates. 
At this stage it is important to make the qualification between PoC and RtoP, and also explain why 
there exist sufficient relations between the two concepts so that analysis of the EU’s approach to PoC may 
indicate its approach to RtoP. Although the protection of civilians has a differing legal precedent5  
(through international humanitarian law as well as international human rights and refugee law6), 
narrower conceptions7 of PoC, as undertaken by UN mandated peacekeeping operations is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. The development in the UN has been predominantly through UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000). Resolution 1296 provides a definition of the narrow 
approaches to PoC advocated in the UN: ‘the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other 
protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.’8 
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Whereas PoC examines how peacekeeping deployments can operationally protect civilians in the 
deployment zone, the R2P principle provides a ‘political framework for preventing mass atrocities’9. 
Moreover, narrow PoC is generally seen as a norm that mainly occurs during a conflict, whereas RtoP is 
seen as an organizing norm which predominantly occurs outside of armed conflict (although there are grey 
areas in this). However, there is crossover between the two concepts, seen most clearly in the UN’s 
approaches to peacekeeping operations. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect notes that 
open debates in the Security Council on PoC have provided the ‘only occasions within the formal 
Council agenda to reflect on the development of the R2P norm and its practice.’10 Moreover, Popovski 
finds that there are links between the narrow approaches to PoC and the RtoP. He argues that ‘in many 
situations, the two circles of R2P and PoC can overlap — for example, when war crimes against civilians or 
crimes against humanity (including ethnic cleansing and genocide) are committed during armed 
conflict.’11 
This has led practitioners and observers to attempt to define the exact relationship between the two 
concepts. Ed Luck, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on R2P has characterized it as 
‘cousins but not sisters’, Popovski argues it is more akin to ‘sisters, but not twins’12. Nevertheless there is a 
relationship between PoC and RtoP, particularly with regards to the possibility that RtoP style 
interventions may have a high civilian protection component. This in turn will have considerable effects 
on the mandates, and the roles and responsibilities of peacekeeping personnel. It is thus appropriate to 
examine the EU’s existing approaches to PoC cases as an indicator to how the organization would 
approach RtoP style deployments. 
 
 
The EU and the UN 
 
 
Regional organizations play a ‘significant’ role in the conduct of international conflict resolution13, and it 
was the contribution of regional organizations to RtoP which formed the basis of an informal interactive 
dialogue in the General Assembly in 2011. In his 2011 report to the General Assembly (which formed a 
guide to the dialogue), UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon stated: ‘as the principle moves from words to 
deeds on both the global and regional levels, what is needed is an early and flexible response tailored to 
the circumstances of each case rather than any generalized or prescriptive set of policy options’.14 
The relationship between the EU and UN in peace operations is a familiar one. Of the 23 Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)15 missions launched between 2003 and 2009, 15 have been deployed 
in countries where the UN has a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. Moreover, all EU missions in 
Africa ‘have involved direct or indirect cooperation with the UN’16. Joint EU/UN policy reflects this 
growing trend17, in particular the EU Council’s paper, EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management 
Operations18. This identified that the EU could deploy forces to assist UN operations, introducing the 
concept of the ‘bridging model’, which would be able to provide the UN with ‘time to mount a new 
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operation or to reorganize an existing one’. Taking this synergy a stage further, the paper discussed a 
model for an ‘over the horizon reserve’ of EU forces to be able to react rapidly to crises. This 
demonstrated the desire for EU crisis management and UN peacekeeping to have synergy in motivations, 
desired end states, and means to achieve those goals. The 2008 implementation report on the European 
Security Strategy reaffirmed this close relationship by stating that ‘everything the EU has done in the field 
of security has been linked to UN objectives’19.  
 
 
EU Crisis Management and Human Security 
 
 
Since 1992, the EU (and the former Western European Union) has developed capabilities for deploying 
military and civilian personnel into what is termed crisis management operations, and creating a 
‘European identity’ to ‘promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’ 20. The 
“Petersberg Tasks”21 have undergone a process of realignment and expansion through the Helsinki 
Council Conclusions (1999)22, and the Headline Goals 201023. The Headline Goals encompass both 
military and civilian actors, and are complemented by the Civilian Headline Goals (outlined further below 
in this article): 
 
 
Box 1-1 
 
 
Military Headline Goals 
 
 Humanitarian and Rescue Tasks; 
 Peacekeeping Tasks; 
 Tasks of Combat Forces in Crisis Management, Including Peacemaking; 
 Support for Third Countries in Combatting Terrorism; 
 Security Sector Reform. 
 
 
 
 
The desire to develop crisis management operations is reflected in the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
as two of the five key threats it outlines - regional conflicts, state collapse – relate to crisis management-
style responses outlined in the Headline Goals 201024. Such responses are suited to the EU, through its 
ability to combine economic, civilian and military capabilities. This view is reinforced in the 2008 Report 
on the Implementation of the ESS, which gave working examples of the EU’s multitude of crisis 
management responses. 
The development of capacities to meet the ESS demands and the Headline Goal has also required the 
EU to develop a wider normative value to its conflict management activities. This can be seen in the 2008 
ESS implementation report, which outlined the EU’s success and remaining challenges in relation to 
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20 European Union, “The Treaty of Amsterdam”, October 1997. 
21 Western European Union Council of Ministers, “Petersburg Declaration”, Bonn, 19 June 1992, p. 6. 
22 EU Council, “Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council”, 10-11 December 1999. 
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concepts of ‘human security’25, stating that ‘we need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all 
activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the 
concept of human security’.26 
A “people-based approach” outlook on foreign and defence policy is related strongly to RtoP 
approaches to peace and security, with the report stating that “sovereignty entails responsibility”, and that 
the EU holds ‘a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity’.27 
The development of RtoP principles in the EU has developed in conjunction with an ‘EU approach’ 
to Human Security. In 2003, High Representative Javier Solana initiated a process to study the 
applicability of “human security” to EU policy. The Barcelona Report28 represents the ‘first coherent 
attempt to develop a security policy based on the human security concept’29. The report defined human 
security as being: ‘individual freedom from basic insecurities. Genocide, wide-spread or systematic torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, and crimes against humanity and grave 
violations of the laws of war as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are forms 
of intolerable insecurity that breach human security’.30 
In this light the Barcelona Report argued that the EU should ‘contribute to the protection of every 
individual human being’, as opposed to focussing on the defence of borders. Militaries should therefore 
be ‘configured in quite new ways’, reflecting the ‘real security needs of people’31, and be backed up by a 
“New European Security Doctrine”, which would cover the whole spectrum of crisis response mechanisms 
– from prevention to resolution. Thus, interventions would look different to what has been seen before, 
sitting between ‘classical peacekeeping and classic military intervention’, offering a comprehensive 
approach, and involving ‘different types of political institutions and different phases of conflict or state 
failure’32. 
In order to put this into practice, the Barcelona Report makes a case for a 15,000 strong “Human 
Security Response Force”, with a military component being combined with civilian capabilities. 
Significant training developments would be required to assist military personnel in carrying out future 
human security interventions, identifying a "considerable culture shift’ for the military, with a new type of 
‘human security officer’ being highly skilled and flexible, in order to meet the tasks bestowed upon 
him/her.33 
In 2006, the same panel of experts was commissioned by the Finnish Presidency of the EU to write an 
update report reflecting the progress of human security in the EU. The outcomes were outlined in the 
2007 Madrid Report34. Like the Barcelona Report, the Madrid Report strongly advocated for an approach that 
involved the use of robust military force35, combined with nuanced forms of integration between civilian 
and military actors. The report makes the point that instead of using civilian and military assets as ‘part of 
a standard toolkit’, human security interventions should foster a deeper understanding about ‘how and 
why civil and military capabilities are combined’36. Importantly, the Madrid Report reflected the growing 
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importance of the RtoP principle, and argues that a human security approach would draw on debates ‘in 
current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human 
development’’37. 
Both the Barcelona and Madrid reports advocate the institutionalization of human security in 
European security principle and practice, outlining ambitious plans for the EU to incorporate not only 
the language, but also the ethos of Human Security. With the Madrid Report, the EU is seen as a vehicle 
which can strengthen the goals of RtoP through a human security approach to operations, arguing that a 
human security approach ‘would allow the EU to refine and coordinate what it already does under 
multiple labels’. In order to understand where the EU can contribute to third pillar activities, it is worth 
seeing exactly where it has contributed in RtoP style activities, namely preparation for operations with a 
high PoC component. 
 
 
Protection of Civilians in EU policy 
 
 
In 2003, the EU Council concluded that EU crisis management operations would fully address the 
‘special protection, rights and assistance needs of civilians’38. The subsequent policy process led to the 
2010 Draft Revised Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations. The 2010 
guidelines were created at the suggestion of the EU Council firstly to explore the extent to which PoC 
issues are considered during the formulation of CSDP missions, and secondly to capture experience of 
other organizations in operationalizing PoC39. Importantly, the guidelines attempt to differentiate 
between the development of existing UN approaches to incorporating PoC, and the requirement for the 
EU to develop its own specific operational guidance. In doing this, it suggests that the EU should develop 
its own PoC contribution on both external and internal levels. Externally, the EU would cooperate with 
the UN through the New Horizons process and other formal channels40. Internally, the Revised Guidelines 
propose that EU deployments take into account PoC at all stages, from advance planning, operational 
planning, conduct of operations, and lessons learned41. 
Nevertheless, the Revised Guidelines contain no EU-specific definition of PoC. This is recognised in the 
guidelines, which note that although PoC provisions have been included in ‘several mandates’, there has 
not been an explicit mention of the ‘concept of PoC’ in mandates of CSDP missions. UN concepts are 
seen as providing input only to the EU processes, and the guidelines only suggests that the EU is well 
placed for developing a coordinated approach to PoC ‘in its broadest sense’42. The closest attempt of a 
definition is provided by the ‘operational aspects’ of proposed deployments, and the training 
requirements for EU personnel preparing for deployment (Box 1-2). Operational and training aspects 
show a full spectrum of peacekeeping activity, carried out by personnel with a wide knowledge of relevant 
human rights law, and how that law applies in the deployment zone.  
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42 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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Box 1-2 
 
 
Operational aspects of operations involving PoC 
 
 Monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement and ceasefires; 
 
 Creating conditions conducive to safe, timely and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian 
assistance; 
 
 Ensuring freedom of movement and route security (including for refugees/IDPs); 
 
 Public order management; 
 
 Monitoring (including of the human rights situation) and reporting; 
 
 Police and military patrols; 
 
 Mentoring and training of local military or police structures to ensure the PoC; 
 
 Stabilization of a post-crisis situation through Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR); 
 
Specific training requirements for personnel deploying on operations including PoC 
 
 Human rights, gender, international humanitarian, refugee, international and national 
criminal law; 
 
 Issues regarding discrimination; 
 
 The rights and protection of children and other vulnerable groups, including the special 
needs of women and girls to be protected from sexual and gender-based violence, forced 
labour, trafficking and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict and post-
conflict environments; 
 
 The human rights situation and the international human rights obligations of the Host 
State or States of a CSDP mission/operation.43 
 
 
 
This lack of definition can be interpreted as a positive factor, enabling the EU to draw on a wide range of 
policies, initiatives, and tools all in the name of PoC. It can also be interpreted as a negative factor. Not 
defining PoC runs the risk of the EU lacking strategic direction to guide its activities and operations. 
Furthermore, a lack of definition creates difficulties in quantifying the success of PoC strategies. Both of 
these factors have influenced the success of military and civilian preparedness. 
 
 
Military Crisis Management – the Battlegroups 
 
 
Although the EU has deployed military capabilities in the past (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, as well as 
deployments in the DRC), this chapter will focus on EU Battlegroups. EU military capacity is largely 
represented by the ‘Battlegroup concept’, which were operationalized in 2007. In the Battlegroup model 
two separate multinational formations of 1,500 soldiers inclusive of all ‘combat and service support as 
well as deployability and sustainability assets44 are placed on rotation for six months (two Battlegroups 
from December to June, then two Battlegroups from July-December). Battlegroups are composed in 
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different ways. Fundamentally, personnel are provided by EU Member States. In some cases, a 
Battlegroup can be comprised of two states (usually if one of the states is a larger military power), in some 
cases there are a large number of smaller states (the strength of many different parts making the whole), 
and in other cases, there is a mixture of the two.
Battlegroups are intended to provide a rapid reaction capability to the EU’s crisis management 
structures, by being ready to deploy between 5 and 30 days from a EU Council Action setting up an 
operation45. Moreover, they are intended to ‘prepare the ground for larger, more traditional peacekeeping 
forces, ideally provided by the UN or the Member States’, and thus
deployment zones where a peace process (if there is one) is its earliest stages and at its most fragile
Granholm’s study of Battlegroups finds that they provide the EU with an autonomous rapid response 
option, which can be utilized as a ‘spearhead force’, with the capabilities to enter a conflict zone with the 
goal of stabilizing it under a UN Chapter VII
also links with conceptions of ‘bridging forces’ outlined above.  A list of the Battlegroup
in Table 1-1. 
Battlegroups are primarily designed to undertake small deployment, and cover the tasks outlined in the 
Helsinki Headline Goals 2010. As the Battlegroups are compri
would be at the ‘demanding end’ of the spectrum of activities. Within this demanding end, the 
Battlegroups have five planning scenarios, or ‘activities’. The five military planning scenarios that the EU 
uses for the Battlegroups are outlined in Table 1
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Table 1-1: The Battlegroups48 
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Table 1-2: List of Planning Scenarios49 
 
 
Task Description 
Separation of Parties by force Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace 
enforcement. 
 
Stabilization, Reconstruction and Military 
Assistance to Third Countries 
Peacekeeping, election monitoring, 
institution building, security-sector reform 
and support to third countries combating 
terrorism. 
 
Conflict Prevention 
 
Preventive engagement, preventive 
deployment and embargo, counter-
proliferation and joint disarmament 
operations. 
 
Evacuation Operation in a Non-Permissive 
Environment 
 
Evacuation of non-combatants. 
Assistance to Humanitarian Operations 
 
Management of the consequences of disasters 
and atrocity prevention. 
 
 
 
 
Conceptually, these activities fit in with concepts of human security and third pillar approaches. Their 
tasks can be aligned within the spectrum of operations under the term ‘peace support operations’, the 
concept calls for rapid deployment, of considerable importance when reacting to ongoing abuses of 
civilians by armed groups50. Battlegroups are also intended to deploy alongside the EU’s police and 
civilian capabilities in post-conflict environments. Although this is not specified in policy, observers note 
that many of the tasks undertaken by EU civilian personnel (outlined below) will lead to encounters with 
their military counterparts51. This is also in line with wider Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine, 
which outlines a combination of both military and civilian interaction in post conflict environments52 
Implementing a culture of PoC into EU peacekeepers is however a difficult task. ‘Specialist skills’ have 
been highlighted by Granholm and Jonson, who find, in their FOI53 study of Battlegroups, that the 
operating environment for EU Battlegroups will demand an increased ability to incorporate a wider series 
of skills, including ‘operational adaptability, use of force, technical and cultural know-how, and, not least, 
ability to cooperate with various civilian agencies’54. Moreover, the unique aspect of ‘interoperability’ 
amongst EU military and civilian mechanism has placed demands on both military and civilian 
peacekeepers, with the Political and Security Committee outlining the desire to promote synergies 
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between civilian and military actors55. Moreover, as seen above, the demands of institutionalizing PoC 
should provide a normative underpinning to how the Battlegroups are developed, trained and deployed. 
Without a strategic definition of PoC, this may prove problematic. Added to this, the Battlegroup concept 
suffers two further difficulties in operationalizing PoC: that of training, and that of force size. 
Training PoC is difficult to assess. As Martin outlined in her study of EU training in the field of 
human security, training of EU military and civilian personal is ‘highly diverse and fragmented’, thus 
making it ‘particularly hard to arrive at a generalized assessment’56. Military training for Battlegroups is 
decentralized in the EU, firstly to the Framework nations, who are then responsible for the individual 
troop contributing countries (thus, in effect offering two levels of decentralization)57. This decentralized 
system carries positive aspects. For example, it encourages increased flexibility for framework nations to 
taper training cycles to more contemporary conflict situations, as opposed to following a ‘one rule fits all’ 
approach to training. It also allows for good practice to spread amongst Member States, encouraging a 
bottom-up process of training for EU deployment58. There is also evidence to suggest that Battlegroup 
training is a well organized activity. The Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) offers a solid example of training 
processes to prepare a multinational group of personnel for joint deployment. The NBG Lessons Learned 
report highlights the high level of joint training for personnel, including design and implementation of 
four major exercises, individual and collective staff training, testing of self-developed concepts, as well as 
involvement in wider European training exercises (e.g. VIKING 11). According to the NBG Lessons 
Learned report, the outcome of training, exercise and evaluation was assessed as ‘very good’59. 
However, little information exists on the level of training across other Battlegroups. This leads to more 
subjective approaches to how well adapted military personnel are to operate in a PoC environment. The 
Institute of Security Studies’ assessment is particularly strong: ‘Europeans do not have nearly enough 
soldiers with the necessary skills for international peacekeeping. Some EU Member States have not yet 
fully reformed their armed forces from a Cold War posture of defending national territory to participating 
in international peacekeeping operations’.60 
Lindstrom outlines that ‘credibility gaps’ may surface amongst nations in a Battlegroup, particularly if 
nations choose not to share exactly how prepared they are with other Member States61. This is partly a 
result of a lack of overarching strategy on PoC, and there being, apart from the European Defence Agency 
and European Security Strategy, ‘no evidence of top down approaches’62. This is reflected to an extent in 
the EU’s own reports. It was reported in 2010 that although the Headline Goal 2010 adds that Member 
States are committed to develop ‘quantitative benchmarks and criteria’ in the field of multinational 
training, Member States were still unable to agree an EU level Standard of Training for Multinational 
Battlegroups63. Additionally, the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 
recommended that pre-deployment training be ‘standardized to a greater extent’64. This not only impacts 
levels of military preparedness. Lack of standardization in joint training programmes with civilian 
counterparts has been cited as a missing element of Battlegroup training. This may contribute to wider 
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difficulties of establishing effective civil-military coordination mechanisms in deployment zones, thus 
impacting on the EU’s ability to provide comprehensive approaches to crisis management65. 
As well as training, it is debatable to the extent that EU Battlegroups can offer the full range of 
protection to civilian populations. The Battlegroup is a restricted tool for the EU – offering a relatively 
small number of soldiers to enter a conflict environment for a relatively short space of time. The Nordic 
Battlegroup offers a solid example of this. The lessons learned report identifies that when choosing the 
possible deployment scenarios for the Battlegroup, it was recommended by the EU Military Staff to leave 
out the scenario ‘Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Assistance to Third Countries’66. Although 
this is a rational approach to what can and cannot be achieved, it demonstrates that the EU’s Battlegroup 
capability is unable to meet the wide and demanding range of policy objectives outlined in EU PoC and 
human security plans. A Battlegroup of 1,500 personnel can only achieve so much when deployed. The 
level of demand placed on the Battlegroup by a potentially wide range of planning scenarios, could be 
dangerous for the EU if the Battlegroup is unable to meet the demands.  
Overarching this is the fact that EU battlegroups are yet to be deployed. The Battlegroups are 
conspicuous by their absence in international crisis management operations, and such inactivity has led to 
critical assessments of EU Member States’ willingness to deploy Battlegroups. Most recently, this has been 
in the form of analysis of the EU’s lack of engagement in the Goma region of the DRC in late 200867. 
Although the EU were formally asked by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (through a letter to Javier 
Solana) to provide forces to support the UN’s MONUSCO deployment, and certain EU Member States 
were enthusiastic about deployment under the Battlegroup concept, the British and German governments 
– framework nations for the two Battlegroups on rotation – refused to deploy68. Gowan notes that this 
refusal to send Battlegroups into Goma highlighted wider political difficulties at the heart of the concept, 
namely that structural flaws in the Battlegroup structures meant that the two framework nations were 
effectively able to avoid a commitment to deploying their Battlegroups.  
Gowan also relates this to debates over RtoP, citing an article which appeared in the Irish Times which 
argued ‘If successful, an EU battlegroup can help transform the responsibility to protect from word to 
deed’69. The fact that this did not happen left advocates of intervention disappointed. As demonstrated in 
the case of the DRC, deploying Battlegroups for PoC and human security objectives is a complex 
undertaking. Immediate post-conflict environments are fraught with hazard, and have a higher potential 
for violence. To deploy an EU Battlegroup, the EU will require the consensus from the 27 Member States 
and a firm commitment from the framework nation70. If a request is made to use a Battlegroup in a 
potentially violent environment, with little relation to the national security objectives of the framework 
nation, then tough decisions will have to be made.   
 
 
 
Civilian Crisis Management 
 
 
In comparison with developments in the military arena, the EU’s civilian approach to crisis management 
has a longer history. The 2000 Feira Council conclusions reinforced the ‘priority areas’ for civilian 
capabilities – police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection – and declared that by 2003, the 
EU will be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions covering crisis response 
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and prevention activities71. In 2004, this was developed in the Civilian Headline Goals 2008, which 
outlined the EU’s vision for enhancing civilian capacity: ‘[The EU] will, inter alia, contribute to activities 
such as security sector reform and support disarmament, demobilization/reintegration processes. Civilian 
missions can achieve this by strengthening local institutions through advice, training and monitoring, 
and/or performing executive functions (substitution missions)’72. 
This was further developed in 2008, with the establishment of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010. The 
2010 goal sought to further strengthen areas of civilian participation in crisis management operations and 
explicitly outlined developments in ‘rapidly deployable police elements’ and the desire to make ‘civilian 
response teams’ increasingly operational. This certainly contributes in areas where the Battlegroups are 
unable to reach. 
Like the military aspect, training is an important indicator of to what extent PoC is infused through 
the crisis management architecture. The process of working out whether police and civilian training for 
crisis management contributes to protection of civilians strategies is difficult to understand due to the 
diverse nature of training, and the number of civilian and police training academies that there are. 
Hadden observes that each Member State is responsible ‘for the design of its own pre-deployment training 
curriculum and its delivery, with only limited guidance supplied by the mission’, leading to variations in 
the level and content of training73. 
Despite this, coordination in training programmes has emerged over the past ten years, firstly with the 
development of the European Group on Training (EGT)74, and its subsequent replacement ‘Europe’s 
New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management’ (ENTRi). ENTRi is the result of collaboration 
between a number of training organizations and government institutes75, and offers a coordinated 
approach to training civilian personnel, offering 34 ‘pre-deployment and specialization courses’ between 
May 2011 and December 2012, with a possible audience of up to 8,00076. Alongside pre-deployment 
courses for particular operations, ENTRi runs subject specific courses, including conflict analysis, human 
rights, mediation and negotiation, and child protection77. As well as covering many of the ‘softer end’ 
tasks of deployment, these training programmes offer a considered response to wider issues of civilian 
protection in conflict and post-conflict societies. 
This is shown most explicitly through the introduction of the Folke Bernadotte Academy – a Swedish 
government agency - run course entitled Field Strategies for Protection of Civilians. This course is based on 
Proactive Presence, a concept developed at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which offers a guide to 
the ‘actions and strategies that deter or dissuade against abuses, persuade abusers to behave differently, 
strengthen or expand civilian capacity for self-protection, and foster institutional reform’.78 
The course is designed to develop participants’ awareness as to how they can ‘promote the protection 
of civilians through effective field presence’ through examining different models and strategies of 
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protection. The course represents a step forward in the development of training concepts for PoC, and 
thus a positive step in designing models for PoC within the EU.  
Both ENTRi and the EGT also develop training programmes to prepare Civilian Response Teams 
(CRTs), defined by the EU as a ‘rapid reaction capability of flexible size and composition, consisting of 
Member State experts with, in principle, Council Secretariat participation’79 Over 100 staff remain in this 
pool of civilian expertise, working in four main areas: carrying out assessment and fact-finding missions in 
crisis situations; helping to prepare operation plans; ensuring a rapid operational presence on the ground; 
and supporting the initial phase of civilian missions. Both the EGT and ENRI have assisted training, and 
CRTs have deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan80. This again outlines a wider 
approach to PoC, where civilian expertise can be fostered to create larger multidimensional operations 
with a strong civilian component. 
The level of civilian expertise gives the EU ‘its comparative appeal as a global crisis-management 
actor’81. Some go further and argue that such tools take the organization closer than ever to concepts of 
human security. Matlary’s assessment of the evolution of the EU’s civilian and military capacities marks 
the ‘political conclusion’ of the development of human security as a concept, and therefore makes the EU 
a ‘potentially more relevant’ security actor as the nature of security is less aligned with the nation state and 
more aligned with concepts of human security. Matlary goes on to argue that the EU Security Strategy 
‘weds’ human rights to security, including military security’82. Although one may argue against Giegerich’s 
claim that the EU has the potential to ‘dominate’ future forms of integrated crisis management83, it is 
certainly true that the more optimistic EU policy makers understand that the EU has an advanced role in 
international crisis management. This optimism is borne out of the view that the civilian assets at the 
EU’s disposal make the organization a leader in PoC activities. 
On the other hand, this must be tempered with a more skeptical analysis of the difficulties that the EU 
faces in the physical constraints that is placed on it. In 2009, ISIS Europe offered a sobering account of 
the challenges faced by EU civilian peacekeeping, stating that developments of civilian capabilities have 
not improved since the Headline Goal 2008. It went on to argue: 
 
‘The first CHG [Civilian Headline Goal] being theoretical in what would be needed for CCM, it is 
only now that the gaps for civilian capabilities have been ascertained. Furthermore, the EU is also 
suffering overload with ESDP missions and EU Member States now face problems of personnel 
rotation and doing more with less. Quality across-the-board EU training and the support structures 
for planning and deployment are still nascent’.84 
 
The ISIS report also touches on how such training developments have dealt with PoC. Questioning issues 
of concepts, resources and procurement dedicated to operationalizing PoC and human security, the paper 
makes a strong warning. That such a warning is still valuable tells of the divide between principles and 
action: ‘tacking on as an afterthought frameworks such as: international humanitarian law; civilian 
participation in security sector reform; and gender perspectives - only if there is sufficient budget or 
“relevance” - is a poor strategy for concretizing the basis for missions to protect the population’.85 
Instead of this ‘afterthought approach’, the paper advocates that such issues must be involved from the 
pre-planning stage, and include local actors in order to engage the local population. Human Security, the 
paper argues, can be used as an ‘organizing concept’, ‘binding and explaining the core aim of a holistic 
EU approach’86. This is reflected in an article authored by Mary Kaldor, who strongly advocates that 
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Human Security requires a ‘change in the way of thinking’ towards ‘an entirely new way of functioning in 
crises’87.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has looked at how, through operationalizing PoC, the EU is developing capacities for timely 
and effective responses to RtoP style responses. As the chapter shows, there is at the declaratory level, a 
commitment to human security, protection of civilians and RtoP. This is outlined in policy statements. At 
the operational level there is less clarity, particularly with regards to the Battlegroups. 
The decentralized nature of training structures in the Battlegroups means that it is difficult to assess 
the level of training for crisis management operations based on PoC mandates. There are signals that 
European forces are well prepared for PoC mandates, either through existing operational experience, or 
through supporting UN initiatives. Operations in Chad and the DRC are testament to this. However, 
Battlegroup units have not led military deployments undertaken by the EU. There is a lack of study into 
individual Battlegroup processes, or comparative studies of how Battlegroups prepare and what scenarios 
they are prepared for. Without such study, it is difficult to respond to critiques. This is not to say that EU 
Battlegroups are incapable of wider PoC activities. There are two models that Battlegroups are useful for – 
both outlined in the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management. Firstly, is the 
‘bridging model’ concept, in preparation for a wider peacekeeping force. Secondly, through acting as an 
‘over-the-horizon’ force to provide a deterrent to ‘spoilers’ and belligerent groups. 
Nevertheless, the lack of deployment of EU Battlegroups is a continual problem. Gowan notes that in 
order ‘to comprehend the EU’s crisis-management tools, it helps to know which ones it discards.’88 When 
linked to differing levels of training and a lack of overarching doctrine, the inaction of certain EU 
Battlegroups’ highlights a gap between the ambitious ideas outlined by the Barcelona and Madrid reports, 
and the realities of Battlegroup preparedness and deployment. This may have consequences for those 
wishing to see whether the EU can mobilize Battlegroups for ‘timely and decisive action’ in responding to 
mass atrocity crimes. 
On the other hand, the development of the EGT and ENTRi shows that there is coordination in 
training processes in civilian crisis management. Although academies are funded by national 
governments, the development of shared training across national boundaries will offer the EU a solid 
foundation of skilled civilian peace-builders. Through applying the theoretical concepts of Protection of 
Civilians, the PoC Course at the Folke Bernadotte Academy also highlights a positive development in 
civilian training for PoC mandates. It also goes some way to responding to the criticism that PoC is an 
‘afterthought’ and demonstrating a commitment to PoC at the planning stage of an operation.  
Definitional problems remain. This has been highlighted in the EU’s overall approach to crisis 
management89. With PoC, difficulties have arisen in how to substantiate levels of training for military and 
civilian personnel, and their overall purpose in crisis management operations. Related to the creation of 
coherent responses to timely and decisive approaches to issues related to human security, the EU may 
suffer from this lack of strategic definition. With this lack of definition, it is difficult for the EU to be as 
proactive in its approaches to intervention as the Barcelona and Madrid reports would desire. 
It would be too critical to claim that the EU’s advocacy on RtoP is ‘words without deeds’. Military and 
civilian operations have shown that in the right context, the EU can employ substantial resources in 
operations. However, the question could be whether the Battlegroups can be reinforced to meet the 
demands of an ambitious human security agenda, or the agenda be downsized to meet the limited 
capabilities of the Battlegroups. 
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Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect’s “Sharp End”: Towards a No 
Footprint Approach? 
 
ROBERT SCHÜTTE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The international community’s dealings with the military operations in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire have 
heralded a new phase of deliberations about the RtoP. Both the NATO-led intervention force and the 
UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) were authorized with a robust mandate by the UNSC to 
protect civilians under imminent threat. However, the implementation of their respective Protection of 
Civilians (PoC) mandates has become a subject of criticism. Some countries have lamented that UNOCI 
and NATO overstepped their mandates by abandoning their impartial role and pursuing regime change 
instead. The events of 2011 have revealed two important developments: first, that the RtoP has become a 
firmly established norm within the UN; and second, that there remains a fair degree of ambiguity and 
disagreement about the actual operationalization of RtoP's “third pillar”, in particular its military 
dimension. In line with this argument, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of 
Genocide, Francis Deng, has argued in early 2012 that recent “Security Council decisions in response to 
developments in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya and the on-going discussions of the situation in Syria also show 
that debates now focus on the manner of response in implementation of RtoP rather than on the concept 
itself.”1 This is in particular true for the military dimension of the norm. 
There is a large body of literature on the issue of preventing mass atrocities dealing with both political 
and operational considerations. The same can be said about the question of re-building states and 
societies that have fallen victim to atrocity crimes, although one has to admit that the international 
community was only partly successful during the past two decades. The most neglected issues to date is 
how exactly the third pillar's military dimension can and should be implemented. Unfortunately, there 
has been only scant reflection about the practical requirements, implications and obstacles of military 
interventions to halt imminent or ongoing mass crimes. For the sake of accurate terminology, I refer to 
such military interventions as Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MAROs). I make three assertions in 
this chapter: first, it is argued that political decisions concerning military measures under RtoP's “third 
pillar” need to take more account of the operational requirements of MAROs; second, the chapter 
analyzes existing approaches to robust civilian protection and highlight the need for a comprehensive 
doctrine on civilian protection; and, third, given Western governments' increasing reluctance to consider 
ground troop deployments for the purpose of halting atrocities, the chapter holds that airborne MAROs 
will for the foreseeable future be the only politically feasible option. It is argued that NATO's campaign in 
Libya might function as a role model for future MAROs, and that the focus of further deliberations 
should be on predominantly airborne military interventions. 
 
 
Moving from “If” to “How”: Re-aligning Political and Operational Aspects 
 
 
The UNSC's resolute handling of the crises in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire has surprised even the most 
optimistic proponents of RtoP. Its swift reaction to the threat of mass atrocities had many different 
reasons. The mandates to coercively protect civilians, however, would have been unthinkable without the 
normative context of the emergence of RtoP and rapidly increasing attention to questions of PoC. Since 
RtoP's adoption in 2005, deliberations about the UN's pivotal role in preventing massive human rights 
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violations have been reflected in numerous UNSC and UNGA resolutions as well as reports of the 
UNSG. In the same vein, a number of initiatives promoted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have been 
instrumental in promoting PoC within the UN and, in particular, the UNSC. Hence, when put to the 
test in early 2011, the issue of protecting civilians in armed conflicts had already taken centre stage in 
Security Council deliberations. The authorization of coercive means in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire did not 
come out of the blue. 
It is sometimes argued that the Security Council’s recent dithering over Syria may be explained by 
NATO's implementation of RtoP in Libya. The critics maintain that the NATO-led coalition has 
overstepped its mandate by launching its bombing campaign with the ultimate aim of paving the rebels' 
way to Tripoli and removing Gaddafi from power. It is not necessary to dive into the details of the 
political pros and cons of the argument, but instead more fruitful to look at how the lack of shared 
understanding about how exactly to conduct an MARO is in part to blame for the misgivings that have 
emerged since. The starting point is the UNSC's language on the Protection of Civilians which is clear 
and ambiguous at the same time. With regard to the deteriorating situation in Libya, the Council in 
Resolution 1973 authorized “Member States (…) to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” [author’s italics]. On the one hand, 
Resolution 1973 is absolutely clear about the objective to protect threatened civilians and civilian 
populated areas with all necessary means. On the other hand, the resolution neither spells out under 
which circumstance civilians or civilian populated areas are to be seen as threatened, nor what exactly the 
necessary means to protect those civilians would be. The threat to the population as well as the necessary 
means to avert this threat can be interpreted in both narrow and broad terms. Regardless of the fact that 
NATO's public statements remained non-committal, it is safe to say that the Alliance came to the 
conclusion that the Libyan population would be threatened by mass atrocities as long as Gaddafi 
remained in power. Against this background, all means necessary to protect civilians in Libya may 
reasonably encompass regime change. It is not surprising that Russia, China and a number of other 
countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa had a different understanding of Resolution 1973. In a 
narrow interpretation of Resolution 1973, NATO could have stopped Gaddafi's forces at the gates of 
Benghazi and subsequently let the Libyans fight it out among themselves. It is easy to imagine how NATO 
would have referred to its “impartial role” and an “unwillingness to become a party to the conflict”. Such 
an interpretation would also have raised questions about the Alliance’s commitment to its PoC mandate. 
There is simply no clear answer to the question, whether NATO overstepped its authority or not because 
the Security Council remained vague about the meaning of the resolution's key terms: “Threat to 
civilians” and “all necessary means”. 
At the end of the day, it was up to the Alliance to interpret Resolution 1973 and thereupon defines 
the ways and means to protect civilians. The lack of clarity about the operationalization of the RtoP in the 
case of Libya has prompted Brazil to propose a so called “Responsibility while Protecting” as a supplement 
to the RtoP. Amongst other things, the proposal calls for only limited legal, operational and temporal 
authorizations of force, and for enhanced UNSC procedures to monitor and assess the manner in which 
resolutions are interpreted and implemented.2 This would indeed be a step towards greater political 
control of RtoP mandates. However, this does not resolve the practical question of how RtoP 
interventions should be conducted. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has announced that the 
operationalization of the RtoP's “third pillar” will be the main subject of debate in 2012. Be that as it may, 
a workable operationalization of RtoP’s military component necessitates not only an agreement on 
political issues and procedures but an understanding of operational questions as well. Paying heed to the 
word and spirit of a resolution authorizing military intervention will be difficult as long as there is no 
understanding about what the provisions entail in practice. Hence, the UNSC should make an effort to 
debate the operational requirements that accompany successful MAROs. For example, the intervention in 
Libya required a sustained bombing campaign to destroy the Gaddafi regime's air defense systems to pave 
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the way for further PoC operations. Nevertheless, some governments that only shortly before had 
advocated for the protection of the Libyan population by all necessary means criticized this approach.  
Twelve years of experience with UN peacekeeping operations authorized to protect civilians have 
yielded an important lesson about separating political and operational considerations. The Security 
Council has time and again adopted unclear and unfeasible PoC mandates for peacekeeping missions that 
were impossible to implement on the ground. While the UNSC apparently saw a political necessity to 
protect civilians and incorporate corresponding wording into its resolutions, it lacked an understanding 
about the operational requirements to successfully implement civilian protection. This has all too often 
resulted in tragic and embarrassing situations where blue helmets were incapable of stopping atrocities 
taking place before their very eyes. Fortunately, the UNSC has in the past years grasped the problem and 
made significant headway. When discussing the military aspects of the RtoP's “third pillar”, we should 
take care to not repeat the same failure again but instead consider political and operational aspects in a 
joint manner. 
 
 
Two Approaches to Robust Civilian Protection Operations 
 
 
If we agree that the operationalization of the military aspects of the RtoP's third pillar should take 
operational considerations of PoC into account, a reasonable starting point is to examine the 
international community's existing modus operandi with regard to robust civilian protection. There are 
basically two distinct approaches, robust peace operations and MAROs. 
The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established in 1999, was the first peacekeeping force 
with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Since then, Protection of Civilian mandates have become a 
common feature of contemporary peace operations: In 2011, an all time high of 8 UN peace operations 
with more than 80,000 soldiers were deployed worldwide to provide threatened civilian populations with 
a modicum of safety. Nevertheless, the UN has not yet developed a comprehensive Protection of Civilians 
doctrine that could provide operational guidance. It is for this reason that the implementation of PoC 
mandates varies heavily among different missions and often hinges upon the prevailing commander's 
attitude and risk disposition. 
Despite laudable ad hoc approaches to civilian protection, the lack of a comprehensive doctrine has 
inhibited the UN's capacity to do a better job in PoC.3 We can nevertheless draw some operational 
conclusions about the dynamics and workings of robust PoC.4 The most important Protection of Civilian 
approach is PoC by deterrence. Protection by deterrence means that the very presence of blue helmets is 
in most cases sufficient to deter attacks on civilians and boost physical security in a given area of 
operations. While militias - mostly in bad shape and ill-equipped - shun direct confrontations with 
comparatively well-armed professional blue helmets, national authorities shy away from the exposure and 
the reporting of assaults. Experience shows that when violence escalates, civilians either flee the region or 
assemble around UN compounds. This is a clear indicator for the functioning of protection by 
deterrence. It is for the same reason of utmost importance for peacekeepers to regularly patrol volatile 
areas and to actually show up. A peacekeeping mission’s capacity to deter direct violence against civilians 
is to a large degree a function of two factors: first, its presence in endangered regions and second, its 
credibility to interfere to curb violence against non-combatants, if needed by force. Operationally, peace 
operations have to square the circle of showing presence in violence prone areas without stretching their 
forces so thin that they become incapable of enforcing their PoC mandate. This is especially difficult in 
vast places such as Darfur or the Democratic Republic of Congo where the UN lacks critical air mobility. 
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A positive example where a UN presence effectively deterred a catastrophe occurred in Darfur in the 
embattled town of Mujajiriya in February 2009. The Sudanese government had called on the local 
UNAMID peacekeepers to immediately withdraw from the rebel-held city, effectively abandoning the 
civilian population. Despite massive force concentrations outside the city and initial aerial 
bombardments, the barely 200 man UNAMID contingent refused to heed the Sudanese government's call 
and stayed on the scene. At the end of the day, high-level negotiations to resolve the situation in 
combination with the operation's determination to enforce their PoC mandate “may well have prevented 
a far larger assault on the town that could have cost many more civilian lives. In this case, the mission’s 
willingness to contravene the host nation’s wishes was key to fulfilling its PoC mandate.”5 
If deterring measures have proven insufficient to protect civilians, UN missions have in some rare but 
yet noteworthy cases resorted to the offensive use of force. This approach of protection by engagement was 
most recently used by UNOCI in 2011 to end attacks of pro-Gbagbo forces on the civilian population in 
Côte d'Ivoire. The UN Mission to the DRC (MONUSCO) successfully protected the local population of 
Bukavu in 2006 by resolutely using attack helicopters against militias, forcing the latter to abort their 
assault and withdraw. Such actions are a slippery slope whose potential short- and long-term effects have 
to be taken into account: on the one hand, they may be needed to avert a pending threat to civilians and 
bolster the UN's credibility vis-a-vis spoilers; on the other hand, they carry the risk of permanently 
antagonizing a party to a conflict and, thereby, causing an escalation of violence. Despite many successful 
instances of protection by engagement, the fear remains that the UN might be crossing a line by becoming 
a party to a conflict. The UN's Capstone Doctrine cautions that the “ultimate aim of the use of force is to 
influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to 
seek their military defeat.”6 
A distinct type of international effort to protect civilians is Mass Atrocity Response Operations. NATO 
interventions in Kosovo and Libya figure among the most prominent and complex MAROs. There are 
major differences between MAROs and UN peacekeeping operations; MAROs can be conducted without 
the consent of the concerned country's government. This may be the case if the government is itself 
responsible for the orchestration and implementation of mass atrocities, regardless of the question if the 
actual killings are conducted by government forces itself or proxies. A non-consensual military 
intervention requires dramatically more military capabilities than a robust peace operation, for example to 
destroy dangerous air defense systems or other military assets. Once on the ground, MAROs step in with a 
much more robust and offensive posture than peacekeeping operations. While the establishment of 
protected safe havens and the deterrence of atrocities is part and parcel of any civilian protection 
operation, the defeat of hostile forces with the aim to prevent future assaults plays a much more 
important role in MAROs than in peacekeeping operations. 
MAROs involve unique operational challenges that are distinct from traditional war fighting. Sewall 
and Kardos7 outline three distinct features of MAROs: first, the intervenor has to cope with multiparty 
dynamics because there are no friendly and enemy forces but a multitude of actors, in particular 
perpetrators, victims, bystanders, media, NGOs etc; second, even if an intervenor may act for just and 
impartial reasons, he will inevitably be perceived as siding with the victimized group against the 
perpetrator group. “As the intervenor changes the dynamics, there is a high potential for a MARO to 
quickly metastasize again into another type of conflict – civil war, insurgency, interstate conflict – and for 
the original distinctions between victims and perpetrator (…) to dissolve”8; and, third, a MARO may lead 
to an escalating dynamic in which perpetrators may increase the speed and scope of their atrocities in fear 
of a closing window of opportunity. Such cases may “stand traditional planning precepts on their heads 
(…) [and] require privileging speed over mass in MARO planning.”9 
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Experiences over the past two decades have shown that there are generally two different forms of 
MAROs: “Heavy footprint” interventions involving substantial ground force components, and “no 
footprint” intervention that are predominantly airborne. Examples for the former category are ECOWAS’ 
intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997; the Australian-led INTERFET operation in Timor Leste in 1999; 
Britain’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, as well as the EU’s operation Artemis in Bunia (DRC) in 
2003. All these missions were more or less successful in curbing mass atrocities in their respective area of 
operations by exploiting their superiority in weaponry, training, command, control, communication, 
computer and intelligence assets against their often ill-disciplined and out-gunned enemies.  
Prominent examples of “no footprint” MAROs are the NATO-led interventions in Kosovo and Libya, 
which were almost exclusively conducted through the use of air power. Predominantly airborne MAROs 
have dramatically reduced the risks to the intervening forces' soldiers and are, therefore, much easier to 
justify to a war weary or casualty averse domestic public. However, the advantage of political convenience 
comes at the cost of diminished operational effectiveness in terms of civilian protection. Ulrich 
summarizes this dilemma in a simple formula: the value attached to the lives of civilians is inversely 
proportional to the altitude at which an intervenor operates his air force.10 
To date, there is no MARO doctrine that could guide either heavy or no footprint interventions. This 
is problematic not only because, as outlined above, MAROs confront military planners and soldiers with 
unique operational challenges; it is also a political problem because it restricts national decision makers' 
options to respond adequately and in time to mass atrocity crimes. In the cases of Kosovo and Libya, 
MAROs have nevertheless been ordered and eventually executed by NATO forces. This begs the question 
how MARO mandates have recently been operationalized. The Libya intervention is an interesting case in 
point; it has already been mentioned that NATO has interpreted its PoC mandate in a very broad sense. 
The Alliance not only targeted pro-regime units attacking or approaching civilians but also attacked 
regime forces performing stationary tasks such as guarding bridges in civilian populated areas. NATO has 
not clarified the criteria it applied to identify potential targets in Libya. This raises concerns about the 
Alliance's accountability and transparency, especially because MAROs must be held to higher standards of 
conduct than ordinary military operations.  
Despite such concerns, NATO has waged the most PoC oriented military intervention in history: the 
Alliance conducted its bombing campaign with an operational standard of “zero expectation” of death or 
injury to the civilian population. To implement this policy, NATO gave orders to abort any combat 
missions if there was a risk to non-combatants. Moreover, the Alliance exclusively used precision-guided 
missiles and took precautionary measures to avoid unintentional civilian casualties, for example: NATO 
concentrated its attacks during the night-time when fewer civilians were on the streets; it used drones to 
observe targets in civilian populated areas and to find “patterns of life” to identify the optimal point in 
time to launch a strike; it used delayed bomb fuses in order to let buildings collapse rather than explode, 
thereby preventing blast and fragmentation damage that could have injured civilians; it has apparently 
refrained from bombing dual-use infrastructure such as energy grids whose destruction is known to have 
caused serious civilian hardship in previous campaigns; and it did not use cluster ammunition or 
ordnance containing depleted uranium in order to avoid post-conflict hazards to the population. NATO 
certainly over-fulfilled its legal obligations under International Humanitarian Law. As a result of these 
precautions, the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry estimates that NATO “conducted 
a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties.”11 The 
Commission of Inquiry cites an interesting case that highlights the intervenor's approach, willingness and 
success to realize their zero expectation policy: 
 
‘From 24-25 May 2011 NATO aircraft struck the Bab-al-Aziziyah facility, a large military compound 
and barracks in central Tripoli used by Qadhafi as a residence and headquarters. Numerous multi-
story buildings used by Qadhafi’s security forces were destroyed. The collapsed buildings show 
damage consistent with 2000lb bombs using delayed fuses: some of the buildings show clear entry 
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holes extending through multiple floors, indicating an aerial bomb with a delayed fuse had exploded 
inside or underground, collapsing the buildings upon themselves and thus minimizing collateral 
damage. Several of the security buildings destroyed were less than 300 meters from civilian 
apartment buildings, close enough to be at risk of collateral damage from the strikes. While civilian 
apartment buildings were well within the collateral damage radius of the attack, not even the glass on 
these apartment buildings was broken. Weapons appeared to impact at angles pointing away from 
civilian housing to ensure flying debris did not impact them.’ 
 
The above precautions, however, have not in all cases avoided unintended civilian casualties. The UN 
Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry has confirmed 60 civilian casualties caused by NATO 
attacks. What is more, an inquiry of the New York Times has collected evidence on at least 40 cases of 
civilian fatalities. Besides technical problems with bombs and faulty or outdated intelligence, some of 
NATO's operational procedures did not sufficiently reflect a PoC logic and led to avoidable unintentional 
civilian casualties. For example, on some occasions NATO airplanes undertook several strikes in a row 
against one and the same target. Civilians trying to rescue survivors of the first air strike were then killed 
by a second strike against the same target. Another issue seems to have been air strikes in circumstances of 
rapidly shifting frontlines as well as Gaddafi forces intermingling with civilians.12 Such issues should be 
reviewed and integrated into NATO's guidance on conducting airborne operations. 
 
 
Towards a “No Footprint” Approach? 
 
 
Current efforts to operationalize the military dimension of RtoP's “third pillar” take place in a difficult 
political situation: the few states that are capable of mounting Mass Atrocity Response Operations, i.e. 
mostly Western countries, are by and large disinclined to use their military assets for costly military 
interventions in remote places. Leaving aside for the moment that numerous countries of the Global 
South that view Western military interventions with suspicion, three dynamics currently work to the 
detriment of implementing future MAROs: first, the West's sobering experiences with the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have undermined popular and political support for sending American or European 
soldiers into new armed conflicts, especially if there are no core national interests at stake; second, the 
financial and economic crisis has prompted NATO countries to implement austerity policies that leave no 
room for increases in defense spending. Therefore, Western governments will think twice before getting 
themselves into costly military interventions in faraway places; third, the geostrategic situation has 
changed: the rise of China has already prompted the US to focus on East Asia. The result will be a shift of 
US capabilities and attention towards the Pacific region with the aim to bolster its regional credentials, 
leaving less spare military capabilities for future MAROs. Meanwhile, a military intervention in Syria will 
remain improbable as long as there is serious danger of war with Iran over its alleged nuclear programme. 
We can assume that a NATO planner's nightmare these days is being entangled in a simultaneous war 
with Damascus and Tehran. It is improbable that NATO countries will consider squandering their 
limited precision-guided missiles in Syria if this entails the risk of lacking necessary capabilities in a 
looming war with Iran. The bottom line is that America and Europe will have no appetite for any major 
wars of choice in the foreseeable future. In a nutshell: those capable of launching MAROs are not willing 
to do so.13 
If the aim is to successfully operationalize the “sharp end” of RtoP's “third pillar”, we have to answer 
the question how to make future MAROs more feasible. Given that Western countries do not even 
contemplate the option of launching massive land-invasions, a solution has to accommodate the 
operational effectiveness and political feasibility of conducting a military RtoP intervention. The Libya 
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case is informative in this regard: the provision of Resolution 1973 that excluded the deployment of an 
occupying force to Libya reflected not only the BRICS' concern for sovereignty but also NATO's wariness 
of being sucked into a North African quagmire. Hence, a “heavy footprint” approach to MARO seems 
impossible to digest for Western countries. The Libya intervention may nevertheless be a model for what I 
call a “no footprint” approach to MARO, i.e. predominantly airborne interventions supported by Special 
Operations Forces and cruise missiles. Such operations would primarily be executed by fighter jets, 
helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), guaranteeing a maximum degree of force protection 
and a low risk of getting entangled in a counter insurgency on the ground. 
While we have become accustomed to the use of drones in the so called war on terror, we should not 
lose sight of the PoC potential of UAVs: drones are capable of observing and hovering over targets for 
extended periods of time. In contrast to fighter jets, whose window of opportunity to strike a target 
amounts to a couple of seconds, drones are capable of picking the most suitable time to attack a target. 
This is especially useful if military assets or perpetrators are located within civilian populated areas or 
heavily intermingled with a non-combatant population. A drone can observe and wait for hours until a 
group of perpetrators or tanks leaves a crowded street, and strike when there is a minimum risk to 
bystanders. Thus, drones have a much greater potential to avoid unintentional civilian casualties than 
fighter jets striking targets of opportunity. If drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen would be 
conducted in line with NATO's “zero expectation policy”, it is probable that this would drastically reduce 
civilian fatalities. 
Another aspect is the capability of UAVs to stealthily monitor threatened areas, detect perpetrators 
and graphically document sites of atrocities for later criminal investigations. As argued above, deterrence 
is a major contributor to PoC in peacekeeping operations. If appropriately planned and used in significant 
numbers, drones may become a power tool for robust PoC. Such humanitarian drones would follow what 
can be called a 4-D approach: 
  
 Detect and identify potential or actual perpetrators;  
 Deter mass atrocities through presence and threats of violence;  
 Destroy military assets or perpetrator forces immediately threatening civilians; and  
 Document cases of atrocity crimes for future criminal investigation.  
 
Their invisibility and omnipresence would certainly have a tremendous deterrent effect on perpetrators 
who would have to fear finding themselves in a drone's cross-hair. Key would be to establish and maintain 
a drone fleet's credibility in using force against anyone committing atrocities, for example by using 
appropriate Military Information Support Operations, shows of force and actual air raids. For example, 
armed drones could be used to protect demarcated safety areas. 
It is clear that a “no footprint” MARO cannot solely rely on UAVs given their limited combat power. 
Drones cannot replace fighter jets to attack military compounds or cruise missiles launched at air defense 
systems. Special Operations Forces would also be needed ‘to disrupt perpetrators, attack key target, divert 
adversary focus, direct air strikes, (…) conduct advance preparations for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance’14 and potentially train local proxy forces. However, drones may become an indispensable tool 
for conducting “no footprint” interventions if we better comprehend and harness their power to protect 
civilians. This would require two things: first, more intensive reflection about the potential of and 
challenges to airborne MAROs; and second, the elaboration of a comprehensive PoC doctrine focusing 
on predominantly airborne robust civilian protection operations. 
Cautionary consideration should be given to the fact that the political feasibility of airborne MAROs 
comes at an operational cost. It is beyond question that land borne expeditionary forces supported by air 
and sea forces would be more effective in halting mass atrocities and establishing security. From an 
operational vantage point, airborne MAROs are a second best solution. It is not the operational but the 
political logic that should drive more intensive reflection about airborne MAROs. A “no footprint” 
approach has clear limitations and disadvantages which have to be taken into account. First and foremost, 
                                                           
14 A. D. Raymond et al, MAPRO: Mass Atrocity Prevention & Response Options, A Policy Planning Handbook, U.S. Army 
Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, (Carlisle, March 2012), p. 113. 
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airborne MAROs seem feasible in open terrain such as desserts or rangelands. However, rugged terrain or 
jungles would certainly impede the effectiveness of applying air power and drones. Furthermore, if a state 
government is responsible for systematic atrocities, recourse to a ground proxy force to stop and avert 
further crimes may be required. Interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya underline that military 
interventions can hardly be won without boots on the ground. It is obvious that the training, arming and 
support of local militias and proxy forces creates issues regarding the protection of civilians and 
compliance with International Humanitarian and Human Rights law. Moreover, significant Human 
Intelligence may be needed to detect potential targets if perpetrators are organized in militia groups that 
are difficult to distinguish from the local population. It will occasionally be extremely hard to avoid 
civilian fatalities if militias such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda are accompanied by innocent 
women, children or abducted persons. Direct action approaches of Special Operations Forces may be the 
only possibility in such a case. A political issue is also the cost of pursuing a month-long “no footprint” 
MARO, including expensive 24/7 drone operations in far-flung and vast theatres. 
These are just some concerns which reveal that airborne MAROs are anything but a silver bullet to the 
question of mass atrocity prevention. It has been outlined that a “no footprint” approach may in the 
future be the most likely and exclusive option on the table. We should be prepared for it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has argued that the present misgivings about RtoP interventions in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire 
can in part be attributed to a lack of agreement and understanding about the operational requirements of 
Mass Atrocity Response Operations. The countries that authorized the two missions to “protect 
threatened civilians with all necessary means” apparently had different ideas about the operational 
implications and requirements of the mandate. In order to improve the operationalization of RtoP's 
military dimension, future mandates should be clearer on the objective and instruments of robust civilian 
protection missions while taking account of the operational necessities that such mandates entail. I have 
claimed that there are principally two approaches to robust civilian protection, namely robust peace 
operations with civilian protection mandates and Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Both kinds of 
operations suffer from a doctrinal PoC gap that should be alleviated to improve their respective civilian 
protection performance. In Libya, NATO has crafted and successfully implemented procedures to avoid 
unintentional civilian casualties. 
Given that Western states are increasingly disinclined to conduct costly and politically unsellable wars 
of choice, this chapter holds that the Alliance's campaign in Libya may function as a model for low-risk 
airborne MAROs. Even though such a “no footprint” approach to MAROs may be less effective than 
troop-intensive land borne interventions, it is probably the only politically feasible option to 
operationalize RtoP's “sharp end”. The chapter has argued that airborne MAROs, and in particular the 
use of drones for PoC purposes, have a notable potential to prevent mass atrocities. This strategy's 
advantages and limitations should become the subject of further research and planning. 
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A Common Approach to the Application of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
SHERI ROSENBERG & EKKEHARD STRAUSS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter seeks to conceptualize and operationalize a narrow but critical subset of the Responsibility to 
Protect by exploring the creation of standards to determine when states should act pursuant to their RtoP 
obligations. Thus, less time is spent on whether states should act and rather on how states should act to 
prevent or react to mass atrocity. In line with the original concept of the RtoP and the definition adopted 
by all UN Member states in 2005, these obligations are based on international law and range from 
structural prevention through capacity building and international assistance, to a range of peaceful 
measures carried out by regional organizations and the international community to more coercive 
measures, to long-term commitments to rebuild and assist populations with recovery and reconciliation.  
A standard for the implementation of the RtoP, ideally, strikes at the mid-term prevention point, 
where risk factors can be assessed with regard to future developments and identifiable prevention tools are 
known to us, but not so far down the road that extreme coercive measures such as military intervention 
appear to be the only “preventive” option. After all, the UN Secretary-General and UN Member States 
have unambiguously stated that prevention is the single most important dimension of the RtoP. As the 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his 2009 Report on Implementing the RtoP ‘…if the 
international community acts early enough, the choice need not be a stark one between doing nothing or 
using force.’1 Nonetheless, frequent debates over when a state must act pursuant to the obligations 
embodied within the RtoP have often slowed the application of appropriate responses to prevent and 
react, and permitted legal and political debates to lose focus on the real concern over protecting human 
lives. A coherent, common standard of assessment that can be utilized on a case-by-case basis provides 
clear boundaries to discussions over when the RtoP applies in a given situation based on a range of 
sources that suggests the most appropriate form for the guidelines given the particular focus on mass 
atrocity prevention. 
Notwithstanding the reference to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, 
the RtoP cannot apply only at the stage at which responsibility under international criminal law for an 
individual culprit could be established. Such a standard would ensure the immediate demise of the 
normative concerns embedded within the RtoP — most of all its ability to proactively attempt to prevent 
imminent or on-going forms of mass atrocities based on existing legal obligations. Instead, the RtoP 
requires the prospective assessment of future developments based on present facts and circumstances. 
Similar challenges are faced in national tort law or the national and international implementation of “non-
refoulement.” 
Based on a detailed review of relevant, diverse areas of law, and consultations with stakeholders across 
the globe, the authors developed the following standard of assessment for the RtoP. The RtoP framework 
shall apply if the examination of a situation establishes a real risk that exceptionally grave human rights 
violations, as described in genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, are 
occurring or could occur in the future. Moreover, we set forth a set of principles, which shall guide 
stakeholders as they utilize the standard of assessment for the consideration of a situation regarding the 
RtoP. Any situation can be assessed for risks of mass atrocities following the proposed standards. It is for 
the relevant stakeholders to determine, based on their assessment, the appropriate time for different 
forms of more or less intrusive action to prevent or halt mass atrocities. With a view to the wording of the 
World Summit Outcome Document, the standards contain principles for the determination of whether a 
state is “manifestly failing” to protect its population from one or more of the four RtoP acts. 
                                                           
1 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.-Doc. A/63/677 of 12 January 2009, 
para. 11(c). 
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It remains unclear, at this time, which precise practical consequences flow from invoking the RtoP in a 
particular situation, because the RtoP may require stakeholders to do something based on existing legal 
obligations and according to a concept of consecutive steps by national and international actors, but it 
does not dictate the precise means by which the RtoP should be implemented in a given situation. 
However, relevant stakeholders have been working to strengthen the understanding and the appropriate 
application of the concept, and this chapter helps to accurately assess when to apply the RtoP. The goals 
of the project are to: 
 
 Promote the full continuum of RtoP actions: while it is universally agreed that the best form of 
protection is prevention, the lack of common standards of assessment at early stages of potential 
developments is one factor for the continued focus and association of the RtoP with military 
intervention exclusively. A common standard that spans the full range of beneficial protection 
endeavours will help to ensure prevention is promoted forcefully where it is really needed; 
 
 Targeted application of limited resources: given the constraints on time and resources that 
stakeholders can direct to address mass atrocities, a common standard of assessment concerning which 
situations will benefit most from international assistance will ensure the most effective allocation of 
those limited resources. 
 
 Legitimizing effect: on the one hand, there are many valid concerns over the potential for selective and 
subjective applications of the RtoP. On the other hand, there are legitimate concerns that necessary 
measures to prevent and react to mass atrocities are not undertaken due to political considerations—
calculations that may leave innocent victims without protection. A common standard of assessment, 
while inevitably open to interpretation by all parties, will at the very least begin to require parties to 
explain their reasoning from a common reference point. Actions that are taken will be seen as more 
legitimate if successfully applying the standard; decisions not to take a certain course of action will also 
be seen as more legitimate. 
 
The application of a common standard will contribute to greater consistency in outcomes of state action 
within the RtoP framework. Despite the use of the terminology, this chapter does not suggest that the 
proposed standard and guiding principles are to be implemented as a legally binding test against which to 
gauge the appropriateness of action. Instead, the standard aims at assisting relevant actors to determine, 
whether a situation could benefit from applying the RtoP. Like all standards guiding international 
relations it will be open to interpretation by a wide array of actors, but its flexibility will be bound by the 
common values shared by states and their populations: to prevent mass atrocities. 
The standard can be used by governments, bodies of regional and international organizations, and civil 
society, which are all called upon to make assessments as to the risks of mass atrocities occurring in a 
particular situation, and thus assist common and coordinated approaches to implement the RtoP. 
Part I examines the relevant standards from across the legal spectrum, and Part II sets forth the 
standard and the guiding principles for its application to the RtoP.  
 
 
Part I:  Standards from Across the Spectrum 
 
 
In approximately forty interviews carried out in the context of this research with representatives from UN 
Member States, academics and NGOs, including during regional workshops, not one interlocutor 
identified a current standard against which to measure the analysis of information regarding potential 
RtoP situations. Only one NGO provided a semblance of a standard and two other NGOs referenced the 
use of early warning models. Several individuals spoke of responding with “gut” reactions or “feelings.” As 
a result, entirely successful situations of early warning and prevention have not garnered the moniker of 
the RtoP — as is perhaps the nature of successful prevention at all times. Certain situations of successful 
prevention of a return to atrocities, such as concerned the fears over potential atrocities and a return to 
violence in South Sudan or Guinea, have also not received high profiles within the RtoP framework, 
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though many suggest that RtoP guided the swift actions taken to avert mass atrocities in each situation. At 
the other end of the spectrum, rebuilding exercises after atrocities, such as in Macedonia or Burundi, have 
generally not been seen and discussed as RtoP situations, applying instead long-term peace-building 
measures to prevent a relapse into violence at critical junctures, such as elections. Nor has the RtoP 
seemed to guide current action in Burundi where a fragile peace appears precarious. 
Debates over the application of the RtoP have been most prominent in situations where conflict and 
the loss of life have already commenced, and the main issue has been the legality, morality and prudence 
of coercive forms of intervention, particularly military action. Strong debates have occurred over whether 
the RtoP was at issue in such situations as Sri Lanka, Burma, Georgia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria. 
The RtoP remains open to different interpretations, and in the absence of universally accepted criteria 
to determine when an RtoP scenario is stated to be occurring, differing interpretations are to be expected. 
The inconsistent application of the RtoP has frequently left situations unaddressed at those times when 
effective preventive measures could have been undertaken. Additionally, RtoP debates have too frequently 
focused on the role of the Security Council to the exclusion of other key actors. Thus, in order to permit 
more energy to be spent on the fundamental question of what is the appropriate action (or inaction) to be 
taken for any set of facts, promoting all actors to utilize a common standard of application will reduce the 
confusion over the RtoP that has marked the first decade of its existence. Reducing such confusion will 
necessarily lead to greater consistency of state action with the RtoP framework, thereby producing a 
legitimizing effect on the norm’s development. 
In seeking to determine the most appropriate and fair set of standards for RtoP, we examine below a 
series of source areas, highlighting the potential overlap in normative, political and legal concerns between 
each area and that of the RtoP. In this way, the articulated standard finds its foundation upon the most 
relevant and widely accepted sources. There are of course standards or guidelines of proof or evidence 
from a variety of fields of enquiry, including science, history, political science and law. However, it is 
within law that standards of proof are most associated with measuring an act or series of acts against ex 
ante standards. Moreover, the scope of the RtoP is bound by the four categories of crimes defined in 
international law and set out in the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD); thus, when 
approaching the RtoP, stakeholders are necessarily searching for its practical meaning within the bounds 
of international law. For these reasons, this project draws on legal areas for the source of its inspiration on 
the appropriate standard. This does not mean, however, that the standard is legally binding (or intended 
to be so), or that it should be utilized by legal departments to the exclusion of political officials. Instead, 
the steady evolution of the RtoP within the General Assembly and across stakeholders has been to 
implement its moral concerns with practical mechanisms. It is for this reason that examining sources of 
law makes the most sense. 
Before examining the various sources of standards, it is important to disaggregate the different 
elements encompassed in the analysis of a situation through a potential RtoP lens, and therefore isolate 
what this chapter in particular is focused on. 
 
 The first element (the substantive dimension) is the type of gross violations of human rights that have 
been included within the scope of the RtoP. The decision was taken at the 2005 World Summit to 
limit the scope of the RtoP to four acts: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. Each of these acts has substantive content from legal and policy-based sources. 
 
 The second element (the gravity dimension) focuses on the realization that the RtoP will be rendered 
essentially meaningless if its three-prong approach of prevent, react and rebuild is only applicable at 
the point at which the commission of one of the RtoP acts has definitively occurred. Instead, it is 
imperative to understand that the RtoP must be called into action at a specific level of gravity or 
seriousness of potential violations, with this level set at below that which would place an individual as 
criminally liable or a state internationally responsible. 
 
 The third element (the temporal dimension) concerns the standard of proof that is applied to 
determine when that level of seriousness or gravity set out in the second element has been reached, 
and therefore when the RtoP framework (and its corresponding set of responsibilities or potential legal 
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obligations) is applicable. The standard of proof could range from as low as “potentially applicable” to 
“definitively proven.” This third element concerns the standard of proof required for all potential 
forms of state or collective action, whether coercive or otherwise. 
 
 The fourth element concerns the consequences of a situation falling within the RtoP. The RtoP is not 
prescriptive. It does not prescribe which measures must be taken to implement the respective 
obligations in a particular situation.  Rather, it offers a methodology to address an exceptional set of 
situations more effectively through a continuum of steps. The RtoP moves from the respective state 
and individual bystander states to the international community when timely and decisive action is 
required. 
 
While appreciating the holistic and interconnected nature of the four elements set out above, this chapter 
is focused primarily on the third element. Such a standard is intended to reduce the technical haggling 
that occurs over whether or not situations are within the RtoP framework by encouraging (if not 
requiring) all stakeholders to set information about abuses against an articulated standard. As will be set 
out in Part III below, the application and content of standards of evidence may differ according to the 
nature and form of the RtoP intervention that is at issue. 
As will become clear, the assessment of the likelihood of prospective conduct is by its nature a very 
different enquiry than the assessment of the evidence to determine whether a fact has been proven about 
a past event. The enquiry involving the RtoP will often, perhaps always, have elements of both forward-
looking and backward-looking investigations, assessing whether sufficient acts have occurred to fall within 
the RtoP and whether future atrocities are potentially to occur. Therefore we examine in areas of the law 
with both prospective and retrospective assessments. 
In examining the language that has been used in debates over the applicability of RtoP, we have been 
struck by the frequency of concepts emanating from criminal law that have appeared to frame the debate. 
As will be examined in the proceeding section, this urge to turn to criminal law is both dangerous and 
entirely understandable. 
However, it is not clear that the normative rationale for international (or national) criminal 
responsibility of an individual is analogous to that embodied in the concept of the “responsibility to 
protect.” In seeking to determine the most appropriate and fair set of standards for RtoP, this project will 
examine a series of source areas, highlighting the potential overlap in normative, political and legal 
concerns between each area and that of the RtoP.  
 
 
The Imperfect Fit of International Criminal Law Evidentiary Standards 
 
The Urge to Turn to Criminal Law in RtoP 
 
The use of international criminal law terminology within the WSOD has both comforted and confused 
all those dealing with the RtoP. The result of both compromise and principle, three of the RtoP acts set 
out—genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity—find detailed definition within international 
criminal law.2 Ethnic cleansing is one possible form of crime against humanity, and may be a component 
of both genocide and war crimes. The limitation to protection from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity was introduced in a revised draft Outcome Document towards the 
end of the negotiations.3 The negotiation history suggests that the additional language was introduced in 
                                                           
2 Article 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. 
3 Revised draft outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 
submitted by the President of the General Assembly, U.N.-Doc. A/59/HPLM/CRP.1/Rev.2 of 5 August 2005. 
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order to limit the application of the RtoP to exceptional grave situations, where international law had 
already defined limitations to the principle of sovereignty.4 
However, this compromise has resulted in much confusion. First, it should be self-evident that the 
RtoP cannot apply only at the stage at which responsibility under international criminal law for an 
individual culprit could be established. Such a standard would ensure the immediate demise of the 
normative concerns embedded within the RtoP, most of all its ability to proactively attempt to prevent 
imminent or on-going forms of mass atrocities based on existing legal obligations. Second, the level of 
“seriousness” or scale embodied within each of the acts is not automatically clear when examining the 
definition of the crimes from within either customary international law or, more narrowly, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Based on the broad agreement that the RtoP builds on 
existing legal obligations related to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, it 
was suggested that any act falling within the definition of these crimes would “trigger” the RtoP. Others 
expressed concern that the broad definition of war crimes included acts, which had little to do with the 
population suffering serious harm as described in the work of the ICISS report, such as compelling 
prisoners of war to serve in the forces of a hostile power or the killing or wounding of combatants who 
had surrendered.  
As a consequence of the use of criminal law language, stakeholders have primarily turned to the 
standard of proof associated with individual criminal guilt to assess whether or not the RtoP should be 
invoked—that is, the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is prima facie clear that this is a very high 
hurdle to pass in order to see the RtoP doctrine applicable. The normative goals of each system differ so 
markedly so as to render this standard of evidence inappropriate. 
International criminal law is ultimately focused on assessing the individual culpability of those alleged 
to have committed the most heinous of crimes. This assessment of responsibility will occur after the 
incidents within which such crimes may have occurred. The potential consequences of a prosecution for 
an international crime (or domestic crime in fact) are the loss of liberty for the individual, and the social 
stigma attached to a finding of criminal guilt. Moreover, the goals of criminal sanction—whether 
retributive, rehabilitative, deterrence-based or another goal—do not align completely with the RtoP’s focus 
on prevention. While certain leaders, governmental or otherwise, may play very important roles in the 
commission and the ability to end mass atrocities (or prevent them from occurring in the first place), the 
RtoP is still focused on the protection of potential victim populations, and their threat from large-scale 
acts of violence. There is little concern with allocating responsibility in terms of restitution or criminal 
sanction, but instead concern with ensuring the right actors take the most effective action to stop mass 
atrocity as soon as possible. 
Similarly, it had been argued during the drafting period of the Genocide Convention that Article II of 
the Convention did not contain an abstract definition of genocide, but an enumeration of acts, which 
allow a finding of genocide based on the specific intent, without the actual destruction of the protected 
group.5 Thus, the drafters attempted to capture risks based on historic experience by means of criminal 
law rather than ensuring only accountability for perpetrators ex post facto. Similarly, German criminal law 
defines a category of crimes punishing the creation of an abstract risk rather than the violation of a 
concrete legal interest. The crime is accomplished, when the hazard has been created by an act considered 
to create a general risk for certain legal interests, e.g. drunken driving, without the requirement to prove 
the existence of a specific risk to a particular person or property in the situation at hand.6 
Despite the divergence of goals and concerns, stakeholders have either felt compelled to use the 
prosecutor’s standard of proof or have hid behind this standard—as either a potential violating state or an 
entity fearful of triggering its own perceived international legal or moral obligation to act. The implicit use 
of this prosecutor’s standard of proof, if continued, will severely limit the ability of the RtoP doctrine to 
effectively work at an appropriately early stage of the specific type of situation it had been developed for, 
                                                           
4 E. Strauss, The Emperor’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (2009), p. 11 
et seq. 
5 H. Abtahi & P. Webb, The Genocide Convention: the traveaux preparatoire (2008). 
6 P. Cramer, Der Vollrauschtatbestand als abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt, (1962). 
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and will permit stakeholders to inadequately act to protect as opposed to merely retroactively respond to 
mass atrocities.  
 
 
The Search for Alternative Sources 
 
How to assess their relevance and applicability to the RtoP 
 
There are a variety of considerations in determining the relevance of standards of proof from an area of 
law onto the political and normative framework of the RtoP: the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility, the ex ante or ex post nature of the judgment, whether it is private or public law at 
issue, whether domestic or international in origin, and the legal nature of the act concerned. There is a 
presumption that the stringency of a standard of proof has been chosen to reflect the nature of the 
consequences that will result if the standard is met. 
Despite this understanding, it is quite apparent that while the substantive legal areas that could 
potentially support the RtoP are relatively well-developed, and developing all the time, the standard of 
proof or evidence that has been set down for each area at issue is often far more uncertain and obscure. 
These alternative standards will at least begin to animate our thinking about the standards applicable to 
the RtoP framework. 
 
Remaining Relevance of International Criminal Law  
 
Despite the strong case for attempting to limit the application of prosecutorial standards of individual 
guilt to assess the correct application of the RtoP doctrine, it is important to emphasize the multiple 
evidentiary standards that are already incorporated within international criminal law and how they will 
play an important role in this Project.  We will limit this examination to the standards associated with the 
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Investigation. As set out in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor will undertake an 
investigation unless there is “no reasonable basis to proceed under the Statute.” The three elements of the 
“reasonable basis: are jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of justice. Decisions of the ICC have 
begun to give content to the requirements of a “reasonable basis” in the context of jurisdiction and 
admissibility. The Pre-Trial Chamber approved the investigation into post-election violence in Kenya, but 
required the Prosecutor to provide additional information and clarification on the question of the 
Court’s jurisdiction.7 
The two elements of admissibility are complementarity and gravity of the case. These aspects have also 
been examined by the ICC; while the substantive content of these two factors has begun to be addressed 
by the Prosecutor’s Office (and is already partially elaborated upon in the Statute itself) and in the 
decisions of the ICC, the standard of evidence used to determine the correctness of this evaluation (the 
essence of this project) has not been made clear--but it may be implicit from the decisions of the ICC. 
Nonetheless, early drafts of paragraphs 138-139 of the WSOD utilized the language of “unable or 
unwilling” instead of “manifestly failing,” and therefore the strong connection between ICC 
complementarity and “manifestly failing’ is clear.”8 
Finally, Article 53 requires that an investigation should not continue if there are “substantial reasons 
to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” With “substantial reasons to 
believe” at a heightened level to “reasonable basis,” it is clear that choosing not to undertake an 
investigation for the “interests of justice” is seen as requiring a greater rationale than undertaking an 
investigation that passes the jurisdiction and admissibility requirements. 
                                                           
7 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09 Corr. of 31 March 2010. 
8 Revised draft outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 
submitted by the President of the General Assembly, U.N.-Doc. A/59/HPLM/CRP.1/Rev.1 of 22 July 2005, para. 113. 
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Arrest Warrant. Once an investigation has been initiated, Article 58 sets out the evidentiary standard 
required for the issuance of an arrest warrant. The Pre-Trial Chamber is guided by whether it is satisfied 
that “[there] are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.” The evidentiary standard was met in the application against President Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan, and the content of this standard can be implied by the evidence 
presented to the Chamber.9 However, the successful appeal by the Prosecutor to the ICC Appeals 
Chamber over the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber not to issue the warrant against President al-Bashir 
on the charge of genocide suggests the strictness of this standard. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s holding, that 
as genocidal intent was not the only reasonable inference available no charge of genocide should be 
included within the arrest warrant, was rejected by the Appeals Chamber as beyond the requirements of a 
“reasonable basis” under Article 58. The Appeals Chamber however did not expand on the proper 
interpretation of the ‘reasonable basis’ standard, referring the matter back to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
future interpretations of the standard.10 
Indictment/Confirmation of Charges: The Prosecutor at the ICC is tasked with providing the Pre-Trial 
Chamber “with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed 
the crime charged.” The decisions in the Lubanga and Bemba cases have begun to spell out what “sufficient 
evidence” will require, including that the evidence must be “concrete and tangible,” and sufficient to 
demonstrate “a clear line of reasoning underpinning its specific allegations.” The Chamber has warned 
that, at this stage of the proceedings, “it may be impractical to insist on a high degree of specificity.” 
“Substantial grounds to believe” has been tackled by the Chamber through the application of dictionary 
definitions, supplemented by reference to relevant case law, including that of the European Court of 
Human Rights. “Substantial” was shown to mean significant, solid, material or strong.11 
It is important to be reminded, however, as seen in the Abu Garda Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the 
confirmation of charges, that the concerns of this confirmation process have already narrowed in on one 
or more particular individuals at this stage. The Chamber’s decision concerning Mr. Abu Garda focused 
on the “scant and unreliable” evidence connecting him to the alleged crimes, and not to their commission 
at all.12 
Prosecution. The most stringent standard utilized is that of “beyond reasonable doubt” as required of 
the Trial Chamber under Article 66. The ICC has yet to reach the stage of assessing the guilt of an 
individual utilizing this standard 
 
Preliminary Judicial Measures: International and Domestic 
 
Courts are often asked to impose coercive measures prior to their examination of the substantive merits of 
a dispute. Fearful that prior to hearing the arguments of both parties actions may be taken that might 
exacerbate the dispute, the application of preliminary measures is similar to attempts within the RtoP 
framework to prevent RtoP acts or to prevent the escalation of atrocities. 
International. Termed provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), the ICJ has been regularly called upon to protect parties from potential harm to their 
rights before the Court has had the opportunity to decide on the case before it. The substantive standard 
required under the Court’s jurisprudence for the application of provisional measures has focused on, first, 
the potential for “irreparable prejudice,” and second, that urgency is present in the need for such 
provisional measures.13 
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With respect to the requirement of urgency, the Court has often utilized the standard that prejudicial 
action is “likely” to be taken prior to the Court delivering a final decision. However, in the context of 
serious allegations of mass atrocity in the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda), the Court implemented provisional measures on finding that “there is a 
serious risk that the rights at issue in this case ... may suffer irreparable prejudice.”14 This wording suggests 
a different standard than “likely” in assessments of the Court. 
National. US courts may issue preliminary injunctions in civil cases in order to prevent irreparable 
harm to either party and maintain the status quo prior to the determination of the case. The US Supreme 
Court has recently required that the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that this potentially 
irreparable injury is “likely to occur,” and is not a mere “possibility.”15 
Courts may issue civil protection orders (CPO) (often referred to as “restraining orders”) in order to 
give relief to past and potential victims of violence, primarily domestic violence. The application for a CPO 
requires a relationship requirement (to determine the level of protection needed) and an act requirement 
to state which potential harms are at issue. The party seeking the order has the burden of proving actual 
or imminent domestic violence most frequently by a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, to show 
that the facts alleged in the petition occurred and that the behaviour is likely to continue. 
The CPO, like the application of the RtoP framework, is both retrospective and prospective, whereas 
other preliminary injunctions attempt only to predict and prevent future harms. It is clear that the 
language and understanding of standards of proof to prevent future harms will be distinct from 
retrospective determinations of whether something did in fact happen. Perhaps most pointedly, the 
higher standard of proof required for the CPO over the preliminary injunction corresponds to the greater 
intrusion on privacy that the CPO represents. More intrusive and coercive forms of action for the RtoP 
should also perhaps be associated with stricter standards of proof. 
 
The Duty to Care and Rescue 
 
In some instances it is possible to hold public authorities responsible for their failure to protect an 
individual from harms committed by a private actor. This responsibility is in the form of civil actions to 
seek monetary damages. In addition, seeking to require citizens to act as “good Samaritans,” certain 
(predominantly civil law) countries impose a “duty to rescue” upon individuals, and in certain 
circumstances, a failure to undertake this duty to help others will lead to criminal sanctions against the 
timid Samaritan. These duties of care and of rescue share common moral foundations with the RtoP’s 
claims upon national governments to protect their own citizens and on third-states to ensure protection of 
citizens anywhere in the world. Of course, this sub-section presents many conceptual difficulties in 
applying domestic, private law actions to the international, public law actions embodied by the RtoP; 
however, the conceptual and normative commonalities are not unimportant, and are therefore worth 
exploring. 
Public duties of care. Domestic tort law in some states provides the opportunity for individuals to sue the 
state for failing to protect them from third party harm in certain instances. In the US, the general “public 
duty rule” means that while the government owes a general duty to all citizens, the limitations of resources 
and the impossibility of ensuring protection at all times means that no duty is owed to any one individual 
in particular, and therefore the government cannot be brought to court for a failure to protect. The 
exception to this rule centres on the state adopting a “special relationship” to the individual, essentially 
involving an affirmative and direct assumption of protection by the state in a particular instance, and the 
individual’s reliance on this affirmative undertaking that then did not materialize. These suits will involve 
the four elements of a tortuous action: a duty to act because of the special relationship, a breach of this 
duty by the public authorities through their omission, the omission was the cause-in-fact of the injury, and 
actual damage to the individual bringing the suit. The standard of proof needed to prove a “special 
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relationship,” as well as the standard needed to prove the elements of the lawsuit, is by a “preponderance 
of the evidence.” 
In contrast, civil law countries in general have a general duty of reasonable care placed upon 
municipalities, and such a duty is actionable. Of course proving what conduct is reasonable of a municipal 
entity will often itself be subject to heavy qualification. When such acts or omissions are actionable, the 
civil law judge will rely on his or her conviction over whether a fact has been sufficiently proven, and no 
clear standard of evidence is present. 
Duty to rescue. States have long debated whether they should require individuals to seek to rescue those 
in danger. The common law family of states has generally placed no general duty upon individuals to help 
others in need. Using the US as emblematic of this set of standards, two general exceptions to this rule 
apply.  First, if an individual volunteers to help, or is herself responsible for the danger itself, then one is 
required to intervene in some form. Second, if a “special relationship” exists either between the failed 
rescuer and the victim or the failed rescuer and the aggressor. A complicated set of factors is utilized to 
determine when this exceptional duty to rescue does exist. In these potential tort actions, the standard of 
proof applied by the court for each element is generally that of a “preponderance of the evidence.” 
Many civil law states have made the “duty to rescue” an individual in peril a criminally enforceable 
requirement. These criminal statutes examine the dangers placed upon the rescuer, and the level of harm 
placed upon the “victim” requiring the rescuing. There is also a wide gamut of required actions to be 
undertaken in order to fulfil this duty of rescue or assistance. As set out above, civil law jurisdictions have 
generally avoided providing detailed indications of the standard of proof required in different actions; 
instead, they rely on the conviction of the civil law judge that applies the (in this instance criminal) code 
to a particular action. It can be generally stated that those courts enforcing a criminal penalty concerning 
the duty to rescue must be persuaded that the evidence, by the “balance of probabilities,” suggests that 
each of the required elements has been proven.  
 
The Obligation to Prevent Violations under International Human Rights Law 
 
The core concerns of the RtoP are of course animated in the longer history of international human rights. 
There are, however, specific threads within the human rights framework that play a more forceful role 
within any discussion of the RtoP. 
Some human rights treaties include specific obligations to prevent, e.g. genocide, torture and racial 
segregation. In its analysis of Article I of the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice 
determined that it implies a positive obligation erga omnes for states to take action to prevent genocide. To 
prevent genocide is interpreted by the Court to be a positive obligation outside of the obligation to refrain 
from committing genocide. For determining a breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, the Court 
moved from a criminal standard of proof “beyond any reasonable doubt” to “proof at a high level of 
certainty,” as the violation of the obligation to prevent did not cause individual criminal responsibility of 
the state organ. The Court expressly refused to find whether there is a general obligation of states to 
prevent the commission by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general 
international law.16 However, it is arguable that such duties are customary international law obligations 
incumbent upon all states, and include a duty to prevent all of the RtoP acts. 
In addition, the general obligation to “respect” and “ensure” the rights within a treaty has been 
interpreted to contain a positive duty to take steps towards effective implementation as much as the duty 
to refrain from acts of violation. On this basis, the obligations upon state actors encompassed within any 
human right have been broken down into obligations to respect rights by not committing direct violations 
against individuals, to protect individuals from violations of their rights by third party non-state actors, and 
to fulfil rights when the state must step in and provide the content of the right.17 
The question whether the positive duty includes a duty to prevent violations has been interpreted 
differently by the relevant treaty bodies. The Human Rights Committee and the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) did not accept a general obligation to prevent violations of the rights guaranteed 
by their respective treaties, but found specific preventive obligations deriving from the application of 
particular rights to specific situations.18 By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACrtHR) did accept a general obligation of states to prevent, investigate, punish and remedy violations 
of human rights under the American Convention on Human Rights. 
These standards of behaviour having been set down, Courts have indicated differing standards of 
proof in the area of the duty to protect. The IACrtHR in Velasquez Rodriguez stated it was “convinced” and 
that the facts were “clearly proven”; this corresponded to the Court’s stating that such serious charges 
required a standard of proof “capable of establishing the truth of the allegations in a convincing manner.” 
The ECtHR in Osman stated that the lack of reasonable pre-emptive steps “must be established to [the 
Court’s] satisfaction.” 
Similar to the outline of different pillars of the RtoP, the primacy of the state to fulfil its duty to 
protect is not absolute and international mechanisms can be used to compensate for lack of effective 
action. Some UN human rights treaty bodies can receive complaints of individuals that rights of the 
respective treaty were violated.19 The admissibility of such complaints depends inter alia on the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. According to the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies, local remedies must only be 
exhausted to the extent that they are both available and effective; it is an established principle in this 
context that complainants must exercise due diligence in the pursuit of available remedies. Treaty bodies 
request complainants to “demonstrate” that they exhausted all available domestic remedies, but accepted 
arguments that further recourse to domestic remedies would have been futile in the light of previous 
precedent. Treaty bodies also considered extensive delays in decision-making indicators for the lack of 
available effective remedies.20 
The “duty to protect” is just one element of a state’s obligations to assist in the prevention of possible 
human rights violations occurring beyond its direct actions or omissions. It is self-evident that the 
rationale for protection of human rights and of the impetus for the doctrine of the RtoP is similar if not 
identical; the duty to protect concerns a state’s obligations to help even when they are not the direct actor 
causing the violations and thus mirrors the role the international community is meant to play under the 
RtoP.  
It is important to note therefore the general standard of proof applied by human rights tribunals in 
finding a state responsible for those violations that would reach the seriousness of the RtoP acts has 
usually been proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” as seen for example in the ECtHR’s decision of UK v 
Ireland (1978) concerning torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Torture and Non-Refoulement Obligations 
 
The international prohibition of torture is reflected in different international conventions. One aspect of 
this absolute ban has been the obligation placed upon states not to expel or return an individual to 
another state if there is a danger that the individual will be tortured in the latter state. The prospective 
nature of the evidentiary standard applied by bodies deciding whether to impose a non-refoulement 
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obligation on an individual correlates strongly with the decision stakeholders must make over whether or 
not to intervene to prevent future atrocity crimes.  In both situations, the establishment and assessment of 
facts related to the past and present have to be used to determine the probability of certain events 
occurring in the future. 
The Convention Against Torture requires that no one shall be expelled if there are “substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 21 The Committee 
monitoring this Convention has noted that this standard entails a “foreseeable, real and personal risk.” 
The risk must be assessed on grounds surpassing “mere theory or suspicion” or “a mere possibility”; the 
risk need not be “highly probable” or “highly likely to occur,” however. The Committee does not require 
that all the facts invoked by the author of a communication be proved; rather, facts should be “sufficiently 
substantiated and reliable.” The Committee will look at a non-exhaustive list of criteria it considered 
pertinent to assess the personal risk to an individual of being tortured, including evidence of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the receiving state, previous instances of 
torture/ mistreatment involving the author, medical or other independent evidence to support a claim of 
past torture/ mistreatment, current assessment of the author’s situation and/or the internal situation of 
the receiving state with respect to human rights, personal vulnerability of the author, and evidence of the 
author’s credibility.22 
The ECtHR has also interpreted its Convention’s prohibition against torture under Article 3 to 
include a non-refoulement obligation. The standard of proof utilized by the Court is to impose the 
obligation if there are “substantial grounds [to believe] that an individual would face a real risk of being 
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.” Of course, the Court itself (most prominently in the 
concurring opinion of Judge Zupancic in the case of Saadi v. Italy23) has acknowledged that this prognosis 
or probabilistic exercise is not the usual retrospective domain of assigning legal responsibility. The Court 
explained that using all evidence available, it would “examine the foreseeable consequences” of the 
proposed expulsion, “bearing in mind the situation [in the receiving country] and [the applicant's] 
personal circumstances.” Thus, although necessarily speculative, the assessment must be conducted with 
care and rigor. 
Domestic courts have actively interpreted and implemented their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention to ensure asylum for those with a “well-founded fear of persecution” on the grounds of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a social group. The US Supreme Court has 
required an individual to show that this fear is based on a “reasonable possibility” of occurrence. 
Moreover, the US State Department has explained that the “substantial grounds to believe” standard from 
the Torture Convention should mean the risk is “more likely than not” to come to fruition. Meanwhile, 
the UK House of Lords requires the risk to have a “reasonable chance” or a “serious possibility” of 
coming to fruition. 
These predictions are intended to protect individuals from serious harms, which, while not reaching 
the level of the RtoP acts at all times, may certainly form elements of such acts. 
 
International Environmental Law: Transboundary Harm 
 
It is a clearly established obligation of international law that states are required to take adequate steps to 
control and regulate the effect of their actions upon the physical environment of other states. 
International conventions dealing with specific areas of the environment have emphasized that the nature 
of environmental problems are such that reparations and restitution will often be inadequate to 
compensate for irreversible damages. Therefore, a norm of harm prevention is ever present in examining 
the obligations states have to protect the environment; this core conception of harm prevention is a 
central component of the RtoP. In an analogous fashion, the harms included within the RtoP acts cannot 
be made whole by reparations or (the often impossible) restitution, and thus the standards utilized for 
transboundary harm may assist in the construction this Project is working on. 
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The standard of proof used to assess this prevention obligation in the context of environmental law 
and transboundary harm has not been readily examined by tribunals or courts, with the ICJ’s opinions in 
international environmental law so far focused on specific treaties and not general standards. However, it 
can be inferred that the Court has not treated this area of concern as one for which a heightened standard 
of proof is appropriate, as it has not invoked the need for a strict standard given the “exceptional gravity” 
of the issue at hand (as had been the case with questions involving the use of force or genocide, as 
discussed below). 
A further relevant concept from within international environmental law is that of the “precautionary 
principle.” This principle stands as a reaction to the very high standard of proof previously required in 
environmental cases, one that did not appreciate the reality of scientific uncertainty, and therefore limited 
the ability of states to require prevention of environmental damage. The principle stands to require or 
permit preventive action even in the face of scientific uncertainty in the foreseeability of harm and the 
likelihood of its gravity. In essence, the utilization and application of this principle works to lower the 
standard of proof required before preventive action must be undertaken.  
 
The Duty to Prevent or React to Serious or Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law  
 
This subsection examines the standards applied when assessing gross violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law, including outside the territory of a state or committed by non-state 
actors. This is directly relevant to the RtoP since the RtoP concerns the actions of third or bystander states 
in their individual or collective roles outside their respective territory. 
Tribunals examining these questions are faced with allegations over situations that have already 
occurred, and usually have already come to a conclusion. In addition, the role of individual criminal 
responsibility has already been addressed above. In addition, we have examined obligations placed upon 
states not to contribute by their actions to harming other states, in this chapter within the context of 
international environmental law and transboundary harm. Instead, this subsection introduces state 
responsibility for those violations included within the RtoP. 
It has already been noted that the ECtHR has applied the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” in 
addressing allegations of violations all of its range of human rights. This standard as to the proof of the 
facts of alleged violations has been applied for both allegations committed within the territory of a 
signatory of the ECHR or for violations committed outside the territory of the state charged with the 
violation. 
Some of the most difficult questions in addressing these areas concern states’ obligations outside their 
territorial borders, and their responsibilities for conduct not directly carried out by the state itself. These 
questions are of particular relevance to the implementation of the RtoP, as states are particularly sensitive 
to the issues surrounding any decision to intervene in other states in order to protect populations from 
potential or existing mass atrocity and non-state actors are involved in committing these crimes. 
The question of control over territory outside the sovereign borders of a state can be seen in the 
ECtHR’s cases (e.g. Loizidou24 and Bankovic25) and in the ICJ’s case law (e.g. the Israeli Wall case26). The 
second element is one of attribution of conduct undertaken by a non-state actor or a third-state so as to 
lead to a state itself being held responsible for the allegedly illegal international conduct. This is an area 
set out in detail under the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, as well as jurisprudence from the ICJ (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and USA v. 
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Nicaragua27), the ECtHR (e.g. Ilascu),28 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
in the Appeal Chambers’ Judgment in the case of Tadic.29 
These tests of attribution and control have implicitly been answered using the same standards of proof 
associated with the serious allegations of state misconduct at issue. 
The Complaints Procedure to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) replaced the former 1503 
procedure in addressing “consistent pattern of gross and reliable attested violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”30 While the procedure its confidential in nature, the admissibility criteria include 
a factual description of the alleged violations, including the rights which are alleged to be violated; it must 
be submitted by a person or a group of persons claiming to be the victim of violations and claiming to 
have direct and reliable knowledge of those violations, accompanied by clear evidence; and domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, unless it appears that such remedies would be ineffective or unreasonably 
prolonged. 
Some UN human rights treaty bodies developed early-warning and early-action procedures to prevent 
and respond to violations of treaty obligations. In 1993, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) developed a procedure relating to early-warning measures and urgent action for 
situations requiring immediate attention to prevent or limit the scale or number of serious violations of 
the Convention. The procedure was established as a response to the call of the Secretary-General to 
contribute to the prevention of genocide by responding early and effectively to discrimination. CERD 
identified indicators for patterns of systematic and massive racial discrimination relevant in the context of 
genocide. In each situation brought to its attention, the Committee ‘assesses their significance in light of 
the gravity and scale of the situation, including the escalation of violence or irreparable harm that may be 
caused to victims of discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.’ 
According to its own account, the Committee addressed situations falling within the scope of mass 
atrocities, such as the bombing of villages, the use of chemical weapons and landmines, extrajudicial 
killings, rape and torture committed against minorities and indigenous peoples.31 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can request reports from States Parties at any 
time the Committee deems appropriate, which forms the basis of its emergency procedure developed in 
1991. So, far urgent reports have been requested from about 20 states, including the provision of specific 
information on specified articles of the Covenant within three months. However, the Committee did not 
reveal the standards applied to request urgent reports; it referred to ‘recent and continuing events.’32  
Meanwhile, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has developed a 
similar procedure in order to obtain and examine information on an actual or potential violation, where 
there is special cause for concern.33 
Different UN entities mandate commissions on inquiry to establish whether gross or serious violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law have been committed and to identify perpetrators. As a general 
approach, the commissions examine existing reports on violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law and to verify the veracity of these reports through their own findings, and establish 
further facts. The commissions select incidents and areas they deem most representative of acts, trends 
and patterns relevant to the determination of violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law and with greater possibilities of effective fact-finding.  For example, the ICI on Darfur has identified 
‘“likely suspects” based on “a reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which 
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tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a 
crime.”’34 
Within human rights law, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has examined the 
obligations included within the Covenant with respect to ‘international assistance and cooperation,’35 
obligations that flow from the undertakings of Articles 55-56 of the UN Charter itself and additionally 
advanced by specific General Assembly resolutions on economic development. However, the Committee 
did not indicate what standard of proof would apply in the situation, for example, when one state sought 
to demand the implementation of this concept against a set of duty-holders. 
Turning to identifiably serious breaches of international law, the ILC’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility36 under Articles 40-41 focuses on “serious breaches of obligations under pre-emptory norms 
of general international law” — and all states’ duty to cooperate to end these violations. The breach must 
be of a pre-emptory norm of international law (frequently referred to as a jus cogens violation), and it must 
be serious. “Serious” is defined as a “gross or systematic failure by the responsible state”; it is self-evident 
that the question of whether RtoP acts are occurring and whether a state is “manifestly failing” to protect 
its population will have great commonalities to this examination. Of course the standard of proof that will 
be applied to determine finding under these Articles will depend on the context in which they are 
invoked: i.e. use by an organ of the United Nations will have different standards than by an international 
judicial tribunal or arbitral body. 
 
The Use of Force: Ex Ante & Ex Post Evaluations 
 
The use of force under international law is valid, in the age of the UN Charter, in only very limited 
circumstances.  Its potential validity can be placed into two categories: the inherent right of self-defense 
(either individual or collective), or as authorized by the UN Security Council as provided for by Chapter 
VII of the Charter, including to protect populations at risk from RtoP acts. 
To work backwards, tribunals have been asked to assess the question over the validity of a claim of self-
defense on several occasions, but there have not been (at this time) judicial findings on the validity of 
Security Council-authorized uses of force. The ICJ examined the alleged illegal use of mines in the Corfu 
Channel case, decided in 194937 — although the case did not centre on the assertion of self-defense by 
Albania. Here, the Court declared its need for allegations to be proven by “conclusive evidence” and a 
“degree of certainty.” The Court’s assertion of a standard of proof in this case was unfortunately missing 
in their more recent cases over Military and Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platforms38; both “sufficiency” and 
“conclusiveness” were invoked, but any choice or clarification of this standard has so far been lacking. 
It is the exclusive competence of the Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter to 
determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security. However, the General Assembly is 
not prevented from making determinations for the purposes of its own functions. Both organs have 
considered situations of mass atrocities in the past in the context of their mandates to maintain 
international peace and security. However, analyzing these cases in more detail does not allow a clear 
conclusion that instances of mass atrocities always constitute threats to international peace and security.  
In past cases, the Security Council referred to ‘massive flows of refugees towards or across international 
frontiers’ or ‘the consequences for the countries of the region” or underlined “the unique character of the 
present situation.’ In addition, the standards of proof applied by the Security Council and the General 
Assembly remains unclear.  
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From an ex ante perspective, it would be useful to set out the standards of proof required to support a 
claim for self-defense under the customary international law rule embodied in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, or for the use of force as authorized by the Security Council. While there is a voluminous 
amount of material on the requirements that must be shown for such undertakings, in neither case has 
there been any robust indication of whether any standard of proof is in fact needed at all, or to whom this 
proof would be submitted and/or examined. The same problems that surround this issue are present in 
all coercive measures of prevention and reaction that may be taken under the RtoP framework. 
 
International Organizations and Responsibility 
 
A final potential area from which to glean insight for this project comes from the consistently evolving 
area of the international legal responsibility of international organizations. The question of whether and 
when international organizations can be held responsible for actions or omissions under international law 
is complex and controversial. Indeed, the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations39 have received a multitude of comment and critique, although they have been referred to 
by certain national courts and the ECtHR in turn. 
Despite the title of the ILC’s work, and in turn the title of this subsection, it is as important to 
examine the question of holding states responsible for actions taken in conjunction with or in the context 
of international organization activity, provisionally set out in Articles 57 to 62 of the Draft. With respect 
to the RtoP, given the framing of paragraph 139 to involve the Security Council as the primary actor to 
address RtoP acts in the face of manifest failure, this topic would be potentially applicable in situations 
whereby the UN or a regional organization fails to act appropriately in the face of RtoP acts, or in 
situations whereby a state incurs responsibility for actions taken or omissions through international 
organizations. Yet the question of whether and what obligations are placed on different international 
organizations in the area of the RtoP is a separate topic outside the scope of this concept chapter. 
There has been an increasing volume of case law concerning the attempts to hold states responsible for 
actions conducted under the auspices of international organizations. These cases have utilized the 
standards of proof that is associated with the primary rule of conduct at issue, i.e. if concerning core 
human rights at the ECtHR, that Court applied the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. There has not 
yet been a separate examination or analysis on the standard of proof for the assessment that might be 
utilized to determine whether a state is failing its international obligations in the context of an act of an 
international organization, or for the responsibility of an international organization independently for its 
acts. Whether this standard of assessment should necessarily be identical to that associated with the 
responsibility of a state will remain an open question at this time.  
  
Part I: Conclusion 
 
The analysis of different evidentiary standards has shown that the determination of the risk of a violation 
of international legal obligations in the future based on present facts and circumstances has been 
addressed successfully by international and national courts. Standards that seek to determine the prospect 
of serious crimes and seek to avoid such crimes prospectively, the risk that must be demonstrated ranges 
from the low end of “reasonable possibility” to the high end of “substantial risk.” In the middle lies the 
“real risk.” In general, courts, both international and national, engage in balancing of the probability of 
an event occurring based on the evidence available at the time of the decision, with the level of harm that 
would occur if such a situation would develop.  In the context of the RtoP, the level of harm that would 
occur must be, by definition, exceptionally grave. At the same time, engagement to prevent such crimes 
must be measured and reasonable in light of the precautionary principle as well as the prerogatives of 
sovereignty. As a result, the mid-level standard of “real risk” makes the most sense and is most fair, as it 
                                                           
39 Adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10). The report, which also 
contained commentaries to the draft articles (para. 88), will appear in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2011, vol. II, Part Two. 
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requires individualizing risks and considering concrete scenarios. Additionally, it mirrors the language of 
the jurisprudence in similar cases, in particular non-refoulement.  
 
 
Part II: The Standard and Guiding Principles for the Application of the RtoP 
 
 
According to past experience, mass atrocities do not evolve in a linear fashion and they hardly encompass 
a whole country at one given time. Therefore, preventive measures cannot be distinguished in neat 
categories of structural and direct prevention. What appear to be ongoing mass atrocities in one part of a 
country could only be the precursor of similar violence in another part; post-conflict peace-building, long-
term and sustainable in its impact, might have the objective of preventing directly the relapse into mass 
atrocities. 
The RtoP can contribute to address a situation of mass atrocities in any stage of its development. The 
urgency and gravity of the situation can only be determined concretely according to the circumstances in a 
particular country in a given time. This assessment determines the nature and timeline of activities 
required by the government or, as subsidiary, bystander states and/or the international community 
collectively. 
A state’s responsibility to protect its own population is based on existing legal obligations, which 
prevail independently of the RtoP at all times. It therefore is necessary to reflect a standard of application 
related to these primary legal obligations. At the same time, with regard to the objectives of the RtoP 
outlined above, the standard should focus on the future risk aspect of the prevention component of the 
RtoP and combine prospective and retrospective elements. The definition of consecutive, measurable 
steps is both preventive and reactive; collective action must balance the urgent imperatives of population 
protection against the legal and normative value of sovereign equality and territorial control. The subject 
of evidence is the foreseeable consequences of present action, which generally requires a lower threshold 
of evidence but a higher risk requirement. The standard should also reflect and address the tension 
between flexibility and prescriptive rigor. As the authors discovered, the need for flexibility is more 
relevant in respect of the response not necessarily in the question of whether RtoP acts are imminent or 
occurring. 
It was reiterated explicitly in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect that the threshold for RtoP measures under Chapter VI is lower than for enforcement action 
under Chapter VII. At the same time, the pillars outlined in the report have not been interpreted as 
neatly separated sets of activities that will be applied according to linear developments on the ground 
moving the situation from one pillar to the next according to clearly defined thresholds. Therefore, it is 
not necessary for the standard to be different for the forms of intervention indicated in the different 
pillars. Instead, the standard provides for a framework to determine existing risk levels as a basis for 
assessing future developments with an acceptable level of certitude. Given the specific rules within 
international law on the use of force as well as evident unwillingness presently (as of February 2012) to 
adopt guidelines on the use of military force under the RtoP set out in the 2001 ICISS report and 
elsewhere, and the approach of the RtoP to define a continuum of measurable steps to mitigate risk 
factors of mass atrocities, it was not required to assign separate standards of proof for this category.  Any 
situation can be assessed for risks of mass atrocities following the proposed standard.  It is for the relevant 
stakeholders to determine, based on their assessment, the appropriate time for different forms of more or 
less intrusive action to prevent or halt mass atrocities.  Given the need to target limited resources to those 
states and situations that truly require forceful early prevention against mass atrocity, the standard can as 
well be very useful in assessing where international assistance and capacity-building should best be utilized. 
The following provides a standard against which incoming information may be assessed in respect of 
RtoP. The accompanying guidelines offer an approach to assess whether a situation would benefit from 
applying the RtoP and suggests a procedure how to identify required action.  
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Application 
 
1. This standard provides a systematic and coherent approach to incoming information that can be 
utilized on a case by case basis for assessment and analysis of potential RtoP situations. The application 
of the standard aims to increase transparency and accountability of deliberations on the application of 
the RtoP to a given situation and promote consistency in state action. 
 
2. This standard is intended to be utilized by states, international and regional organizations, civil society, 
academia and other actors called upon to determine the applicability of the RtoP. The standard may 
assist common and coordinated approaches to implementing the practical steps embodied in the RtoP. 
 
Standard of Assessment  
 
1. The situation will be considered in the context of the RtoP, if the examination of the situation 
establishes a real risk that exceptionally grave human rights violations, as described in genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, are occurring or could occur in the future.  
 
2. The assessment of available information aims at the determination of the likelihood of future conduct. 
This determination will build on evidence of past events as relevant.  
 
3. For fact-finding on present and past events, the standard of reasonable suspicion should be applied, 
which is met when a reliable body of evidence indicates the occurrence of a particular incident or 
event.  Relevant facts cannot be established solely on the basis of reports in mass or social media and 
must be corroborated.  
 
Principle 1:  Determination of relevant human rights violations 
 
1. The objective of the determination of relevant human rights violations is not the identification of 
separated legal categories of mass atrocity crimes on the on hand and other human rights violations on 
the other, but a common consciousness of the risks involved in any massive violation of human rights. 
 
2. The following human rights violations have been of particular relevance in past cases of mass atrocities: 
killings, torture, mutilation, rape and sexual violence, abduction, forced population movement, 
expropriation, destruction of property, looting, lack of freedom of speech/ press/ assembly/ religion, 
destruction of subsistence food supply, denial of water or medical attention, man-made famine, 
redirection of aid supplies, discrimination in access to work and resources, political marginalization, 
restricted movement, discrimination in education and lack of access to justice and redress. 
 
Principle 2: Determination of the level of gravity or seriousness of potential violations 
 
1. The persecution of large parts of the population based on identities applied by the perpetrators is the 
main element of the exceptional situations relevant to the application of the RtoP.  
 
2. The significance of human rights violations will be assessed in light of the number of potential victims 
of violence or level of irreparable harm that may be caused to potential victims taking into account the 
following risk-factors: identification of the victims based on identity criteria linked to race, colour, 
descent, religion, ethnic, or national origin, gender, sexual orientation or other ground and their 
association with a specific political opinion or group; public hate speech, incitement to violence, or 
humiliation of a group publicly or in the media; exclusionary ideologies that purport to justify 
discrimination; a past history of violence against perceived groups; and a climate of impunity in which 
these events unfold. 
 
3. The following circumstances can increase the risk-level for potential victims: Armed conflict, which 
may disproportionately affect a specific group or a large part of the population; existence of and 
support to militias that could carry out attacks against potential victims; elections. 
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Principle 3:  Application of the RtoP 
 
1. The RtoP requires states to take concrete measures to mitigate the real risk of mass atrocities, based on 
existing legal obligations.  The RtoP encourages a concept of consecutive, measurable steps by national 
and international actors, based on existing resources and strategies, but does not itself prescribe 
particular measures. 
 
2. The nature and timeline of the steps depends on the gravity and urgency of the situation.  Such 
measures could include:  public acknowledgement and condemnation of human rights violations; clear 
and public orders to military, police or security forces to respect international human rights and 
humanitarian law; immediate enforcement of accountability for the most relevant violations; ensuring 
humanitarian assistance and protection for victims of violence; and, in cooperation with relevant 
stakeholders, including potential victims and drawing an action plan with timelines for mitigating the 
most urgent risk factors. 
 
3. Action of the international community is subsidiary to action by the national government, i.e. to 
support and complement rather than substitute.  
 
 
 
Principle 4: Determination whether a State is “manifestly failing” to meet the RtoP 
 
1. In case the national authorities are manifestly failing to meet their responsibility to protect, the 
responsibility is moving to the international community. 
 
2. The determination — whether a state is “manifestly failing” — should be based on the information of 
relevant human rights violations, the state of implementation of measurable steps to mitigate risk 
factors, and its impact on the real risk that exceptional grave violations of human rights could occur in 
the future. Based on the outline of consecutive measures to mitigate the real risk of exceptionally grave 
human rights violations, the compliance of national governments and the international community 
can be established.  Manifest failure occurs when foreseeable consequences have not been addressed 
and the risk level prevails or increases. 
 
3. The impact of measures taken by the government and their impact on the risk-level should be 
monitored on a permanent basis against the timelines and indicators of the concept. 
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Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons for “Pillar Three” 
 
RUBEN RIEKE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Until 2011, debate on the third pillar of RtoP was rather neglected. The United Nations chose to 
promote and build consensus around the controversial principle by emphasising its preventive and non-
coercive aspects.1 In particular, it was suggested that the prevention of mass atrocity crimes is the most 
important dimension of RtoP, and that prevention is primarily based on pillars one and two (state 
responsibility and long-term capacity-building).2 The main focus therefore was on addressing the so-called 
root causes of mass atrocities, managing diversity, building capacity in at risk states, and supporting (not 
coercing) sovereign states to protect their populations. As the RtoP’s sharper end, “pillar three” seemed 
too close to the dead-end debate on humanitarian intervention and too controversial to convince critics to 
weaken their resistance to RtoP. 
In 2011, however, “pillar three” has made a meaningful comeback. The humanitarian crises in Côte 
d’Ivoire and Libya triggered coercive international responses that can be seen as good examples of the 
operationalization of RtoP’s third pillar.3 In Côte d’Ivoire, UN peacekeepers and French troops launched 
military attacks against forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo in order to protect civilians.4 In Libya, 
the international community adopted a whole range of “pillar three” measures - from targeted sanctions 
and ICC referral to a no-fly zone and military intervention - in order to prevent the Gaddafi regime from 
committing mass atrocity crimes.5 According to Ramesh Thakur, Libya was ‘the first time the Security 
Council authorized an international RtoP operation’.6 Whilst some are worried that the comeback of 
“pillar three” may trigger a wave of neo-militarism,7 others applaud this development as a welcome 
broadening of the debate to include RtoP’s coercive edge.8 Regardless of where one stands on this issue, 
Libya in particular seems to be a crucial case to study for generating conceptual and operational lessons 
about RtoP’s third pillar, which is what this chapter aims to do.9 
In what follows, the chapter shows that Libya teaches at least three lessons about RtoP’s third pillar. 
First, and more conceptually, Libya shows that “pillar three” deals not only with responses to ongoing 
mass atrocities, but contains an important preventive dimension as well. The prevention tools that the 
                                                           
1 According to Jennifer Welsh, ‘The current Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, hopes that by focusing his implementation 
plan on so-called Pillars One and Two, and downplaying Pillar Three, he can build greater support for the principle among 
UN member states’. See, J.M. Welsh, “A Normative Case for Pluralism: Reassessing Vincent’s Views on Humanitarian 
Intervention”, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, (2011), p. 1201. 
2 See, Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/667, 12 January 2009, p. 9. 
3 See, A. Bellamy & P. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2011). 
4 Self-defence was another justification provided for the decisive military action in Cote d’Ivoire. See, Bellamy and 
Williams, “The New Politics of Protection?”, pp. 829-838. 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the preventive engagement in Libya. See: R. Reike, “Libya and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Lessons for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities”, St Antony’s International Review, Vol. 9, No. 11, (2012), pp. 122-149. 
6 R. Thakur, “R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle for Competing Normative Architectures”, e-International 
Relations, 7 September 2011. See: www-e-ir.info/?p=13728.  
7 See, Ms. Louise Arbour’s remarks at the Stanley Foundation conference on ‘R2P: The Next Decade’, New York, January 
18, 2012. See: http://fora.tv/2012/01/18/R2P_as_a_Tool__Identifying_Past_and_Potential_Value.  
8 See: T.G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); and T.G. Weiss, 
“R2P Alive and Well After Libya”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3, (2011), pp. 1-6. 
9 The author should state from the outset that this paper does not address the question of whether and how international 
action “á la Libya” could potentially be repeated. In my view, the question of consistency is often over-emphasised in RtoP-
related debates, as an element of inconsistency is in fact built into RtoP’s third pillar. The 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document clearly states that decisions on pillar three will be made on a case-by-case basis. 
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international community employed in Libya were all of a “pillar three” kind. This indicates that at an 
immediate stage where potential perpetrators, potential victims and situational crime factors can be 
identified with some clarity, “pillar three” tools are most appropriate to change the cost-benefit analysis of 
potential perpetrators, reduce the vulnerability of potential victims and decrease the permissiveness of 
crime situations. Thus, it is important to approach “pillar three” with a mind-set of prevention. Second, 
and more operationally, Libya suggests that preventing mass atrocity crimes might require the 
international community to take sides in internal struggles and apply certain “pillar three” tools partially. 
Libya also forces us to discuss the difficult question of whether regime change needs to be the ultimate 
tool of the “pillar three” toolbox, namely in cases where potential perpetrators prove unwilling to change 
course. This challenges the UN approach to most situations of armed conflict. Third, Libya reveals that 
“pillar three” prevention efforts might entail agonizing dilemmas and unintended consequences. The 
“responsibility to prevent” is therefore likely to be much more controversial than it is often depicted. The 
Brazilian initiative on “Responsibility While Protecting” (RWP) should be applauded as a useful starting 
point in addressing such dilemmas, and thereby making future “pillar three” activities more likely. 
This argument will be developed in four parts. To begin, the chapter briefly discusses the international 
preventive engagement in Libya to show that “pillar three” in fact contains an important preventive 
dimension. In the next section, the analysis turns to the actual application of “pillar three” prevention 
tools to demonstrate how preventing mass atrocity crimes might require the abandoning of the central 
conflict prevention principles of consent and impartiality. In the subsequent part, there is discussion 
about the problems and unintended consequences that resulted from the preventive engagement in Libya. 
To conclude, the chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis. 
 
 
Pillar Three and Late-Stage Prevention 
 
 
The world’s early warning mechanisms for mass atrocity risk all failed to identify Libya as a country of 
concern. Neither quantitative nor qualitative risk assessments provided any warning on Libya.10 Thus, the 
crisis that unfolded in Libya from 15 February onwards caught the world by surprise. Suddenly 
confronted with high mass atrocity risk in Libya, the international community very quickly engaged in 
preventive efforts to stop the fragile situation from sliding into one of large-scale atrocities. However, due 
to the time constraints, more structural prevention measures had not much to say about the case.11 There 
simply was not enough time to implement any long-term measures. Instead, the international community 
reverted to more short-term and targeted prevention measures aiming to prevent an escalation. Even 
though the bulk of the discussion usually focuses on the military measures taken to protect civilians and 
enforce the no-fly zone, it is important to recognize that the international community adopted a whole 
range of prevention tools before reverting to the last resort of military intervention. As the following 
discussion shows, most of the tools employed in Libya belong to the R2P’s third pillar, which is usually 
not associated with preventive action. 
                                                           
10 More generally, see A.J. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’, Ethics & 
International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3, (2011), p. 266. More specifically Barbara Harff’s 2009 list of 22 states at risk of mass 
atrocities does not include Libya (her top five are Sudan, Burma, Somalia, Iran, and China). See Barbara Harff, ‘How to 
Use Risk Assessment and Early Warning in the Prevention and De-Escalation of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, No. 4, (2009), pp. 506-531. Equally, Minority Rights Group International’s early 
warning list “Peoples Under Threat” identified 68 countries at risk of mass killing, not including Libya, 
www.minorityrights.org/9885/peoples-under-threat/peoples-under-threat-2010.html. More qualitative early warning 
mechanisms such as the International Crisis Group’s monthly Crisis Watch bulletin did not identify Libya as a country at 
risk either. See Crisis Watch No. 90 (February 1, 2011), www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-
type/crisiswatch/2011/crisiswatch-90.aspx. 
11 See, J.M. Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back Into RtoP’, Ethics & International 
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3, (2011), pp. 255-263.  
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Initially, the international community tried to deter Gaddafi and his inner circle from committing 
large-scale atrocities through threats and warnings.12 On 25 February, alarmed by the public incitement of 
the Gaddafi regime and an increasing death toll amongst civilians, the UN Human Rights Council 
recommended Libya’s suspension from the Council and established an international commission of 
inquiry.13 Only one day later, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 (26 
February), which referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, established an arms embargo on the Libyan 
territory, and imposed targeted sanctions (asset freeze and travel ban) against certain members of the 
Gaddafi regime.14 However, these sticks did not help to prevent Gaddafi from continuing its violent 
crackdown on the popular uprising. On 10 March, the UN and the AU responded to the continuing 
deterioration by initiating parallel mediation initiatives to find a political solution to the crisis. UNSG 
Ban appointed a Special Envoy, Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib, to lead the UN mediation effort and the AU 
mandated a six person High-Level Committee.15 
However, the Gaddafi regime continued to ignore the international community’s warnings and robust 
prevention efforts. To the contrary, it intensified its efforts to retake cities and openly threatened to crush 
the rebellion in its stronghold Benghazi. Faced with the imminent fall of Benghazi and the widely 
anticipated massacre therein the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 (17 March) which authorized 
military measures to prevent a large-scale massacre of civilians. UNSCR 1973 strengthened the sanctions 
regime, imposed a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and authorized the use of all necessary measures to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas.16 Air strikes to enforce the no-fly zone and the protection of 
civilians mandate commenced on 19 March. NATO took over all operations on 31 March. Whilst 
Benghazi and eastern Libya were secured within weeks, the overall situation became increasingly 
deadlocked with neither the Gaddafi regime nor the rebels able to make significant military progress. 
At that point, some states decided to pursue a strategy of regime change, arguing that civilian 
protection in Libya ultimately required the removal of the root cause of the problem, namely the Gaddafi 
regime.17 As a result, some air strikes looked like they were directly targeting Gaddafi and his inner circle, 
and some states actively supplied weapons, intelligence and other equipment to the rebels.18 This “mission 
creep”, however, triggered intense debate and proved to be very controversial. Nevertheless, the 
international community’s preventive engagement only ended with the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the 
violent death of Colonel Gaddafi on October 20, 2011. 
Interestingly, the tools employed to prevent mass atrocity crimes in Libya - that is threats and warnings, 
membership suspensions, fact-finding missions, ICC referral, arms embargo, targeted sanctions, 
mediation, no-fly zone, and military intervention to protect civilians - belong to the RtoP’s third pillar, 
which is usually conceptualized as dealing with responses to ongoing mass atrocities. In Libya, however, 
these tools were used in a preventive manner, aiming to prevent an escalation of a high risk situation. 
Conceptually, therefore, the Libya case suggests that “pillar three” has an important preventive 
dimension.19 In situations of imminent mass atrocity risk where time constraints are high and in which 
                                                           
12 See, for instance, “Live Blog Libya – February 20,” Al-Jazeera,  February 20, 2011, http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-
east/2011/02/17/live-blog-libya#feb20; and H. R Clinton, “Situation in Libya,” Press Statement, PRN: 2011/249, 
Washington D.C., February 21, 2011. See:  www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156836.htm. 
13 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/S-15/1, February 25, 2011. 
14 UN Security Council, Resolution 1970 (2011), February 26, 2011. 
15 See, Peace and Security Council of the AU, 265th Meeting, Communiqué psc/pr/comm.2 (CCLXR), March 10, 2011. 
16 UN Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011. Importantly, UNSCR 1973 was passed with five 
abstentions (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Germany). Moreover, some would probably argue—not unreasonably—that 
the tools in UNSCR 1973 were reactive rather than preventive. In my view, the tools in that resolution constitute very late-
stage prevention measures. 
17 Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, op-ed, “Libya’s Pathway to Peace,” New York Time, April 15, 2011. 
18 See, J. Pattison, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2011), 
pp. 273-274. See also, “France Won’t Rule Out More Libyan Weapon Drops,” Channel 4 News, June 30, 2011, 
www.channel4.com/news/france-wont-rule-out-more-libyan-weapondrops; and “French Military Airdropped Arms to Libya 
Rebels,” France 24, June 29, 2011, www.france24.com/en/20110629-french-military-confirmsairdropping-arms-libya-
kadhafi-rebel#. For a legal assessment, see Dapo Akande, ‘France Admits to Arming Libyan Rebels: Was this Lawful?’, 
EJIL:Talk!, July 1, 2011, www.ejiltalk.org/france-admits-to-arming-libyan-rebels-was-this-lawful/.  
19 See also, Reike, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect”. 
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the identity of potential perpetrators and potential victims becomes increasingly clear, tools to change the 
behaviour of the potential perpetrators (e.g. verbal threats, targeted sanctions, ICC referral, and 
preventive diplomacy) and protect the potential victims (e.g. no-fly zone, safe areas, and military 
intervention) are crucial for preventive purposes. It is “pillar three” that contains the means to achieve 
these ends. Thus, it is important to approach “pillar three” with a mind-set of prevention; even though 
Libya also shows that at times there might only be a very fine line between prevention and response. 
This finding is also relevant for the debate on the so-called “responsibility to prevent” as it challenges 
the conventional wisdom that RtoP prevention is primarily rooted in pillars one and two. As Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon writes, ‘prevention, building on Pillars one and two, is a key ingredient for a 
successful strategy for the responsibility to protect.’20 Adopting Ban’s perspective, prevention would 
mainly involve the following tools: becoming party to human rights treaties and the ICC; ending 
impunity; strengthening civil society; ensuring the independence of the press; engaging in state-to-state 
learning processes; education programmes; building conflict-sensitive development analysis; and 
strengthening local dispute resolution capacity.21 Libya shows, however, that limiting prevention to pillars 
one and two excludes a key set of tools that are crucial to late-stage prevention, namely those contained in 
“pillar three”. Put differently, Libya suggests that the “responsibility to prevent” needs to encompass all 
three pillars of RtoP. 
 
 
Tool Application 
 
 
Furthermore, studying the Libya crisis helps to illuminate how certain tools might need to be employed in 
a mass atrocity context. In other words, it helps to start answering some operational “how” questions for 
“pillar three”. 
In the Libya crisis, the international community adopted a gradual approach of prevention, which 
continuously increased the coerciveness of prevention tools and the pressure on the Gaddafi regime. 
Amongst Security Council members there was general agreement that not all prevention tools should be 
exhausted at the outset, and that the option to ratchet-up further pressure needed to be retained. It is 
noteworthy, though, that the international community’s strategy for preventing mass atrocities in Libya 
abandoned the principles of consent and impartiality that traditionally guide the UN’s response to most 
situations of conflict. 
With regard to the principle of consent, it needs to be acknowledged that none of the measures 
adopted had the consent of the Libyan government. This is not really surprising with regard to, for 
instance, the targeted sanctions. However, it is very curious with regard to the military measures adopted. 
According to Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, Libya was the first time ever that the UN Security Council 
authorized a military intervention for human protection purposes against a fully functioning state without 
the consent of that state.22 Of course, consent is not a legal requirement as long as the Security Council 
acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but in the past some sort of host state consent has usually 
been sought (though sometimes coerced).23 Thus, Libya shows that in order to prevent mass atrocity 
crimes, it might become necessary to abandon the principle of consent.   
The issue of impartiality seems even more interesting. The prevention measures adopted in UNSCR 
1970 and 1973 were all specifically directed against the Gaddafi regime. In other words, the international 
community took sides in Libya’s internal struggle; siding with the National Transitional Council (NTC)-
led rebel movement and denouncing the Gaddafi regime. UNSCR 1970 imposed targeted sanctions on 
some specifically named individuals and entities, all of which belonged to the Gaddafi regime. The 
                                                           
20 Ban, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 9. 
21 Ban, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 21. 
22 See, Bellamy, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect”, p. 263; and Bellamy and Williams, “The New Politics of 
Protection?”, p. 825. 
23 See: S. Chesterman, “Leading From Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian 
Intervention in Libya”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3, (2011), p. 2; see also Bellamy, “Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect”, p. 263. 
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Prosecutor of the ICC clearly identified Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam, and Abdullah al-Senussi as 
those most responsible for crimes committed in Libya, leading the ICC to issue arrest warrants against 
them.24 The comprehensive territorial arms embargo was enforced in a one sided manner, supplying 
weapons to the rebels and cutting off the Gaddafi regime. Furthermore, the mandate to use all necessary 
measures to protect not only civilians but also civilian populated areas further pushed the international 
community towards abandoning the principle of impartiality. The protection of civilian populated areas 
prohibited Gaddafi from attacking entire cities and areas, regardless of whether they contained legitimate 
military targets. As Jennifer Welsh explains, ‘though one can understand the logic behind the focus on 
civilian-populated areas, it nonetheless concretely moves the international community toward aiding one 
side in a conflict and restricting the movements of the other’.25 Finally, the strategy of regime change, 
which some states seem to have pursued, is probably the clearest indicator that impartiality was 
abandoned as a guiding principle. In short, the international community chose sides in the internal 
Libyan struggle. 
All of this suggests that efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes may at times have to relinquish the 
traditional conflict prevention principles of consent, impartiality, and minimal coercion; principles that 
are still at the core of conventional accounts of the “responsibility to prevent”.26 According to Welsh, an:  
 
‘important aspect of Resolution 1973, and the accompanying air campaign, is the degree to 
which it shifts the nature of the UN’s involvement from one of genuine (or at least professed) 
impartiality — a hallmark of the United Nations’ original approach to peacekeeping — to one of 
taking sides … With the Libya case, the Council is reasserting its right to point fingers at the 
“wrongdoer.”’27  
 
Hence, the Libya crisis suggests that “pillar three” based strategies for preventing mass atrocity crimes can 
be at odds with traditional conflict prevention strategies. 
 
 
Problems and Unintended Consequences 
 
 
There can be little doubt that the international community successfully prevented a bloody massacre in 
Benghazi and large-scale atrocities in other parts of Libya. But it seems equally clear that this was achieved 
in a way that many perceived as very problematic. Thus, the Libya case also reveals, in all clarity, the 
dilemmas and unintended consequences that efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes may bring about, 
particularly if they rely on “pillar three” tools. The controversy about Libya led some commentators to 
even predict the death of RtoP as an operationally relevant principle.28 In what follows the chapter 
highlights some of the unintended consequences that arose from the international prevention efforts in 
Libya. 
First, one problem that some states raised with regard to the international community’s preventive 
engagement in Libya relates to the issue of civilian casualties. The high likelihood of civilian casualties is 
one of the dilemmas that most – if not any – form of military intervention faces. This was no different in 
Libya. Whilst NATO and its international partners did not suffer a single casualty, NATO air strikes 
evidentially caused some casualties amongst the Libyan civilian population. The Indian Ambassador to 
the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, even accused NATO of having ‘killed thousands in order to save a few 
hundred’. Whilst this assessment is polemic and exaggerated, the Human Rights Council’s inquiry into 
                                                           
24 See, L. Moreno-Ocampo, “Statement of the Prosecutor on the opening of the investigation into the situation in Libya”, 
March 3, 2011, The Hague. 
25 Welsh, “Civilian Protection in Libya”, p. 259. 
26 See also, A.J. Bellamy, “Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility 
to Prevent”, Policy Analysis Brief: The Stanley Foundation, January 2011, p. 7.  
27 Welsh, “Civilian Protection in Libya”, p. 258. 
28 D. Rieff, “R2P, R.I.P”, The New York Times, November 7, 2011. See: www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-
rip.html?pagewanted=all.  
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civilian casualties in Libya shows that NATO airstrikes indeed caused civilian deaths of a number 
somewhere around 100.29 The Human Rights Council’s inquiry clearly stated that NATO did not 
deliberately target civilians, and some argue that 100 civilian casualties are a relatively low number for 
such a military operation.30 However, Brazil and others have articulated the view that even one civilian 
casualty is one too many. Russia and China have equally criticized NATO for the existence of civilian 
casualties.31 
Second, another shortcoming of the international prevention efforts in Libya was that the provision of 
protection was selective. Whilst the international community rather successfully prevented large-scale mass 
atrocities in Benghazi and eastern Libya, such protection was not provided in other parts of Libya. In 
those unprotected parts, some atrocities and civilian deaths occurred (often against Libyan women). Ivo 
Daalder, the US Ambassador to NATO, and James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, argue 
that NATO was very effective in implementing the arms embargo and the no-fly zone, but encountered 
difficulties in providing comprehensive protection for civilians. According to them, ‘the proximity of the 
regime’s forces, facilities, and equipment to civilian infrastructure; the initially limited ability of the 
Libyan opposition to defend itself and the population centres under its control; and the need for NATO 
to minimize harm to civilians all slowed the operation and at times led to a perception of deadlock and 
stalemate.’32 NATO’s difficulties in providing comprehensive protection were also due to the air based 
nature of the military prevention measures. As UNSCR 1973 explicitly prohibited the deployment of 
ground troops, international protection efforts were limited to the air campaign. This raises questions 
about how much protection an air campaign can provide for threatened populations. 
Third, there are reports about atrocities committed by the internationally supported rebel movement.33 
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented 
several instances in which forces loyal to the NTC committed reprisal attacks on alleged Gaddafi 
supporters, often foreigners from sub-Saharan Africa assumed to be mercenaries. According to Amnesty 
International those reprisal attacks may constitute war crimes as well.34 Moreover, in January 2012, the 
humanitarian organisation Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) suspended its operations in detention centres in 
Misrata as it was asked to treat patients between torture sessions. According to MSF, it treated at least 115 
people with torture related injuries.35 By having supported one side in a civil war, the international 
community unintentionally empowered that side to commit atrocities of its own. Understandably, many 
see the relative silence over NTC atrocities as a hypocritical double standard.36 
Fourth, a major problem since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime is the proliferation of arms in Libya 
and the wider region. The power vacuum that the fall of the Gaddafi regime left as well as the active 
supply of weapons to the rebels by some states led to a high circulation of arms and the emergence of 
highly armed militias. This raises serious concerns not only for stability in Libya but also in the wider 
region. As the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, stresses:  
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32 I. Daalder and J. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2 (2012), pp. 2-7. 
33 See in particular the following reports: Amnesty International, The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture, 
MDE 19/025/2011; Amnesty International, Detention Abuses Staining the New Libya, MDE 19/036/2011; Human Rights 
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35 Medecins Sans Frontières, Libya: Detainees Tortured and Denied Medical Care, Press Release, January 26, 2012. 
36 On October27, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2016 (2011) which simply urges the Libyan authorities 
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‘The AU has continuously drawn attention to the proliferation, in the region, of weapons 
emanating from the Libyan military depots. To some, these concerns seemed exaggerated when 
they were first expressed. Today, there is a growing realization within the international 
community of the gravity of the threat posed by this situation and the need for a concerted 
international action to address it. This is all the more urgent as some of the countries in the 
Sahelo-Saharan belt are in a fragile situation, having to deal with both latent rebellions and 
terrorist groups.37’ 
 
In Resolution 2017 (31 October), the UN Security Council acknowledges the problem of arms 
proliferation, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS), and expresses concern about 
‘the risk of destabilization posed by the dissemination in the Sahel region of illicit small arms and light 
weapons’.38 Moreover, many see the military coup d’état in Mali in March 2012 as a spill-over from the 
Libya intervention. 
These are just some of the broader dilemmas and unintended consequences that the preventive 
engagement in Libya brought about. This is not to suggest that the prevention efforts in Libya are not to 
be applauded, but it raises awareness for the problems that might be associated with robust “pillar three” 
prevention efforts. Those challenges need to be included in debate and planning in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of “pillar three” action, also in the long-term. One channel for addressing some of the 
aforementioned problems could be the Brazilian initiative on RWP, which emerged relatively directly 
from problems associated with the Libya campaign.39 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
To sum up, at least three lessons for RtoP’s third pillar can be learned from a closer look at the 
international community’s preventive engagement in Libya. First, and more conceptually, Libya shows 
that “pillar three” is as relevant for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes as it is for responses to ongoing 
mass atrocities. Strategies for late-stage prevention rely heavily on “pillar three” tools. It seems likely that 
such pillar three late-stage prevention will be the norm rather than the exception for as long as we have 
not developed better structural indicators to foresee mass atrocity risk early enough to engage in 
meaningful structural prevention. Thus, illuminating and developing the preventive dimension of “pillar 
three” is an important task. This alludes to the second lesson from Libya. With an eye to 
operationalization, Libya indicates that it is important to pay more attention to the details of how pillar 
three tools are employed. “Pillar three” is sometimes approached too narrowly, focusing mostly on 
military intervention. In reality, however, “pillar three” contains a whole range of measures that can be 
used to ratchet-up pressure on potential perpetrators. Thereby, Libya demonstrates that “taking sides”, 
abandoning impartiality, and acting without host state consent might become necessary elements of 
strategies that aim at the immediate prevention of mass atrocity crimes. This challenges the approach of 
the UN to most situations of conflict, and suggests that the prevention of mass atrocity crimes is different 
from conflict prevention more broadly conceived. Finally, Libya shows that action under “pillar three” is 
likely to entail some agonizing dilemmas and unintended consequences that need to be accounted for. 
Discussing the problematic aspects that action under “pillar three” might raise seems important to 
establish the political basis for future RtoP action. The Brazilian initiative on RWP could be used to 
address some of those concerns. 
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The Role of Business in Third Pillar Interventions under the Responsibility to 
Protect 
 
CONOR SEYLE & EAMON ALOYO 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The RtoP is unusual because of the speed at which it was adopted internationally as a serious topic for 
discussion1. This adoption was broad as well as rapid: organizations including the UN Security Council2, 
the UN General Assembly3, the popular press4, NATO, and many NGOs have written on and invoked 
RtoP. However, despite the speed and breadth of this discussion, the conception of RtoP has remained 
relatively limited in its understanding of what and who the relevant actors are in RtoP issues. Although 
there has been some discussion of non-state actors in the general discussion of RtoP, in the formulation of 
RtoP as defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)5 and 
elaborated by Ban Ki Moon6, the central actors are states. This conception is limited: in the globalized 
world of the 21st century, non-state actors can play a major role in international issues7. 
One such non-state actor is business. When discussing issues of armed conflict, human rights abuses, 
and mass atrocities, existing research focuses on how business can or should mitigate such issues8. 
Businesses have economic, legal, and moral reasons to participate in the prevention, cessation, and 
recovery from mass atrocities. This chapter argues that business represents an untapped sector relevant to 
RtoP issues, and business can help implement third-pillar interventions as well as playing a role in 
prevention and recovery from RtoP violations. 
 
Why Business should be Interested in Participating in RtoP Interventions 
 
There are two main bodies of literature examining when, why, and how national and international 
businesses engage with conflict and human rights. Broadly, these literatures can be broken into Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR),9 and “Business and Peace” or Corporate Security Responsibility (CSecR)10. 
The CSR literature discusses how and why corporations should be aware of their impact on societies in 
which they work. Research and practice in CSR has tended to look at how businesses can be motivated to 
limit their social harms, and contribute to positive outcomes. The business and peace or CSecR literature 
has a more limited focus, looking specifically at how and why businesses participate in stopping armed 
conflict or/and increasing security and stability11. Research in these areas has attempted to develop 
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11 Op.Cit., The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution; Op.Cit., “The Role of the 
Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace.” 
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empirical descriptions of where and how business is legally or practically implicated in issues of human 
rights12 and armed conflict13. It has also developed more prescriptive arguments about why businesses 
should choose to engage in these issues14. 
Third pillar RtoP interventions can be considered a special case of these general literatures: although 
questions of CSR and CSecR certainly are central to RtoP interventions, both CSR and CSecR can 
happen outside of RtoP contexts. For this chapter, we will limit our discussion of business specifically to 
violations of RtoP as defined by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and reaffirmed in the 
2009 UN Report of the Secretary-General15, which includes “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.” Additionally, the chapter mostly limits its discussion to “third pillar” 
interventions, which are attempts to stop ongoing RtoP violations. Existing literature has identified 
several reasons why domestic and international businesses may be interested in participating in RtoP 
issues in general and third pillar interventions specifically. Drawing on this literature, we argue that there 
are economic, legal, and moral reasons for businesses to be interested in RtoP interventions. 
There are bottom-line reasons for businesses to work for a quick cessation of RtoP violations. The 
most pertinent economic reason is simply stability: most businesses require a relatively stable environment 
in order to carry out regular business activities, and activities which support stability may act as long-term 
investments supporting more profitable business activities16. The kind of mass violence that triggers third 
pillar interventions is extremely disruptive to business activities: civil wars decrease per-capita GDP,17 and 
damage the infrastructure and physical and social capital on which businesses rely18. One primary 
economic reason for businesses to participate in RtoP issues is that in doing so they can help to re-
establish stability and improve their bottom line. This requires that the cost of the investment not exceed 
the expected return. However, for businesses with significant infrastructure investments or long-term 
activity within a specific country, the potential for conflicts to persist for generations in the absence of 
intervention is a strong argument for the economic utility of action. 
In addition to minimizing losses from the cost of conflict, participation in RtoP interventions can 
actively promote profit. If there is widespread awareness and condemnation of RtoP violations or mass 
atrocities in a state, then there can be reputational and hence economic benefits for companies resisting 
these abuses. One illustration of this point in general, although not a RtoP issue specifically, can be found 
in the response of both national and international companies in Egypt to the successful revolution that 
occurred in 2011. The Egyptian revolution was a popular movement that occurred as a part of the “Arab 
Spring” wave of democratization that happened in 2011. In order to capitalize on the passion generated as 
a part of this movement, national and international businesses in Egypt issued advertisements and public 
statements associating themselves with the revolution19. This approach has risks: it relies on the public 
accepting these messages; and companies associated with the previous regime or with repressive activities 
during the revolution may face a backlash from attempting to position themselves as supporters of the 
revolution. Vodafone, an international telecommunications company suspected by many Egyptians to 
have actively worked with the Mubarak regime to assist crackdowns, faced exactly this kind of backlash to 
an advertisement claiming its association with the revolution20. 
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Reputational benefits translate directly into profits: research in CSR has tracked the way that, for many 
consumers, a perception of CSR increases the willingness of the consumer to buy from that company, or 
the price a consumer is willing to pay21. Of course, this effect is mediated by how a consumer views an 
issue a company is focusing on, and a consumer’s general attitude toward CSR22. This suggests that the 
economic impact of pro-RtoP activity will be strongest when RtoP issues are widely known and 
acknowledged to be important. The restriction of RtoP to major abuses including genocide or mass 
human rights abuses suggests that RtoP interventions may meet these criteria. Similarly, watchdog NGOs 
such as Global Witness or Enough may “name and shame” companies failing to abide by the protection 
of human rights, thereby decreasing profits or hampering companies’ ability to work in areas where there 
is a focus on human rights. 
Another economic argument for engagement with RtoP issues is first-mover advantage. This occurs 
when a company becomes one of the first to engage within a specific domain, group, or sector, which 
allows a company to learn how to effectively operate in the domain and build relationships with 
consumers and with influential people in the area without competition from other companies. This can 
allow for companies to become strongly associated with a particular issue, which can result in strong 
reputational benefits even after other companies become involved in similar work23. In the case of RtoP, 
businesses providing support for resistance to RtoP violations may be rewarded with access to, and 
positive relationships with, officials in a new political regime. Although regime change is not necessarily a 
part of RtoP interventions (or, arguably, an appropriate part) recent third pillar interventions including 
Libya and Côte d’Ivoire have resulted in regime change. The Libyan rebels have explicitly stated that they 
will provide preferential treatment to companies from states that supported their movement24, and 
individual businesses may be in a similar position to profit (or fail to profit) from being early supporters of 
new regimes. 
The second reason businesses may be interested in working on the third pillar of RtoP is their legal 
obligations. Many states have laws barring companies from engaging in corruption or human rights 
violations domestically or abroad. In the US, certain types of victims can bring claims under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act against businesses that supported these violations.25 Similarly, the UN has established a 
formal statement of the norms on the human rights responsibilities of businesses. This statement is not 
treaty-based international law, but Weissbrodt and Kruger argue that it is customary international law and 
hence binding26. They claim further that it is a potential reference for legal claims against companies 
which violate it27. Moreover, businesspeople could be directly indicted by the ICC. For instance, the head 
of operations of a Kenyan radio station, Joshua Arap Sang, has been charged with crimes against 
humanity28. The ICC may also be able to deter by threatening to indict business leaders, such as may have 
occurred with some of Côte d’Ivoire’s media moguls that were inciting violence29. 
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Economic sanctions represent an additional legal obligation. Third pillar interventions often use a 
variety of non-military coercive methods including economic sanctions, which place a legal obligation on 
companies not to engage with states or individuals that violate RtoP. Sanctions can work30 or they can 
contribute to repression and result in human rights violations.31 
The third reason businesses may choose to involve themselves in RtoP interventions is the moral 
leadership of some companies. We know that most people prefer to act in line with their moral beliefs 
when they are given the opportunity32. Businesspeople have this preference as well: Fort and Schipani 
have argued that in fact, businesses can be considered as collections of people acting interpersonally and 
developing their moral perspective33. Empirical evidence supports this claim; businesspeople have made 
decisions based in part on their moral beliefs. For instance, in 2000, the Chairman of the DeBeers 
diamond company pointed out that when they made the decision to move away from diamonds sourced 
from conflict areas, DeBeers’ market share had already been increasing and their reasoning behind the 
decision had more to do with moral choice than business imperatives: ‘the market has been extremely 
good and there would not have been any inventory problem if we bought these goods. It was the moral 
imperative and also the fear of what might happen to the diamond industry’34. Of course it is also the case 
that DeBeers was attracting negative attention for association with conflict minerals when their Chair 
made that statement, and such moral arguments, though reasonable, must also be balanced against the 
thought that they can serve to cover or work in tandem with other more strategic reasoning35. 
In sum, businesses can have moral, legal, and economic reasons to work to end violations of RtoP.  
 
 
Points of Business Engagement with Third Pillar Interventions 
 
There is a spectrum of activities that businesses may choose to take when confronted with RtoP violations. 
Businesses may choose to withdraw from the region, attempt to conduct “business as usual,” or actively 
engage with attempts to stop RtoP violations. 
One common response to conflict or severe human rights abuses is to withdraw from the area of 
conflict, either voluntarily or in response to social pressure or legal mandates. Voluntary withdrawal can 
reflect concerns about the safety of the companies’ workers, concern for the reputation of the company, 
or a conscious attempt to pressure those committing violations of RtoP. Perspectives on the utility of this 
approach are mixed, with some groups calling for a withdrawal of multinational corporations from 
conflict areas or a divestment from funding groups in these areas as a way of pressuring states to behave 
appropriately36 and some groups arguing that remaining in the area allows for more effective engagement 
and pressure on the government. If a company withdraws, it may be replaced by a morally worse company. 
For instance, a Canadian oil company operating in Sudan, Talisman Oil, withdrew after social pressure, 
only to be replaced by Oil and Natural Gas Company of India, which did less to protect human rights.37 
Moreover, the Canadian government lost influence over the Sudanese government due to the withdrawal 
of Talisman. 
An interesting example that falls somewhere between a voluntary and legally imposed sanction can be 
found in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, where post-election violence between supporters of ousted President 
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Laurent Gbagbo and the electorally victorious Alassane Ouattara included significant human rights 
violations sufficient to be considered a violation of RtoP principles. As a part of Ouattara’s movement to 
pressure Gbagbo to step down peacefully, he instituted a ban on the export of cocoa. Despite his limited 
legal mandate, cocoa companies voluntarily abided by the ban38. 
A second approach businesses can take is to maintain business as usual. Even regular business activities 
may make a business complicit by providing support for the “war economy”39. By engaging in regular 
business activities, businesses can provide funds to the government or rebel groups via official or 
unofficial taxation. Individuals within the country can direct their profits to support those violating or 
resisting the violation of RtoP. Contemporary conflicts such as those associated with RtoP violations tend 
to include a distributed and fragmented set of actors, all of which require funding and support either 
from traditional economic activities (whether legal or illegal) or from support from diaspora groups or 
states40, and business activities conducted within the state can fund these sources. 
Businesses can instead actively engage with attempts to intervene to stop atrocities through direct 
military or security support or political pressure. Direct provision of support for military activities can take 
the form of business engagement with forces opposing RtoP violations. For example, during the Libyan 
conflict, one source of funding for the rebel army was oil sold through the captured national oil company. 
International oil companies were considered as a potential source of increased funding for the rebel forces 
through this company: closer collaboration between international oil companies and the rebel-held oil 
company would increase oil exports41. This kind of approach, while feasible, is not common and may 
open companies to claims of complicity in human rights violations committed by rebel forces. Alternately, 
companies may use company security forces or hired guards to provide security in regions where the 
company has a strong presence. This can include protecting company infrastructure or employees from 
attack, such as the attacks that focused on Unilever compounds in Kenya during the post-election 
violence42. As with all issues of direct security provision, there is the potential for abuse: in Nigeria, Shell’s 
corporate-supported security forces have been used to protect company staff and property, but these forces 
have also been accused of human rights violations43. 
Communication companies deserve special attention. Because of the powerful role of 
telecommunications in social organizing44, telecommunication companies have been implicated in the 
commission of, and resistance to, RtoP violations. For instance, in Rwanda Radio Télévision Libre Des Mille 
Collines (RTLM) incited violence.45 In Kenya, text messages sent over the phone were used to incite and 
organize ethnic violence.46 In response, the Kenyan phone company Safaricom sent messages calling for 
calm,47 and has now implemented a filtering system that will allow them to block hateful messages in the 
future48. Companies can also choose to actively allow the use of their system for resistance: in 2010, the 
security team at Facebook identified attempts by the Tunisian security services to hack into Facebook 
pages of people affiliated with protests against the Ben Ali government. The security team responded to 
this as they would any other unauthorized attempt to gain access, and prevented the hacking49. Facebook 
casts this as a business decision, not a political one, but it was a decision which supported the organized 
resistance to the then government of Tunisia. 
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A second track for direct engagement with the conflict is companies using political influence to 
encourage the cessation of RtoP violations50. Businesses, particularly multinational corporations, are often 
accused of exerting a powerful impact on the political processes of countries in which they work. For 
example, a diplomatic memo released by Wikileaks in 2010 included a report from a Shell Oil executive 
describing the influence that Shell had with the Nigerian government51. The United Fruit Company was 
famously influential in encouraging the US government to overthrow the democratically elected 
Guatemalan president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, in 1954.52 This political influence is a reflection of the 
size and impact of the companies involved, and could be used for good. Businesses have been actively 
involved in the resolution of significant human rights abuses. In South Africa, Shell Oil funded a major 
education campaign encouraging peaceful democratic transition in 1994, and other South African 
companies directly engaged in setting up and encouraging negotiations between the apartheid government 
and organized opposition53. 
Finally, and no less importantly, businesses may participate in peacebuilding and recovery following 
RtoP interventions. Economic growth and the resumption of regular economic activity is an important 
part of ensuring stability, and both local and multinational businesses can play a major role in assisting 
with investment and the re-establishment of sustainable economies in formerly violent areas54. While this 
is outside the scope of a focus on third pillar interventions, it is nevertheless an important issue that 
should be considered. 
 
 
Maximizing Business Participation in Third Pillar Intervention 
 
The previous discussion identified potential ways that businesses may participate in RtoP interventions, as 
well as some limited examples of when they have participated in the past. This calls for a focus on why 
businesses have not engaged more frequently, systematically, and beneficially. 
One reason for this is that the participation of business in third pillar interventions has been 
hampered by a lack of systematic outreach or explicit invitations to participate. Businesses may not see 
RtoP interventions as within their remit. For example, Milton Friedman argues that “the social 
responsibility of business is [only] to increase its profits”55  However, as the above discussion has pointed 
out, there are clear bottom-line economic reasons for businesses to participate in the prevention, 
cessation, and recovery from RtoP violations. This suggests that businesses may not have been exposed to 
sufficiently convincing arguments. It is also possible that businesses do not participate in RtoP 
interventions because they are ignorant of how to do so effectively, legally, and legitimately. Jamali and 
Mirshak’s interviews with businesses dealing with armed conflict in Lebanon found that one reason 
businesses did not choose to participate directly in the conflict was a perception that they had low 
bargaining power when participating in discussions about conflict, as well as concerns about the 
legitimacy of any action they could take56. 
This suggests that the fundamental challenge with business engagement is a lack of outreach and the 
establishment of credible pathways by which business can participate in RtoP interventions. Providing 
businesses with economic, moral, and legal arguments, combined with practical pathways for how 
businesses may benefit from RtoP interventions may provide significant benefits to businesses. One model 
of a related approach is the role of business in humanitarian relief: since the mid-1990s, there has been a 
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gradual expansion of business involvement in humanitarian relief in general, although this has 
predominantly been in response to natural disasters57. This has taken the form of partnerships between 
businesses and large NGOs such as the ICRC or CARE as well as direct or company-driven engagement 
with disaster recovery or conflict prevention or recovery58. 
How a business is connected to an RtoP violation can be used to identify specific contributions that 
individual businesses can make, which can then be directly presented to business by NGOs or states 
interested in involving these companies.59 
RtoP interventions have a strength that traditional attempts to engage business in conflict do not: by 
the nature of RtoP’s formulation, it deals with events where there is widespread condemnation. Third 
pillar interventions have to date been characterized by attention and, in many cases, the endorsement of 
major IGOs. To the extent that such IGOs legitimize an intervention, business involvement may be 
concomitantly legitimized. 
That IGOs are involved in third pillar interventions also raises the possibility that outreach to 
businesses may be undertaken by IGOs instead of NGOs or other groups. A formal invitation from an 
IGO may be seen as more legitimate by businesses and their stakeholders than pressure from NGOs. To 
the extent that business participation is limited by perceptions that there is no legitimate pathway to 
participate, IGO invitations may increase participation. Unlike NGOs, IGOs and states can change the 
laws regarding businesses, and in doing so create new pathways to participation or formally legitimize 
existing paths. One example is the recommendation of the Working Group on the Prevention of Odious 
Debt in 2010: they argue that if a state is in violation of RtoP or otherwise illegitimate, other states or 
IGOs can engage in “pre-emptive contract sanctions” by declaring that they will not recognize contracts 
made with an existing regime from some specific point in time60. In addition to formal outreach to 
encourage businesses to engage with RtoP issues using existing potential approaches, states and IGOs may 
choose to create new pathways. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Businesses have significant resources, and represent one organized sector of society operating in areas 
where RtoP violations occur. There is a general connection between a well-functioning economy and 
political stability61, and several indicators of successful governance are based on the argument that good 
governance is in part related to support for business activity62. Aside from this general connection between 
economic activity and stability, research on humanitarian intervention and research in business and peace 
suggests that businesses can contribute to stopping RtoP violations. 
Ultimately, business is an inescapable part of the modern world, and a sector which can and has 
mitigated conflict and human rights abuses in the past. The question is not whether business has a role to 
play in these issues, but rather how business’ contributions to stop RtoP violations can best be maximized. 
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Gender Dimensions of Third Pillar Capacities: Women's Contributions to 
Conflict Prevention, Early Warning and Rapid Response 
 
MELINA LITO 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the winter of 2011, a group of NGO and UN agency representatives came together in New York to 
begin a preliminary discussion on how best to integrate women’s skills and perspectives, shifting from that 
of survivors to that of agents of change who can make significant contributions, into the RtoP norm and 
its tools of implementation. The purpose of the group was to identify the links and the gaps that both 
bind and separate these communities and their modes of discourse as part of our contribution to this 
summer’s General Assembly debate on the “third pillar” of RtoP. 
The group acknowledged that much of the analysis of potential linkages has come from an academic 
perspective, and that more could be done from the policy side to increase linkage robustness and make 
connections more actionable. The political sensitivity of including a gender lens within RtoP 
implementation language was also addressed, as well as similar concerns about including RtoP language 
within the frameworks and priorities of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, which is devoted 
to increasing women’s participation in all aspects of peace policies and processes as set out in Security 
Council Resolution (SCR) 1325.1 
The group identified the need to create broader and more collaborative networks of actors binding the 
WPS and RtoP communities as well as to bridge divisions that might otherwise cause these communities 
to keep their distance. As part of this process, it was agreed that we should create, assess and revise a 
background “concept note” that lays out some productive policy linkages that can help bind the gender 
and RtoP communities in ways that would be of benefit to issue practitioners, but especially to diplomats 
with responsibility to cover both of these issues. 
The note principally argues that the RtoP framework would be further enhanced by incorporating 
gender perspectives, including both skills for implementation and a greater understanding of the unique 
ways in which mass atrocity violence impacts female populations. Often under-represented, women can 
make significant contributions in their capacities as both survivors of conflict and agents of change; thus 
more attention should be given to making fully operational their capacities and experiences. Of course, as 
RtoP moves from norm building to implementation, we must be sensitive to full spectrum issues of 
gender inclusivity. As UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Margot Wallström 
noted in her recent report to the Security Council, while sexual violence generally has a disproportionate 
effect on women and girls, recent trends show that men and boys are victims of rape as well so violence 
against both genders should be examined as part of our responsibilities to protect civilian populations.2 
Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) was the original convener of the working 
group that has developed this concept note. In preparation, GAPW undertook broad consultations within 
the RtoP and WPS communities. At the same time, GAPW promotes its own perspective on this and 
other linkages within the UN security system. As best we can, we are committed to highlighting the need 
for a robust, multi-faceted human security agenda with strong connections between nuclear and non-
nuclear disarmament, but even more with linkages that bind the protection of civilians, gender-based 
violence, illicit arms transfers and other current security concerns. RtoP is an important normative 
development, but one which does not occur in a vacuum. Just as the pillars of RtoP highlight 
complementary responsibilities by states and the international community to address atrocity crimes, 
states have urgent, complementary responsibilities to create stable, transparent, sustainable security sectors 
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and adopt policies that contribute to trust by states and other stakeholders – even those states that will 
never possess a nuclear weapon or contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. In this inter-connected 
security architecture, the roles and challenges of women must be highlighted and enhanced. 
In our view, the most effective tools to address mass atrocities are the ones that never need to be used. 
To help ensure that “third pillar” coercive capacities are deployed as seldom as possible, we all have 
important, complementary responsibilities to security sector reform, ending diversion in the global arms 
trade, creating sustainable weapons of mass destruction free zones, all of which are occasions for increased 
levels of women's participation. The responsibility to protect is part of a larger “responsibility to peace 
building” that the UN is taking increasingly seriously and to which our norm-based community must 
contribute as much as possible. An important component of that “responsibility to peace building” is the 
integration of women’s perspectives, shifting from that of survivors to that of agents who can make 
significant contributions in protecting against, and preventing, mass atrocity crimes.   
 
 
Background Concept Note 
 
 
Reflections of Current Gender Issues in the RtoP Framework    
 
The RtoP norm was affirmed by the international community in 2005 with the aim to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (hereinafter “mass atrocity 
crimes”). The UNSG’s report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect3 (2009) noted that sexual violence 
against women could constitute a war crime, or a crime against humanity.4 
As outlined in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, there is a three pillar strategy on implementing the 
doctrine:  
 
 ‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’5  
 
 The international community has a responsibility to assist states in meeting those obligations.6  
 
 ‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.’7 If such means prove inadequate and a state is “manifestly failing” 
in its efforts to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes, then the international community, 
working with regional organizations, can engage in “collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner.’8   
 
While the implementation of RtoP has in many instances addressed the need to protect women from rape 
and other sexual violence, much remains to be done to fully integrate women's skills and capacities in 
preventing and addressing mass violence.9 Attention to the particular needs of women is important 
because women are often underrepresented in policy discussions and are not necessarily a priority focus 
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group for state protection strategies.10 Women often experience disproportionate impacts from armed 
conflict insofar as they are targets of rape and sexual violence, tend to have less access to policy, 
employment and educational options, and ‘experience widespread violations of non-derogable rights to 
life, torture, summary or arbitrary executions, displacement’ and other gross violations.11 RtoP can be 
further enhanced as an effective security framework by incorporating women’s skills and experiences as 
returning ex-combatants, immigrants, refugees, mediators, and political leaders. As SRSG Wallström has 
noted, in practical ways ‘the Council has understood that there can be no security without women’s security. 
The aim is not to protect women from violence; it is to protect them to participate in public and economic 
life.’12 
Thus far, the incorporation of women’s perspectives, skills, and needs has been limited. The UNSG’s 
2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, did make some direct and welcomed references to 
SCR 1325 and 1820. SCR 1325 acknowledges women’s participation at all decision-making levels; their 
protection from sexual and gender-based violence; and stresses the importance of including gender 
perspectives in peace processes.13 SCR 1820 focuses specifically on widespread sexual violence in conflict 
as a major impediment to sustainable peace and security.14  The 2009 report made reference to the 
following:  
 
 The role of women’s groups in shaping an international response to crimes relevant to RtoP is 
not very well known and requires more attention.15 
 
 There is a need to provide care to victims and survivors, and to recognize and support women’s 
groups who have played a critical role in assisting survivors of systematic sexual violence.16 
 
 It must be recognized that women’s non-government organizations can be important sources for 
detecting and warning of conflict at early stages.17 
 
 There is a need to expand research (including women's voices) to help determine ‘why it has been 
so difficult to stem widespread and systematic sexual violence in some places.’18 
 
 There is acknowledgment that ‘[i]n its resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1820 (2008), the Security 
Council underscored that rape and other forms of sexual violence could constitute war crimes, 
crimes against humanity or constitutive acts with respect to genocide. In its resolution 1820 
(2008), the Council recognized that widespread and systematic sexual violence was a security 
problem that should be monitored by the Council,’19 especially as it can be ‘as destructive to 
communities as more conventional weapons.’20 
 
In the context of SCR 1325, the UNSG’s report did give some attention to promoting women as agents 
of change in the most critical areas of peace and security.21 In the context of SCR 1820, the identification 
of mass rape and sexual violence as mass atrocity crimes is, of course, supported. But, the UNSG’s 
conclusion that systematic sexual violence can destroy communities as much as conventional weapons 
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can, does not expressly mandate the responsibility of states to protect populations from acts of sexual 
violence under RtoP.22 Therefore, while it is true that some forms of sexual violence can be construed as a 
mass atrocity crime, and that states have a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities, a 
direct link is not made that states thereby have a special responsibility to protect populations from sexual 
violence. 
The UNSG’s 2010 report on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect focused attention 
on detecting sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) at an early stage,23 while the UNSG’s 2011 report 
on The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect noted that 
SGBV is aggravated by a weak judicial system and security sector and that consultations with women’s 
groups are necessary to prevent mass atrocity crimes.24 
Despite these positive developments, official discourse on gender and RtoP still focuses on women as a 
vulnerable population- as victims of violence. More attention needs to be paid to women as agents of 
change and how their contributions in this capacity, at an early stage, can be influential in detecting 
patterns of conflict, in mediating conflict at early stages, and in contributing to greater protection and 
prevention activities under RtoP. 
Even in looking at some of the SCRs where RtoP has been invoked, attention to women’s role as 
effective agents of change is limited. SCR 1973 (2011) authorizing the no-fly zone over Libya called for 
Member States ‘to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas,’25 
although SCR 2009 (2011), which established the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), did make 
reference to the promotion of women’s full participation after conflict.26 Similarly, the recent SCR 2040, 
extending UNSMIL’s mandate for six months, made reference to the ‘empowerment and political 
participation of women’ as part of UNSMIL’s mandate.27 
Moreover, in SCR 1975 (2011) regarding the immediate end of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the Security 
Council called for the ‘immediate end to the violence against civilians, including women, children and 
[i]nternally displaced persons,’28 and emphasized the support to United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to ‘use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of violence.’29 In SCR 2000 (2011) where the Council extend UNOCI’s mandate, more emphasis 
was placed on protection strategies that reflect the needs of the vulnerable groups on the ground and that 
aim to eliminate gender-based violence.30 Also, enacting protection strategies that include sexual and 
gender-based violence and violations against women and children, became part of the mandate as did 
supporting the government in combating sexual and gender-based violence including appointing ‘Women 
Protection Advisers and to ensure gender expertise and training, as appropriate and from within existing 
resources.’31 
While attention must continue to be paid to strategies for protecting women from sexual violence in 
the broader context of protection of civilians and vulnerable groups, like women and children, more 
attention is needed on the contributions women can make in their role as mediators of conflict, 
peacekeepers, and effective participants in protection, prevention and post-conflict rebuilding. 
More analysis and discussion is also needed from the international community’s stakeholders on how 
conflict-related sexual violence could amount to mass atrocities and how the responsibility to protect 
applies in such situations. As noted in the SRSG’s recent report, ‘[c]onflict-related sexual violence refers to 
incidents or patterns (for the purposes of listing in accordance with Security Council resolution 1960 
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(2010)) of sexual violence, that is rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men or children.’32 
The responsibility still remains with the international community to protect populations from widespread 
violence; examples include the situation in Libya where reports show that men have been raped in 
detention facilities, and women have been abducted and subsequently raped;33 also in Syria where reports 
indicate male detainees have been subjected to sexual torture and forced to witness the rape of other 
boys;34 and in the DRC where retaliatory rapes by armed groups and sexual violence are used as a way to 
exercising control over the population.35 
More attention should be placed on linking the responsibility of states to protect populations from 
conflict-related violence, which can amount to mass atrocity crimes. Protection is most effective when it is 
“gender-responsive and community-based.”36 Therefore, more attention among the international community of 
policymakers and academics must be paid to women’s experiences and skills as agents of change to ensure 
that RtoP operates effectively and legitimately to protect populations. 
 
 
How Women be More Effective Participants in the RtoP Framework 
   
The international community cannot effectively promote international peace and security, nor 
successfully protect civilian populations from the four crimes within the mandate of RtoP, without taking 
into account the gender specific needs of the population, particularly the skills and perspectives of 
women.  In preparation for its General Discussion on the Protection of Women’s Human Rights in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Contexts, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
issued a Concept Note noting that ‘women are not always passive-by-standers or victims… in the diverse 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, women have historically and continue to express their agency as 
combatants, as part of organized civil society  as human right defenders, as members of resistance 
movements and as active agents in both formal and informal peacebuilding processes.’37 
Inclusion of a gender perspective at an early stage can make significant headway in the protection of 
women against violence, but also to encourage their participation as agents of change in protection, 
prevention, and promotion of their rights in post-conflict rebuilding or reintegration, in the following 
ways:38  
 
 Women as mediators can be key players in conflict resolution and protection of populations from 
violence as part of a robust commitment to the women, peace and security agenda.  
 
 More attention to women's agency in all phases of conflict-related violence can help highlight 
instances of abuse, heal those who have been violated, and contribute to a greater understanding 
of the causes of and solutions to such violence.  
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 A commitment to incorporate women into policy can promote a stronger, more reliable, and 
more transparent security sector as well as contribute to more effective conflict prevention and 
peace policy.  
 
 Promoting women’s participation as peacekeepers and peacebuilders can ensure that gender 
expertise is available to help train other personnel and community leaders about gender equality 
and women’s participation.  
 
Overall, incorporating a gender perspective in the RtoP framework helps ensure the full protection of all 
populations from mass atrocities, which can happen most effectively when we do our best to highlight 
gender perspectives on atrocity crime violence and ensure gender equality in all measures to prevent, 
respond to and rebuild from such violence.39  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
References to women’s potential and actual agency in the prevention of mass atrocity crimes and the 
protection of civilians could be highlighted more in future reports by the UNSG. In carrying out the RtoP 
pillars, and most especially the challenging third pillar, the international community can and must do 
more to integrate women’s perspectives and voices into all policy discussions focused on prevention and 
protective response. 
To help ensure this integration, we propose the following concrete steps:  
 
i. In discussing early warning and assessment in his 2009 report, the UNSG noted that women’s 
organizations can be among the actors who can provide ‘timely and sensitive information on evolving 
conflict situations.’40 Women’s organizations, including many most civil society organizations, can 
corroborate information about situations on the ground or can be ‘the first to sound the alarm in the 
early stages of atrocity crimes.’41 Similarly, more engagement and collaboration with civil society, in 
particular women’s groups, at an early stage can also provide a link to a wider range of actors who can 
give input on the necessary skills and experiences of women that need to be addressed, and identify 
qualified candidates with gender-expertise who would be able to make significant contributions to 
policy discussions on prevention and protection. 
 
ii. Likewise, in the 2009 report, the UNSG called upon UN departments and agencies to integrate RtoP 
into ‘their ongoing activities and reporting procedures to the extent that their mandates permit’ in 
hopes of anticipating situations of violence and ‘encouraging more regular dialogue, information-
sharing and common analysis among disparate programmes and agencies.’42 Similarly, in his 2010 
report, the SG identified the information sharing among the various agencies as a gap, and noted that 
to fully prevent against mass atrocity crimes, we need ‘full utilization of the information gathered and 
the insight gained by existing UN entities, not the relabeling or duplication of their work.’43 Along 
those lines, communication should be strengthened between UN agencies regarding how instances of 
conflict-related sexual violence can rise to the level of mass atrocity crimes where RtoP would apply; 
how the international community can invoke gender-inclusive protection strategies; and how women 
can be significant voices of change in conflict and post-conflict. Communication and consultations 
amongst the relevant agencies on these issues could go a long way to building bridges between the 
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gender and RtoP communities, and can also help ensure that these and other sectors of the UN system 
are more fully engaged in all aspects of violence prevention. 
 
iii. In the 2011 report, the UNSG stressed the need for more collaboration with regional and subregional 
organizations.44 Regional organizations can do more to encourage women’s direct participation in a 
wide range of peace and security initiatives and can also highlight the roles that women can play as 
mediators to prevent mass atrocities. In addition, states can appoint more women to decision-making 
positions as mediators and negotiators and help to document women’s achievements in the conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding fields. Such attention to women’s participation in peace processes can 
promote a culture of women as effective participants in the prevention of atrocity crimes within the 
RtoP framework. 
 
iv. In the recent “Monthly Action Points” published by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and 
Security (NGOWG), the NGOWG noted that, given the current challenges of women in Syria, Libya, 
and Yemen, the Security Council should be briefed on ‘how the Council could build on previous good 
practice, and address the remaining gaps in implementation of Women, Peace and Security 
obligations, notably relating to women’s empowerment and participation in peace talks.’45 The 
NGOWG also encouraged that ‘country reports and mandate renewals evaluate the levels of 
protection and promotion of women’s human rights.’46 In the context of mass atrocity crimes, civil 
society should evaluate lessons learned from the operation of RtoP, assess and supplement previous 
reports and mandates issued to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes, and develop strategies that 
build upon already-enacted measures to promote women’s participation in prevention and protection 
processes. 
 
v. Illicit arms are one of the most pervasive threats to a dependable security sector, and diverted arms 
contribute to diverse crimes of violence on populations, including rape and other mass atrocities. Illicit 
weapons also contribute to domestic violence, trafficking and many other forms of lawlessness. Both 
RtoP and gender advocates are encouraged to consult regularly with UN agencies and civil society 
organizations focused on disarmament and security sector reform to help ensure that the negative 
impacts of illicit arms flows are recognized, highlighted and addressed long before these impacts rise to 
the level of mass atrocities. 
 
vi. Finally, with the GA debate on the “third pillar” fast approaching, we should do everything possible to 
use this opportunity to explore and highlight the links between gender and RtoP. Nonetheless, 
attention to these complementary concerns should continue long after the debate. In ‘The Role of 
Women in the RtoP Framework’, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
(ICRtoP) recommends the creation of an ongoing working group within the UN (separate from our 
own initiative in this area) to ‘better integrate a gendered approach to the norm.’47 Such a working 
group, especially if it is formed by the Secretary-General, or with significant involvement from the 
“Friends” of both SCR 1325 and RtoP, can play a major role in highlighting sector linkages and 
guiding future policy.48  
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As the RtoP framework evolves, it is more and more apparent that the international community should 
endorse discrete, tangible responsibilities not only to protect civilians from the commission of mass 
atrocity crimes, but, most importantly, to prevent such crimes from occurring in the first place. In order to 
do so effectively, RtoP policies need to consider women's contributions both as survivors of mass violence, 
and as agents of stability and change at all levels of engagement.49 The RtoP framework can be more 
effectively implemented with the full integration of women whose multifaceted roles can range from being 
leaders of conflict prevention and resolution activities to providing assistance to survivors of conflict and 
ex-combatants.50  
 
 
Conclusion 
  
 
The broad purposes of the “background concept note” are to highlight the gender links in the RtoP 
framework, promote women’s participation in all preventive and reactive capacities, and ensure that the 
RtoP framework is more responsive to conflict-related sexual violence. The intent of this particular 
chapter is to stimulate discussion on how women’s integration can strengthen the broad RtoP framework, 
to provide some background on how gender issues have been addressed in the recent history of RtoP 
starting from 2009, and to share recommendations that can raise the visibility of these issue linkages 
within the policy community. With the GA debate coming up in summer 2012, this note can hopefully 
serve as background for states as they compose their statements and positions on ways to strengthen the 
RtoP “third pillar”. We urge all delegations and other stakeholders involved with RtoP to incorporate an 
awareness that effective protection of populations from mass atrocity crimes includes enacting policies 
that incorporate the skills and experiences of women in diverse circumstances, with particular concern for 
women in often neglected traditional and rural communities. 
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Sanctions, Trials and Peace: 
Promises and Pitfalls of the Responsibility to Protect’s Civilian Dimension 
 
CAROLINE FEHL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The RtoP, brainchild of UN diplomats, American scholars and Canadian politicians, is still a young 
international norm, yet it has already taken on a life of its own unforeseen by its intellectual parents. The 
most striking evolution within the concept has been the continuous shift in emphasis from military to 
non-military responses to humanitarian crises, both at the conceptual level and in the implementation of 
RtoP in recent crises. 
Conceptually, the “civilization” of RtoP started almost upon its inception, when the “International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS), rather than the “International Commission 
on Humanitarian Intervention” originally proposed by its Canadian sponsors, was convened in 2001. The 
name change was a political concession signalling that humanitarian intervention remained a highly 
controversial concept which needed to be reconciled with – rather than simply override – the principle of 
state sovereignty.387 In its final report, the Commission sought to achieve this reconciliation by 
conditioning sovereignty on a state’s fulfilment of its protective tasks, but also by striking a balance 
between military and civilian tools for implementing RtoP. The hard historical core of the concept – the 
“Responsibility to React” to humanitarian emergencies with military interventions – was cushioned with a 
call for civilian crisis responses and with the invention of pre- and post-crisis “sister responsibilities”: the 
“Responsibility to Prevent” and the “Responsibility to Rebuild”.388 Further discussions and refinements of 
the concept then followed the path laid out by the ICISS report in emphasizing civilian crisis 
management, as well as responsibilities other than crisis reaction, as part of the RtoP. Most notably, the 
UNSG’s Report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”, released in 2009, introduced a three-pillar 
structure that shifted attention to states’ responsibilities vis-à-vis their own populations (“pillar one”), to 
the non-confrontational supportive role of the international community with regard to this primary 
responsibility (“pillar two”) and to the importance of non-military crisis responses as part of the reactive 
“pillar three”.389 
The conceptual development toward a stronger civilian component of RtoP is not a case of mere 
academic quibbling, but reflects a real and growing scepticism vis-à-vis military interventions under the 
cloak of humanity among large parts of the international community, not only in the Global South.390 
This scepticism has largely inhibited humanitarian interventions in a long row of recent crises – with 
Libya perhaps the exception that proves the rule – and has driven states to look for alternative responses 
to mass atrocities, such as mediation, sanctions, or international criminal tribunals. 
While interest in the civilian dimension of the Responsibility to Protect has thus been growing at a 
conceptual and practical level, it is striking that this has thus far generated little in-depth analysis and 
debate, compared to the controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention. For instance, the ICISS 
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report singles out the Responsibility to Prevent as the most important element of RtoP, yet gives more 
than three times the space to the discussion of humanitarian intervention.391 
The sparse treatment of RtoP’s civilian aspects both in official documents and in the academic 
literature could be read as indicating, quite simply, that no discussion is needed because the civilian 
dimension is self-evident and unproblematic.392 In fact, some critics of humanitarian intervention claim 
that prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding and civilian crisis management have been added to the RtoP 
mix precisely because of their uncontroversial nature – as a strategy of “selling” intervention to the 
sceptics.393 While this may well have been a motivation, this chapter argues that the seemingly broad 
agreement about RtoP’s civilian dimension is in fact unjustified. Non-military strategies prominently 
advertised as part of the RtoP “toolbox” have many inherent problems and pitfalls that RtoP advocates 
have neglected for too long. A more critical discussion of these issues is therefore needed – if we are to 
take RtoP’s civilian elements seriously as more than a sales pitch. 
More specifically, the following analysis focuses on two civilian strategies which are prominently cited 
in the RtoP literature and have been widely used in recent state practice: economic and other forms of 
sanctions, and the prosecution of perpetrators in international criminal courts and tribunals. Both 
sanctions and trials are widely cited as promising alternatives to military intervention in a humanitarian 
crisis, for instance in the ICISS report: ‘by far the most controversial form of [..] intervention is military, 
and a great part of our report necessarily focuses on that. But we are also very much concerned with 
alternatives to military action, including all forms of preventive measures, and coercive measures – 
sanctions and criminal prosecutions – falling short of military intervention.’394 
In this quote, sanctions and trials are framed as early steps on an escalation ladder of coercive 
crisis responses that precede, and ideally render unnecessary, military intervention. This escalation 
logic is most clearly expressed with regard to sanctions, for instance in the argument that sanctions 
are an important tool of RtoP because “there remains a need [...] for a tool lying ‘between words and 
war’.”395 But also the criminal prosecution of perpetrators is often discussed under the heading of the 
“Responsibility to React”, based on the argument that “[t]he strongest direct legal weapon to employ 
against those initiating unlawful violence is to arrest, try, and if properly convicted, punish them in a 
competent criminal court”.396 
Yet, neither sanctions nor trials are thought to be limited to the crisis response stage. Efforts to 
prevent the escalation of crises, RtoP proponents argue, can rely on timely threats of sanctions,397 as 
well as on the deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions: ‘the threat to seek or apply international legal 
sanctions has [...] become a major new weapon in the international preventive armoury. [...] [T]he 
establishment of specialist tribunals to deal with war crimes committed in specific conflicts [...] will 
concentrate the minds of potential perpetrators of crimes against humanity on the risks they run of 
international retribution.’398 Lastly, the prosecution of major crimes is also seen as a key building block 
of RtoP’s “Responsibility to Rebuild”.399 
In summary, sanctions and trials are presented as true “multipurpose” instruments in the RtoP 
toolbox, which the international community can wield with great effect, both within its “pillar three” 
responsibility of crisis response and in pre- and post-conflict contexts. Yet, does this ideal picture 
match with the empirical reality? The following analysis casts doubt on this claim. 
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Sanctions and trials – lessons from research and practice 
 
Effectiveness and unintended consequences of sanctions 
 
The fact that sanctions are still accorded a prominent place in discussions on RtoP must surprise anyone 
familiar with decades of academic debate about the effects of various forms of sanctions. A first wave of 
research on the issue, conducted from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, focused on the question of 
whether and under what conditions economic sanctions such as trade embargoes could actually attain 
their – humanitarian or other – political aims.400 The findings were largely negative: while sanctions 
induced modest behavioural change in some cases, more often they remained without visible effects or 
even hardened the target’s opposition to outside pressure.401 As early as 1989, one analyst therefore drew 
the sobering conclusion: ‘the view that these measures are an ineffective tool of statecraft has become 
almost axiomatic’.402 
Their limited effectiveness was not even the weightiest argument advanced against sanctions, however. 
The comprehensive economic embargoes imposed on the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti and particularly Iraq 
in the early 1990s triggered a wave of new research and a heated political debate about the grave negative 
humanitarian impact of global sanctions regimes. The shocking realisation that international sanctions 
had caused the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children gave rise to calls for “targeted” or 
“smart” sanctions aimed more precisely at political elites.403 UN members heeded these calls by launching 
three reform processes in the late 1990s, the Interlaken Process on Targeted Financial Sanctions, the 
Bonn-Berlin Process on Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions, and the Stockholm 
Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. As a result of these and other discussions, 
comprehensive economic sanctions have disappeared from the arsenal of the UNSC, which has instead 
imposed a growing number of sector-specific trade embargoes, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, 
aviation and travel bans.404 
The notion that sanctions need to be “smart” has by now become a firm international consensus, 
which is also reflected in the RtoP literature.405 Yet, studies evaluating the success of smart sanctions 
imposed to date have yielded mixed results at best. On the upside, there is clear evidence that targeting 
sanctions better has dampened their negative humanitarian effects. The downside of this development, 
however, is that the political effectiveness of smart sanctions in making targets change their behaviour has 
been even more limited than that of the old comprehensive regimes.406 Arms embargoes, one of the most 
popular forms of targeted sanctions, receive particularly bad grades in this regard.407 
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In addition, even smart sanctions are not immune to the problem of unintended consequences. Even 
partial trade embargoes and aviation bans can affect the well-being of the general population, and the 
institutionalization of humanitarian safeguards and impact monitoring remains weak and patchy in 
contemporary sanctions regimes.408 Like comprehensive embargoes, blockades of individual economic 
sectors can also lead to the “criminalization” of the target society through smuggling and corruption. 
A particularly grave problem can result from the imposition of arms embargoes which are “impartial” 
on paper but effectively benefit the stronger side within an asymmetric conflict. The paradigmatic example 
was the UN arms embargo imposed on the Former Yugoslavia during the Bosnian War. Since the Serbs 
controlled the Former Yugoslav army and domestic arms industry and the Croats received clandestine 
arms shipments from friendly governments over the Adriatic Sea, the landlocked Bosnian Muslims were 
hit hardest by the officially neutral embargo – with well-known consequences.409 But also more recent 
arms embargoes imposed in the name of RtoP have been criticized for inadvertently skewing conflicts in 
favour of the stronger side. In the Darfur crisis, the UNSC imposed an arms embargo on all non-state 
actors in Darfur in an apparently impartial manner. Yet, since it did not cover the Sudanese government, 
the measure did not interfere with the government’s arms supply to the “non-state” Janjaweed militia and 
thus effectively disadvantaged the Darfuri rebels.410 Similarly, in the recent Libya crisis, the UN as well as 
the EU imposed arms embargoes on the whole country that were meant to hit both government and rebel 
forces. Yet, the idea that this measure could curtail the fighting after years of foreign arms supplies to 
Gaddafi, including billions of euros worth of arms shipments from EU members, was naive. Rather than 
stopping the violence, the embargo threatened to reinforce the crushing superiority of government troops 
over the rebels – and thus to undermine the goals of the military intervention conducted at the same time 
in the name of the RtoP.411 
As these examples illustrate, arms embargoes are particularly problematic when imposed after the full-
scale escalation of a conflict. Arguably, a much more stringent European arms export control policy 
against the Libyan dictator at an earlier stage could have reduced his capacity to terrorize the civilian 
population. Yet, as one commentator points out with resignation, ‘there is not a single case where an arms 
embargo was introduced sufficiently early to prevent the aggressor faction from actually initiating civil war’ 
[author’s emphasis].412 
 
Trials as an instrument of peace  
 
The treatment of international criminal courts and tribunals as instruments of the RtoP rests on the 
assumption that the criminal prosecution of perpetrators can help to prevent, end, and alleviate the 
consequences of mass atrocities. At first sight, this proposition receives considerable support in the 
specialized literature on international criminal justice. The argument that prosecutions deter potential 
future perpetrators – and thus prevent the occurrence of atrocities – can be traced back to the very origins 
of the international criminal justice system, to the Nuremberg tribunals following World War II. It has 
since accompanied every step in the expansion of the system, from the establishment of the Yugoslavia 
tribunal to ongoing investigations of the ICC. In addition to this long-term deterrent effect, international 
criminal justice has also been credited with serving a specific deterrent function: by dissuading perpetrators 
from committing further crimes, by undermining their domestic power bases and by forcing them into 
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negotiations, it is claimed, trials can serve as a peace-making instrument at the height of a crisis.413 Lastly, 
scholars argue that the legal Aufarbeitung of major crimes can help consolidate peace and advance 
reconciliation by teaching democracy and the rule of law to post-conflict societies.414 
While these widespread arguments are in line with the presentation of international criminal justice as 
an instrument of peace, they are, unfortunately, all highly contested. The long-term deterrent effect of 
international tribunals is notoriously difficult to measure and to insulate from other factors.415 More 
fundamentally, critics attack the theoretical rationale of the argument from different directions. While 
some doubt that génocidaires are primarily guided by rational cost-benefit calculations, others point out 
that the high selectivity of international criminal justice – due to its limitation to the gravest crimes and to 
the political difficulty of enforcing arrest warrants – drastically reduces incentives for rational individuals 
to eschew the commission of atrocities.416 
Regarding the usefulness of criminal prosecutions as part of a post-conflict peace-building strategy, 
some critics argue that trials unfold the greatest “demonstration effect” precisely on those audiences which 
are already convinced of the value of democracy and the rule of law.417 Furthermore, criminal prosecution 
is only one among many alternative forms of transitional justice – ranging from trials to truth 
commissions and traditional rituals of healing and forgiveness – that are being discussed as valuable 
pathways toward post-conflict reconciliation.418 The literature gives little reason to conclude that 
international trials are an inherently superior stabilization tool after major conflicts. 
While preventive and post-conflict uses of criminal prosecutions in the service of the RtoP are thus 
debatable, by far the gravest criticism is directed against the use of trials in ongoing conflicts, that is, as 
part of the international community’s “pillar three” responsibility to respond to humanitarian crises. To 
perpetrators who have already committed crimes and who are still in a position of power, many critics 
argue, the threat of prosecution provides no incentive to lay down arms, but rather a strong incentive to 
defend their power with all available means. Criminal prosecutions in ongoing conflicts can thus escalate 
and extend, rather than de-escalate and shorten conflicts.419 This infamous “peace versus justice” dilemma 
is not bound to manifest itself in every conflict investigated by international courts. Yet, there are clear 
indications that ICC investigations have complicated efforts to broker peace deals and aid the civilian 
population in the Ugandan and Darfuri civil wars. 
In Uganda, the ICC got involved following a self-referral: The Ugandan government asked the court to 
investigate the situation in Northern Uganda, where it was fighting a consumptive civil war against the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This self-referral, observers believe, was primarily intended to deflect 
international criticism of the negative humanitarian impacts of a recent government offensive against the 
rebels and of abuses committed by government soldiers. In addition, it allowed President Yoweri 
Museveni to exempt the LRA leadership from an amnesty law that had been passed earlier against his 
opposition to facilitate peace talks. Despite the ICC’s investigations and issuing of arrest warrants against 
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five LRA commanders – heavily criticized by local peace activists –, talks between the conflict parties 
continued, and a peace agreement was drawn up by 2008. However, the LRA leadership, which had 
demanded guarantees against the enforcement of the ICC warrants throughout the negotiations, 
ultimately never signed it.420 
In Darfur, ICC investigations followed a referral by the UNSC and have focused primarily on 
government officials. Ignoring warnings by analysts that “ending criminal violence in Darfur will require 
some compromises with international criminal justice”,421 the court issued an arrest warrant against 
Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009. At the time, commentators feared that this step could derail 
not only peace talks in Darfur itself, but also the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and 
South Sudan.422 While these extreme consequences have not materialized, this might in part be due to the 
fact – evident to Bashir – that neither the West nor African states have an appetite for actually enforcing 
the warrant. In any case, despite partial peace deals between the government and some Darfuri rebel 
factions, both sides continue to resort to violence. 
A more immediate consequence of the warrant was the Sudanese government’s decision to expel 
foreign aid organizations responsible for about 50% of the aid to civilians in the region on the grounds 
that they could collaborate with the ICC.423 Most were readmitted months later, yet it was civilians in 
Darfur who suffered the consequences of this power game between Bashir and the international 
community. 
 
The symbolic politics of sanctions and trials 
 
Given the evident problems with using sanctions and trials as instruments of peace, why do they still 
occupy such a prominent place in discussions of RtoP’s civilian dimension, and why do they tend to be 
used precisely when the risk of unintended consequences is highest, as an acute response strategy at the 
height of crisis? The political science literature on sanctions and trials offers thought-provoking answers to 
both of these puzzles, too. 
As early as 1967, Johan Galtung pointed out the “expressive function” of sanctions: 
 
‘If economic sanctions do not make a receiving nation comply, they may nevertheless serve functions 
that are useful in the eyes of the sending nation(s). […] There is the value of at least doing something, 
of having the illusion of being instrumental, of being busy in time of crisis. When military action is 
impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, 
then something has to be done to express morality [emphasis in original] [...]. If the sanctions do not serve 
instrumental purposes, they can at least have expressive functions.’424 
 
According to this argument, shared and elaborated also by other theorists, (Western) governments use 
sanctions as a less costly substitute for military intervention, not because they expect them to affect the 
target’s behaviour, but to demonstrate resolve to a domestic public concerned about violence against 
innocent civilians abroad.425 This dynamic also explains why sanctions that could work better at an early 
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stage as crisis prevention tools – such as arms embargoes – are much more likely to be used at the height of 
crisis, when public pressure to “do something” is highest. 
An example that well illustrates the use of sanctions as a symbolic substitute for military intervention is 
the stance of the German government in the Libyan crisis. Torn between allied pressure to contribute to 
crisis management and the (perceived) opposition of the German population to German involvement in 
another military campaign, the government did not participate in the Western military campaign against 
Gaddafi, but became a leading proponent of UN and EU sanctions against Libya, also insisting on the 
strict enforcement of the arms embargo when its allies had long begun to doubt the wisdom of this 
measure.426 In a parliamentary debate, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle justified this policy by arguing 
that “the alternative to a military intervention is not to do nothing, not to stand by and watch, but to 
increase the pressure, to impose and tighten sanctions”.427 
In a similar way, the search for symbolic alternatives to military intervention also appears to have 
contributed to the creation and increasingly frequent resort to mechanisms of international criminal 
justice. According to historians, Western policy-makers’ desire to “do something” about the Bosnian 
tragedy in response to massive domestic public and media pressure, while at the same time avoiding a 
risky military campaign, played a central role in the creation of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The creation of the permanent ICC is often interpreted as a more long-term response 
to the same kind of domestic pressure.428 Even the leader of the US delegation to the Rome Conference 
on the ICC Statute paid tribute to this factor: 
 
‘[I]t is simply no longer tenable for the democratically elected political leaders or among the publics 
they serve to tolerate impunity for the commission of such international crimes. [...] There are many 
different mechanisms that the international community is exploring and using to respond to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. [...] The permanent International Criminal Court 
is needed at one extreme of this spectrum of mechanisms.’429 
 
The apprehension that ICC investigations could serve as symbolic substitutes for military interventions 
has been widely discussed – and has been confirmed, in the eyes of many observers, by the Security 
Council’s decision to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC without taking any more robust action.430 
That international criminal justice has thus been instrumentalized as a substitute for military 
intervention is not only the fault of RtoP advocates, however. As Leslie Vinjamuri has convincingly 
showed, proponents of international criminal justice themselves – from justice NGOs to the prosecutors 
and presidents of international courts themselves – have increasingly emphasized the peacemaking effect 
of prosecutions, rather than principled demands for “doing justice”, to broaden international support for 
these measures. While the peace argument thus serves a marketing strategy for justice advocates, it also 
suits activists interested in “selling” the RtoP concept to intervention-sceptic audiences. We can thus 
speak of a mutual instrumentalization of RtoP and justice advocates. 
While there are thus good reasons to assume that sanctions and trials can be – and are – used as a 
symbolic substitute for military intervention, they may serve quite a different symbolic function in other 
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cases: that of legitimating military intervention. As the Ugandan example shows, a government may be 
interested in ICC investigations and prosecutions of a rebel group to delegitimize its opponents and to 
claim a higher moral justification for its violent fight against that group: after all, it is merely “enforcing 
the will of the international community”.431 But also for outside actors preparing to intervene in a conflict 
under the auspices of the RtoP, sanctions and trials serve an important legitimating function: their use 
before the authorization of armed force demonstrates to intervention sceptics that all other means have 
been exhausted. The escalation logic cited at the outset of this article can thus be re-read as a symbolic 
strategy of war legitimization. Sanctions and trials are irreplaceable instruments in the civilian RtoP 
toolbox not so much because of their superior effectiveness, but because they are the only truly coercive 
measures short of war. Viewed in this way, the “need for something between words and violence” flows 
above all from the need to demonstrate the ultimate necessity of violence. 
Whether sanctions or trials are used as symbolic substitutes for military intervention or as symbolic 
steps toward legitimating violence – the important thing to realize is that none of these functions have 
anything to do with the purported beneficial effects they can achieve on the ground, in the target country. 
If (ab)used in this way, sanctions and trials do not constitute a truly free-standing civilian component of 
the RtoP, but merely serve secondary functions in relation to the core of the concept, military 
humanitarian intervention. The critics’ argument that the civilian aspects of RtoP are not to be taken 
seriously would then be justified. 
Yet, do we need to draw such a radical conclusion? Does the realization that sanctions and trials are 
more likely to impress Western publics than alter the strategic calculations of their targets suggest that we 
should scrap these instruments altogether from the RtoP toolbox? Not necessarily. One important 
argument in their favour is that in the long run and indirectly, the symbolic effects of sanctions and trials 
may still contribute to altering the international and domestic social environment in which atrocities are 
being committed, and thus contribute – even if in very small steps – to reducing global violence. By 
communicating disapproval with a particular kind of action, both measures confirm the validity of the 
norms that the behaviour is violating, and serve to brand the violator as an outcast of the international 
community. The outcasts’ desire to regain their international as well as domestic social standing, to 
confirm their identity as members of a larger moral and legal community, can constitute a powerful, albeit 
slow-working, force for change. Constructivist International Relations theorists have discussed this 
mechanism with regard to the domestic enforcement of international human rights norms, in which 
“shaming” and other forms of social pressure have been found to play a powerful role.432 Furthermore, 
even if the target itself remains unimpressed, sanctioning atrocities in some form can reinforce the 
strength of human rights norms at the global level and thus contribute to decreasing violence in an even 
more indirect and long-term fashion. In a somewhat different language, political theorists relate to very 
similar ideas when they refer to the “expressive function” of punishment, whereby a society communicates 
and reaffirms its core norms both to the perpetrator and to all of its members.433 
These beneficial symbolic effects may seem quite intangible, compared to the high expectations that 
are placed on the immediate, coercive peacemaking effect of sanctions and trials. But, as David Baldwin 
argues with regard to sanctions, their use as symbolic signalling devices is a perfectly valuable policy tool, 
the usefulness of which must be evaluated not only on its own terms, but in comparison with available 
alternatives. ‘Even when the expectation of success is very low, the use of sanctions is justified if there is 
no policy alternative with a higher expectation of success.’434 In light of the preceding discussion, two 
additional conditions should be attached: firstly, that the use of sanctions or trials is unlikely to have 
unintended negative consequences for the civilian population, and secondly, that decision-makers resist 
the temptation to present these symbolic signalling strategies as coercive tools functionally equivalent to 
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military intervention – in order to deflect public pressure for action. In practice, this is admittedly a very 
fine line to walk. 
 
 
In lieu of a conclusion: Lessons for analysts and policy-makers 
 
It is high time that RtoP advocates engage more honestly with critical findings about the effectiveness of 
sanctions and trials as peacemaking instruments, which have long been debated in specialized academic 
communities but have remained insulated from an RtoP debate focused on humanitarian intervention. 
Above all, this means scaling down expectations as to what sanctions and trials can do in the service of the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
In particular, there are grave reasons to doubt that either of them can be used with immediate effect as 
a tool of crisis management, under the international community’s “third pillar” responsibility to react to 
manifest violations of the RtoP principle. Neither sanctions nor trials are likely to function effectively as a 
“coercive tactic” that manipulates violent actors’ strategic incentive. Both measures can have unintended 
negative consequences for peace, and both are routinely used as convenient symbolic substitutes for 
military intervention in situations when public pressure to act is high, yet when intervention is considered 
too costly. 
The theoretical case for both strategies is somewhat better with regard to preventive and post-conflict 
uses: a timely arms embargo, imposed at the earliest sign of systematic oppression, may help to prevent the 
escalation of a crisis; the growing activism of the ICC – provided its sentences are enforced – may yet 
strengthen the long-term deterrent effect of international criminal justice. The greatest promise that both 
strategies hold for the realization of the RtoP, however, lies in openly recognizing their primarily symbolic 
effect – not as alibis for eschewing military action, but as normative appeals that strengthen the RtoP in 
the long run, by “shaming” and isolating perpetrators and by reaffirming the international community’s 
commitment to human rights. The benefits to be gained are intangible and small, but much more realistic 
than the proposal to deescalate an ongoing crisis with sanctions and trials. 
More concretely, what does this mean with regard to the use of sanctions and trials in a given 
humanitarian crisis? Given the small chances for effecting a direct behavioural change, the most 
important rationale underlying any decision on sanctions or criminal prosecutions must be to anticipate, 
avoid, and monitor unintended impacts on the population to be protected – economic hardships as well 
as undesirable manipulations of conflict dynamics through arms embargoes and criminal prosecutions. 
With regard to economic sanctions, proposals for instituting better impact monitoring mechanisms have 
long been on the table.435 In the case of arms embargoes, their effect on conflict dynamics is very hard to 
estimate in advance. These measures should therefore be used extremely selectively in the context of 
ongoing conflicts, their impact on power relations between conflict parties should be closely monitored. 
Criminal prosecutions as a tool of crisis management have an additional disadvantage, compared to 
sanctions. While sanctions can be lifted if they are found to have a negative impact on the conflict, 
indictments cannot. There is thus a good case for preferring sanctions over trials as symbolic tools of 
condemnation in the context of an ongoing conflict. The pursuit of justice should be delayed until after 
the end of a conflict if there is any risk that it could undermine peace negotiations. Self-referrals, which 
are particularly prone to political instrumentalization by the conflict parties, should be avoided altogether. 
Importantly, this is not the same as saying that justice has no value of its own. To the contrary, both 
RtoP and international criminal justice advocates should recognize that peace and justice are independent 
pursuits which are often in conflict, at least within short time horizons, and require careful balancing. A 
deferral of criminal investigations may be regrettable in a “purist” view of criminal justice. Yet, it is not 
irreconcilable with retributivist ethics – and does not undermine the long-term deterrent, norm-teaching 
and post-conflict reconciliation goals of prosecuting mass atrocities. 
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These chapters are a response and contribution to the challenges of the third pillar of 
the Responsibility to Protect
responsibility to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity in those instances where a state is 
unable or unwilling to protect its own population. As RtoP moves further away from 
discussions on norms towards operationalization, and following the concerns raised by 
the intervention in Libya
capacities needed for a timely and decisive response under pillar three.
contribution to this end. 
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